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BEFORE ROLLING BLACKOUTS BEGIN: 
BRIEFING BOARDS ON CYBER ATTACKS THAT TARGET 
AND DEGRADE THE GRID 
“[P]erfect protection [of the grid] is . . . not possible. 
There will be a successful attack at some point.”1 
 
“The Electric Power grid makes an attractive target 
because it is the foundational critical infrastructure that 
underlies all others. A successful attack on the power grid 
causing a wide-area long-term outage would have 
significant national security . . . consequences.”2 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Blackouts, even the briefest, shock, surprise, and confuse. They 
imprint their images on people’s memories. Most residents in the 
Northeast United States and Ontario, Canada, remember where 
they were, what they were doing, and what it took to get their 
bearings during the great blackout of August 2003. When blackouts 
strike (they do not just “happen,” they appear to “strike”), it is as if 
an anthill has been kicked or dug up; the orderly populace turns 
into a frenzy of “what’s happening, what’s going on?” The 
disruption does not spread—its reach is immediate and pervasive; it 
wraps a new universe around every inhabitant under the blackout.3 
Individuals struggle to orient themselves to having no power and to 
trying to figure out how long an outage they should prepare to 
endure. Blackouts, lasting minutes into hours, change lives and 
 
 3.  A memorable description of a wartime blackout experience appeared in 
The New Yorker in 1942: 
   We chose the top of a Fifth Avenue bus for the blackout. . . . [A]s 
we got aboard the conductor said to the driver, “Let’s try to make the 
Pierre,” . . . . The lights in the store windows were already out as we 
proceeded up the Avenue . . . . There was little traffic and the bus 
moved right along. It became obvious that we would overshoot the 
Pierre when we got to the Plaza . . . . People were sitting all around the 
fountain and Sherman looked larger than usual in the moonlight. . . . 
The lights in the buildings, in the Park, and on the street corners went 
out and about thirty seconds later the traffic lights did too. . . . This left 
only the red beacon on the top of the R.C.A. Building, and the 
moon. . . . The silence was the big surprise of the blackout, we thought, 
the darkness having been discounted. 
Talk of the Town: Lights Out, NEW YORKER, May 9, 1942, at 12. 
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take lives.4 Consider the following recent widespread outages and 
their effects on customers: 
 In August 2003, approximately fifty million commercial and 
residential electric customers went without power for days in 
the Northeastern United States and Canada;5 the outage 
started when “several key transmission lines in northern Ohio 
tripped due to contact with trees” and “initiated a cascading 
failure of 508 generating units at 265 power plants across eight 
states and a Canadian province”;6 
 
 4.  That blackouts “take lives” is not an exaggeration, and it happens 
because other critical infrastructure tend not to plan with sufficient imagination 
or seriousness for worst-case consequences of the causes and durations of 
blackouts. As recently observed during the blackouts caused by Hurricanes Katrina 
and Sandy, blackouts not only “take lives” but force doctors to choose who will 
receive life-saving electricity from backup power units, and who will be denied it 
and, in essence, dispatched to die—issues that will arise in blackouts following 
cyber attacks that disrupt the grid: 
   When the floodwaters rose around New Orleans hospitals after 
Hurricane Katrina in 2005, doctors wondered whom to rescue first. 
Sick babies? Critically ill adults? The elderly?  
   More than seven years later, as Hurricane Sandy hit New York City, 
Bellevue Hospital’s basement filled with millions of gallons of 
floodwater from the East River. The physician heading the intensive 
care unit was told that most backup power was likely to fail. She would 
have six power outlets. Which of her 50 patients should get one? 
 . . . . 
   At Memorial Medical Center in New Orleans, after the levees failed, 
doctors chose to rescue babies, pregnant women and critically ill adults 
first, and they designated certain elderly and very sick patients to go 
last. The heat rose and the power failed. Roughly 20 of the remaining 
patients were medicated with morphine or a powerful sedative, or 
both, before they died. Doctors told me they hastened their deaths in 
desperation. 
Sheri Fink, Shelter From the Storms, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2013, at A27, available at 2013 
WLNR 27044887.  
 5.  Brian Wingfield, Power-Grid Cyber Attack Seen Leaving Millions in Dark 
for Months, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 1, 2012, 11:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com 
/news/2012-02-01/cyber-attack-on-u-s-power-grid-seen-leaving-millions-in-dark-for 
-months.html.  
 6.  GREGORY C. WILSHUSEN & DAVID C. TRIMBLE, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, GAO-12-507T, CYBERSECURITY: CHALLENGES IN SECURING THE MODERNIZED 
ELECTRICITY GRID 11 (2012); see also U.S.-CAN. POWER SYS. OUTAGE TASK FORCE, 
FINAL REPORT ON THE AUGUST 14, 2003 BLACKOUT IN THE UNITED STATES AND 
CANADA: CAUSES AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2004), available at http://energy.gov 
/sites/prod/files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/BlackoutFinal-Web.pdf. 
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 In late October 2012, 8,661,527 customers in New York, New 
Jersey, and Connecticut experienced outages in the weeks 
after arrival of the Hurricane Sandy-Nor’easter7 and its 
accompanying storm surge of seawater;8 
 In late July 2012, 680 million customers went without power 
across Northern India when “India’s rickety power grid” failed 
“for the second time in two days.”9 
Such sustained blackouts expose and fragment our 
assumptions of normalcy and the dependable availability of reliable 
electricity. If voltage or frequency become unstable, or if spikes and 
drops reoccur, then large equipment and small devices short-out; 
 
 7.  OFFICE OF ELEC. DELIVERY & ENERGY RELIABILITY, U.S. DEP’T 
OF ENERGY, HURRICANE SANDY-NOR’EASTER SITUATION REPORT #13, at 1 (2012), 
available at http://www.oe.netl.doe.gov/docs/SitRep13_Sandy-Nor’easter_120312 
_300PM.pdf. 
 8.  James Barron, Storm Barrels Through Region, Leaving Destructive Path, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 30, 2012), 2012 WLNR 22912767. 
 9.  Amy Kazmin, Power Restored Across Northern India, FIN. TIMES (London), 
Aug. 1, 2012, at 1, available at LEXIS. The committee appointed by the 
government of India to investigate the causes of the outage found “no evidence of 
any cyber attack.” REPORT OF THE ENQUIRY COMMITTEE ON GRID DISTURBANCE IN 
NORTHERN REGION ON 30TH JULY 2012 AND IN NORTHERN, EASTERN & NORTH-EASTERN 
REGION ON 31ST JULY 2012, at vi (2012) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE ENQUIRY 
COMMITTEE], available at http://www.powermin.nic.in/pdf/GRID_ENQ_REP_16 
_8_12.pdf. 
Instead, the committee found that once loads and frequencies went out of 
balance, the operators could not bring the system back into balanced stability 
before the grid collapsed. For example, one of the contributing causes to the first 
day blackout (on July 30, 2012) was that 
after [Northern Region] got separated from [Western Region] due to 
tripping of 400 kV Bina-Gwalior line, the [Northern Region] loads 
were met through [Western Region-Eastern Region-Northern Region] 
route, which caused power swing in the system. Since the center of swing was 
in the [Northern Region-Eastern Region] interface, the corresponding tie lines 
tripped, isolating the [Northern Regio] system from the rest of the NEW grid 
system. The [Northern Region] grid system collapsed due to under 
frequency and further power swing within the region. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Apparently, India’s grid is so susceptible to peak usage overloads that when 
its most famous cricket player, Sachin Tendulkar, walks out to bat for India, it is 
reported that “[p]erhaps 400m watch on television, risking power surges to India’s 
jerry-rigged grid, which end abruptly the moment Mr. Tendulkar gets out, as 
millions switch off.” Banyan: The Meaning of Sachin, ECONOMIST, Oct. 19, 2013, 
at 48, available at 2013 WLNR 26138887. 
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expensive motherboards and processors go from being expensive 
tools to worthless debris. But limited duration blackouts have one 
still-point around which all expectations gravitate: the North 
American Bulk Power System (BPS) tends toward order, not 
chaos.10 Customers tend to assume that the owners and operators of 
BPS companies will manage the crisis, inform customers of the 
cause and schedule for restoration of power, and restore power. 
Customers also tend to assume that once power is restored 
everything will go back to normal—reliable, full supply of power 
with no destructive spikes or drops, and no resumption of the 
hours or days experiencing the “dark ages.” 
What will the impact be, however, if instead of “back to 
normal,” the populace discovers that some locations will remain 
blacked out not for days or weeks, but for months and possibly 
years? What if electricity service in a region existed only in widely 
separated “islands”? What if stabilizing and maintaining even those 
“islands of electricity” required scheduled “rolling outages” and 
rationing of electricity to the highest-priority customers (hospitals, 
first responders, telecommunications providers, etc.)? What if such 
prolonged, degraded, and unreliable supplies of electricity became 
an industry-wide “New Normal”? And what if the cause was not a 
one-off incident—a hurricane, earthquake,11 storm-surge, or solar 
flare? What if instead the cause became identified only over weeks 
and months to be coordinated kinetic12 cyber attacks? And what if 
these cyber attacks amounted to an industry-defined Severe Event, 
namely one so damaging that afterwards the electricity services 
 
 10.  The apparent tendency toward order is an illusion, created by the 
moment-to-moment monitoring and adjustments of load balances and other 
factors that enable the large, interconnected BPS to remain stable instead of 
having its interconnectedness turn into a chaos of cascading blackouts. 
 11.  In fact, as anyone who has lived through a major earthquake knows, 
strong earthquakes are never “one-off” events. There are aftershocks, some large 
enough to qualify as significant quakes by themselves, and the after-shocks often 
cause substantial, additional damage to structures and to the psyches and nerves of 
inhabitants who experience the tremors of each after-shock. 
 12.  A “kinetic attack” is defined by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) as 
“one using weapons that rely on energy—blast, heat, and fragmentation, for 
example—to cause their damage. A non-kinetic attack might involve electronically 
disabling an enemy’s computers and communication equipment.” John Paradis, 
Strategic Command Missions Rely on Space, U.S. DEP’T DEF. (Sept 29, 2003), 
http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=28408.  
6
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remained degraded for months or years. And finally, what if, in the 
meantime, the cyber attacks adapted to recovery efforts and 
continuously fed inaccurate supply-and-demand load data to 
operators of BPS generation, transmission, and distribution 
centers? What would the impact be on individuals, critical 
infrastructure, the nation’s economy, and national security if these 
cyber attacks continued to cause recurrent disruptions and 
increased damage, made “trust deficits” a reoccurring burden on 
operators, and impressed on BPS companies and customers that 
the New Normal defined the scope of their plans, because no one 
knew with even remote certainty when the old normal might be 
restored? This is the most significant cybersecurity challenge that 
boards, management, and legal counsel of BPS companies need to 
confront. The subject of this essay is how to address that challenge 
responsibly. 
We endeavor in this essay to assist BPS boards, management, 
and their legal counsel in addressing the cyber threats to the BPS 
and in making what appears to be an increasingly difficult choice 
between two paths to pursue in reducing the company’s exposure 
to cyber risks. One path involves addressing risks identified by the 
executive branch in Executive Order No. 13636 (EO), adopting the 
Cybersecurity Framework (authorized by the EO) and focusing on 
improving company resilience to cyber attacks. The other path 
involves addressing risks identified by task forces (authorized by 
their regulator, the North American Electric Reliability 
Corporation (NERC13)) and focusing on the task forces’ 
 
 13.  As explained in testimony by NERC’s Executive Vice President to a 
congressional subcommittee: 
   NERC’s mission is to ensure the bulk power system in North 
America is reliable. To achieve this objective, NERC develops and 
enforces reliability standards; monitors the bulk power system; assesses 
and reports on future adequacy; evaluates owners, operators, and users 
for reliability preparedness; and educates, trains[,] and certifies 
industry personnel. NERC is a self-regulatory organization that relies 
on the diverse and collective expertise of industry participants. FERC 
certified NERC as the electric reliability organization (ERO) in July 
2006. 
The Cyber Threat to Control Systems: Stronger Regulations Are Necessary to Secure the 
Electric Grid: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, & Sci. & 
Tech. of the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 110th Cong. 39 (2007) (statement of David 
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recommendations for managing the consequences of a 
catastrophic cyber attack. The NERC task forces call this cyber 
attack a Severe Event because it results in such disruption and 
damage to the BPS that for months, if not years, the BPS operates 
at a level significantly below the pre-attack levels and requires 
rolling blackouts to stabilize the surviving “islands” of electric 
power.14 Since it appears that many BPS company boards are not 
yet aware of the widening gap between the White House’s and 
NERC’s cybersecurity initiatives, we will devote much of this essay 
to explaining those initiatives and the choices and challenges that 
each presents to BPS company boards, management, and their 
legal counsel. 
II. UPDATING BPS COMPANIES’ WORST-CASE SCENARIO RISKS TO 
MATCH THE INCREASED SOPHISTICATION OF KINETIC CYBER ATTACKS 
A. Reliance on the North American Bulk Power System Put at Risk by 
Cyber Threats 
In North America, public access to a resilient and reliable 
supply of electric power—whenever needed—is our economic 
foundation; it is a critical constant supporting our quality of life 
and the quickening pace of digital technological innovations. As 
each wave of new digital communications technology gains 
widespread use and fosters, in turn, new prodigious data capture 
and search capabilities, the necessity of available, reliable, and 
resilient electric power whenever needed to operate or recharge 
devices is absolute. 
 
NERC-sponsored cybersecurity initiatives include the recommendations 
found in the following documents, which are part of NERC’s “Critical 
Infrastructure Roadmap.” See N. AM. ELECTRIC RELIABILITY CORP., CYBER ATTACK 
TASK FORCE: FINAL REPORT 4–5 (2012) [hereinafter CATF REPORT], available at 
http://www.nerc.com/docs/cip/catf/12-CATF_Final_Report_BOT_clean_Mar_26 
_2012-Board%20Accepted%200521.pdf; N. AM. ELECTRIC RELIABILITY CORP., HIGH-
IMPACT, LOW-FREQUENCY EVENT RISK TO THE NORTH AMERICAN BULK POWER SYSTEM 
(2010) [hereinafter HILF REPORT], available at http://www.nerc.com/pa/ci 
/resources/documents/hilf_report.pdf; N. AM. ELECTRIC RELIABILITY CORP., SEVERE 
IMPACT RESILIENCE: CONSIDERATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2012) [hereinafter 
SIRTF REPORT], available at http://www.nerc.com/docs/oc/sirtf/SIRTF_Final 
_May_9_2012-Board_Accepted.pdf. 
 14.  See SIRTF REPORT, supra note 13, at 2–3. 
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When employees arrive at work, they assume that when they try 
to illuminate their office space, power up their computers, and 
recharge their battery-operated phones and portable computing 
devices (pads, tablets, phablets), the power will flow without 
interruption, without destructive surges or plummets, and will keep 
doing so without requiring their attention, oversight, or 
intervention. For decades, when boards of directors met to oversee 
management’s handling of risks to an enterprise, the board 
members seldom, if ever, asked: 
 What is the risk that our company’s need for electricity will be 
met in the next quarter? 
 Do we have contingency plans in place to ensure that, in the 
event that a coordinated cyber attack on the BPS causes a 
regional outage that lasts for weeks or months, our company 
can procure the electricity needed to continue operation and 
production without disruption? 
Those questions might once have been met by management 
and board members with incredulity. They would have seemed far-
fetched, the kind of wrong question that humans ask the computer 
“Deep Thought” (in A Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy) and to which 
they receive the incomprehensible answer “forty-two.”15 Now, 
however, such questions are pertinent and timely. Boards and 
management need to adjust their risk management in order to 
address not far-fetched, but worst-case scenario questions relating 
to kinetic cyber attacks that now have immediate relevance. 
By now, the boards of many companies have come to view the 
security of corporate intellectual property and business information 
against the risks of cyber intrusions and cyber attacks as a top 
priority.16 Nevertheless, cybersecurity risk remains “a difficult and 
intimidating topic for corporate boards to consider.”17 The main 
reasons are well known: 
 Each year the learning curve for cybersecurity becomes longer, 
steeper, and tougher to climb. 
 
 15.  See DOUGLAS ADAMS, THE HITCHHIKER’S GUIDE TO THE GALAXY 151–53 
(1979). 
 16.  Paul Taylor, Security Tops Boardroom Agendas, FIN. TIMES (London) (Apr. 
24, 2012, 11:56 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/47b3bfec-8978-11e1-85b6 
-00144feab49a.html#axzz2tDDhVp5D. 
 17.  David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, Corporate Governance Update: 
Cybersecurity Risks and the Board of Directors, 248 N.Y. L.J. 5, 5 (2012). 
9
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 The ability of cyber adversaries to probe, find vulnerabilities, 
and launch sophisticated and stealthy attacks against company 
networks continues to outpace the ability of target companies 
to defend, detect, and thwart such attacks. 
 And, unlike other corporate crises, boards and management 
must be ready to address severe cyber incidents with response 
and recovery plans that activate upon discovery of an intrusion 
and with little or no time for deliberation.18 
These challenges become formidable and daunting when, 
instead of non-kinetic attacks on information systems, a board and 
management must address the risks of kinetic cyber attacks that 
target the control systems and operations run by a critical 
infrastructure company. The potential consequences for the 
company’s reputation, finances, and survival—and for third parties 
that depend on its services—become prodigiously far reaching for a 
board and management responsible for a company that operates 
part of the BPS. As pointed out in a National Academy of Sciences 
study released in November 2012, “The electric power delivery 
system that carries electricity from large central generators to 
customers could be severely damaged by a small number of well-
informed attackers.”19 Such an attack “could deny large regions of 
the country access to bulk system power for weeks or even 
months.”20 Soon after taking office, Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz 
made clear in August 2013 that the executive branch views the 
“threat of a cyber attack shutting down the U.S. electric grid” as its 
most serious concern.21 
B. The Salient Questions for a BPS Board and Management When 
Confronted by Risks of Kinetic Cyber Attacks 
BPS owners and operators, when addressing the risks of kinetic 
cyber attacks against their companies, will probably continue to do 
 
 18.  See id.  
 19.  NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, TERRORISM AND THE ELECTRIC POWER DELIVERY 
SYSTEM 1 (2012), available at http://www.wiresgroup.com/docs/WPF_Terrorism 
%20and%20The%20Electric%20Power%20Delivery%20System.pdf. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Paul Bedard, Energy Secretary: Cyber Attack, Not EMP, Is Biggest Threat to 
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as they have customarily done: attempt to assess risks and endeavor 
to manage them effectively and responsibly. But these owners and 
operators appear to sense that with the emergence of credible 
threats of kinetic cyber attacks against BPS company operations, 
the stakes have become much higher and the time frames within 
which they and their boards of directors must take decisive action 
have shrunk from weeks to hours to minutes. As two corporate 
commentators recently observed: 
One potential difference between cybersecurity crises and 
other corporate crises is that both internal and external 
aspects of crisis management with respect to a cyber 
incident must begin within hours rather than days, in 
order to be as effective as possible. Directors should 
expect management to be prepared to respond very 
quickly to any cyber attack.22 
As a result, when the federal government identifies a cyber 
threat to national security whose targets include companies that 
operate the nation’s critical infrastructure, boards of directors of 
the targeted companies (including BPS companies) may ask some 
preliminary, cautionary questions of senior management in order 
to ensure they are assessing the risks and adequately addressing 
them. The questions may take many forms, but ultimately boards of 
directors will probably be seeking answers to the following: 
 How seriously should our company take the government’s 
declaration of this cyber threat? 
 If the cyber threat poses a serious risk to our company, is the 
main risk to our company’s business information systems or to 
its operation and control systems? 
 If the main risk of the cyber threat is to our company’s 
operation and control systems, how comprehensive should our 
company’s preparations be? 
 What priority and urgency should our company give to 
completing those preparations? 
 In the absence of a uniform federal or state standard for 
critical infrastructure cybersecurity, by what standard will our 
response to this cyber threat ultimately be judged? 
In preparation for such discussions, the board may ask counsel 
to provide an analysis that helps management understand the 
 
 22.  Katz & McIntosh, supra note 17, at 5.  
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cybersecurity risks to the company and the extent to which the 
company is responsible for addressing risks that originate offshore 
in planned kinetic cyber attacks that target critical infrastructure 
companies in the United States. Although there is a growing 
consensus on the magnitude of the threats and risks of kinetic 
cyber attacks against critical infrastructure companies, there is a 
remarkable lack of consensus and considerable confusion 
regarding who is responsible for addressing such risks and 
threats—the federal government or private industry. We address 
that issue in the next section. 
III. WHO HAS THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ADDRESSING RISKS OF 
KINETIC CYBER ATTACKS AGAINST BPS COMPANIES? 
BPS company boards and management face a narrowing 
window of time in which to confront and manage risks from kinetic 
cyber attacks. The risks are increasing as the result of three 
converging phenomena: 
First, the increasing interdependence of rapidly growing, high-
tech industries (such as cloud computing) and the immense 
quantities of electric power they consume, dissipate as heat, and 
require for cooling.23 
 
 23.  Cloud computing is precariously dependent on a reliable supply of 
electric power (since any unevenness in that supply can damage the equipment), 
and the electricity cost has become the chief operating expense. For example, the 
enormous server farms that support cloud computing and big data analyses 
depend on reliable supplies of prodigious quantities of electric power. For each 
kilowatt-hour of power needed to operate a cloud computing facility’s acres of 
servers, those servers dissipate an equal amount of heat requiring an additional 
kilowatt-hour of power to cool the air surrounding the servers. As researchers have 
explained:  
   Cloud computing is hot, literally. Electricity consumed by 
computers and other IT equipment has been skyrocketing in 
recent years, and has become a substantial part of the global 
energy market. . . . Energy efficiency is . . . important to reduce 
operational costs . . . [because] cooling cost is significant in centralized 
data centers due to the power density. 
JIE LIU ET AL., THE DATA FURNACE: HEATING UP WITH CLOUD COMPUTING 1–2 
(2011), available at http://research.microsoft.com/pubs/150265/heating.pdf. 
The dissipated heat is so high that researchers propose that data centers be used 
as “data furnaces” and be the primary heat sources for offices and homes. Id. at 2.  
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Second, the increasing fragility of electric power grids (such as 
the BPS) as equipment ages, as cyber vulnerabilities proliferate 
(and remain uncorrected), and as “smarter” devices with software 
flaws are deployed that create two-way communication channels 
and nodes that provide adversaries vulnerable points and attack 
vectors.24 
Third, the growing risk that adversaries are now capable of 
launching coordinated kinetic cyber attacks capable of damaging 
the BPS so severely and extensively that service might not be 
restored to pre-event levels for months, if not years.25 
Boards of directors and management of critical infrastructure 
(all of which are dependent upon, and interconnected with, the 
BPS) will therefore need to determine who has the responsibilities 
for addressing such risks and making the preparations to cope with 
post-attack recovery. Do those responsibilities remain in the hands 
of the federal government (as it would in the event of a tangible, 
kinetic attack against the tangible assets in the U.S. homeland), or 
has a significant part of those responsibilities been relegated to 
private industry? 
A. The Scope of Federal Government Cyber Responsibility and Authority Is 
Unclear 
lf a foreign-based or foreign-planned kinetic or non-kinetic 
attack is launched against the U.S. homeland and involves an 
assault across the U.S. border (or from within the U.S. homeland 
using chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons as a 
terrorist attack) and targets critical infrastructure, the attack 
immediately implicates national security and is addressed by the 
responsible agencies accordingly. The federal government has 
clear and full responsibility for intelligence, defense (including 
preemptive strikes), interdiction, and counter-strikes. Federal 
government responsibility for national defense concerning 
tangible, visible weapon attacks against tangible, visible targets is 
clear and familiar.26 
 
 24.  See infra Part IV.B–IV.D (discussing the vulnerabilities introduced by 
“smart grid” technologies). 
 25.  See infra Part IV.D (discussing the emerging cyber threats to the BPS). 
 26.  It extends also to foreign terrorist attacks launched within the United 
States, such as the attacks that occurred in 1993 and 2001. Note also that at least as 
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But what happens when the foreign attacker launches 
invisible, intangible sorties of electrons through the Internet, 
injects intangible malware invisibly through a vulnerable wireless 
connection, or hacks into a two-way communication “smart” device 
node and eventually succeeds in making a kinetic attack? Even 
though the result might be long-term damage to operational 
equipment and reduces, for months, the service capabilities of a 
critical infrastructure company (such as power plants or the 
transmission system), it is unclear whether the federal government 
or private industry has primary responsibility for addressing the 
incident. In other words, what if, instead of a few trees touching 
power lines in Ohio and tripping off the regional power grid in the 
Northeast, a rogue foreign actor infiltrates the power grid and trips 
off the same cascading outages? The attack poses an immediate 
and substantial danger to the nation. For that reason, it too 
implicates national security; but, efforts to respond to such attacks 
on the defense and information technology sectors of critical 
infrastructure (and they have occurred) have not been well 
organized, coherent, vigorous, or particularly effective. Reportedly, 
the targeted companies (e.g., Lockheed Martin and Silicon Valley 
companies such as Google), who are among the nation’s largest 
and developers of its most sophisticated technologies, experienced 
severe cyber attacks.27 Chief among the reasons for the lamentable 
 
early as 1998, the DoD conducted exercises and drills involving simulated armed 
assault on offices within the Pentagon, including one on May 30, 1998 called 
“Cloudy Office” that was part of an “effort to improve the nation’s overall ability to 
respond to incidents involving nuclear, biological or chemical agents.” Alicia K. 
Borlik, DoD Drill Tests Response to Terrorist Attack, U.S. DEP’T DEF. (June 9, 1998), 
http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=43179. However, it is unclear 
from the DoD press release which agency had ultimate authority over the 
command and control of the response to the simulated lethal nerve agent attack 
and taking of hostages. See id. 
 27.  Reports of cyber attacks on Lockheed Martin appeared in 2011 and 2012. 
See Dara Kerr, Cyberattacks Against Lockheed Have ‘Increased Dramatically,’ CNET 
(Nov. 12, 2012, 8:05 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-57548766-83 
/cyberattacks-against-lockheed-have-increased-dramatically/; Mathew J. Schwartz, 
Lockheed Martin Suffers Massive Cyberattack, INFO. WK. (May 30, 2011, 7:58 PM), 
http://www.informationweek.com/government/security/lockheed-martin-suffers 
-massive-cyberatt/229700151. Although Lockheed Martin claimed that these later 
attacks did not access sensitive information, an earlier series of attacks against it in 
2009 were apparently quite successful in exfiltrating data related to the design of 
the Joint Strike Fighter: “[W]hile the spies were able to download sizable amounts 
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and ineffectual response against the attackers would seem to be 
that the intangible and invisible nature of the attacks and the 
advanced technology used to carry them out have proceeded 
without an immediate determination of responsibility for 
addressing them.28 
 
of data related to the jet-fighter, they weren’t able to access the most sensitive 
material, which is stored on computers not connected to the Internet.” Siobhan 
Gorman, August Cole, & Yochi Dreazen, Computer Spies Breach Fighter-Jet Project, 
WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 2009, at A1, available at LEXIS. 
Accounts of the attacks on Google and other Silicon Valley tech companies 
appeared, for example, in January 2010:  
   Those attacks, which Google said took place last week, were 
directed at some 34 companies or entities, most of them in Silicon 
Valley California . . . . The attackers may have succeeded in penetrating 
elaborate computer security systems and obtaining crucial corporate 
data and software source codes, although Google said it did not itself 
suffer losses of that kind. 
Andrew Jacobs & Miguel Helft, Google May End Venture in China Over Censorship, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2010, at A1, available at 2010 WLNR 676831; see Cade Metz, 
Cyberattack Lifted Google Password System Code, Says Report, REGISTER (Apr. 20, 2010), 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/04/20/reports_says_cyberattack_on_google 
_lifted_code_for_password_system/. None of these accounts suggest a vigorous or 
organized response by the U.S. Government or by any of the companies attacked 
beyond attempting to halt the attack after its detection. The reports do not 
disclose how long the attacks may have been proceeding before their detection 
and whether they continued after detection. Although these uncertainties may be 
deliberate, they also leave unclear what, if any, outside agencies may have assisted 
the attacked companies. In the case of Lockheed Martin, of course, the company 
would have reported the breach to its customer, the DoD. Such reports are now 
mandatory under recent DoD-issued regulations applicable to its contractors and 
subcontractors at every tier. 
 28.  Moreover, with the emergence of the “Internet of things” with sensors, 
RFID-chips, and other means of communicating to the Internet attached to every 
quotidian object, the vulnerability to cyber attacks will escalate substantially, as 
noted in a recent Financial Times essay: 
[W]e are about to undergo a technological shift that will bring the 
connectivity of the internet into every aspect of life. Marketers call it 
the “internet of things,” where everything, from shoes to pacemakers, 
will have an internet connection—a tenfold increase in the number of 
connected devices is expected by 2020.  
   The damage that it will be possible to inflict through cybercrime, 
warfare or terrorism will increase exponentially. No longer limited to 
cyberspace, hackers will be able to overload a power grid or derail a 
train if desired. 
Bede McCarthy, Secrecy Hampers Battle for Web, FIN. TIMES (London), June 7, 2013, 
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It is doubtful that federal government officials believe that they 
are responsible for addressing the risks of kinetic cyber attacks 
against critical infrastructure companies because there is so much 
uncertainty expressed concerning the limited government 
authority to respond to the threats of such attacks. The efforts to 
enact comprehensive cybersecurity legislation evidence a belief in 
Congress that, without such legislation, the federal government 
lacks the authority to respond to such threats or to require private 
industry to improve cybersecurity in order to mitigate or thwart the 
effectiveness of kinetic cyber threats. Moreover, we have found no 
evidence to suggest that BPS and other critical infrastructure 
companies have a clear understanding of where the government’s 
limited responsibility ends and where private industry’s 
responsibility begins. 
When the World Trade Center collapsed after a tangible 
attack—although local municipal and state fire, police, and 
medical service personnel had responsibility for the “first response” 
on the scene—the federal government was responsible for 
addressing future similar attacks and for pursuing those 
responsible for planning and carrying out the attack.29 But if a 
major segment of the Eastern Interconnect of the BPS collapsed 
after a cyber attack (and its service could not be fully restored to 
pre-attack levels because transformers and other equipment with 
 
at 1, available at LEXIS.  
 29.  With respect to the 9/11 attack on the Pentagon, a subsequent study of 
the response on the scene observed: 
   The initial response to the Pentagon attack was performed by the 
fire and emergency units from the Arlington County Fire Department 
(ACFD), the Fort Myer Fire Department (a U.S. Army Base located 
adjacent to the Pentagon), and the Metropolitan Airport Authority 
Fire Unit at Ronald Reagan National Airport . . . [all of which] 
responded without any state or Federal intervention or control. 
   The Federal mobilization of resources for the response was 
governed by the structure and process defined in the Federal Response 
Plan (FRP). . . . State and local authorities retained the primary 
authority to respond to the consequences of terrorism, and FEMA was 
assigned responsibility for coordinating federal assistance as required. 
GEORGE WASH. UNIV. INST. FOR CRISIS, DISASTER, & RISK MGMT., OBSERVING AND 
DOCUMENTING THE INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSE TO THE SEPTEMBER 11TH 
ATTACK ON THE PENTAGON § 4.1 (2002), available at http://www.gwu.edu/~icdrm 
/publications/nsf911/response.html. 
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long lead time were damaged),30 there would be considerable 
dispute afterwards as to who was responsible for failing to prevent it 
(the federal government or the BPS operators and owners) and 
who was responsible for managing the long-term recovery. Quite 
simply, who is responsible for defending against a cyber attack 
against the BPS or for identifying its origin and the adversary who 
planned and carried it out? Evidence of the uncertain and limited 
role to date by the federal government appears in a 2011 report by 
researchers for McAfee and the Center for Strategic & 
International Studies in their second annual critical infrastructure 
protection report. The researchers observed: “How are govern-
ments responding to the vulnerability of their core civilian 
infrastructures? In general, they continue to play an ambiguous 
role in cybersecurity—sometimes helping the private sector, 
sometimes ignoring it.”31 
B. The Scope of Private Industry Cyber Responsibility and Authority Is 
Unclear 
If responsibility for addressing risks of kinetic cyber attacks 
against critical infrastructure ultimately rests with private industry 
(as it appears to), the allocation has not been made by any clear 
decision of Congress (which appears increasingly derelict in the 
duty to address cyber threats to national security) but has been 
made almost incomprehensibly by default. As a result, the nation 
lacks a plan to address cyber threats of a severity that could disrupt 
the BPS into widespread, long-duration outages. In the absence of 
a plan—or concerted federal legislation to address the risks—
 
 30.  Regarding the long lead time required to procure heavy BPS equipment 
from off-shore manufacturers, note the following: 
Estimates are that most first world economies can cope for 3–4 days 
without power. Anything more than that, and social order dies a rather 
quick death. Given that most of the huge and complex power 
generators are built in China and India and have rather a long lead-
time to produce (anywhere from months to years), a powerless 
Australia for up to a year [from a destructive cyber attack] is a daunting 
prospect. 
Katherine Ziesing, The Cyber Bogeyman, STRATEGIST (June 18, 2013), http://www 
.aspistrategist.org.au/the-cyber-bogeyman/. 
 31.  STEWART BAKER ET AL, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES, IN THE DARK: 
CRUCIAL INDUSTRIES CONFRONT CYBERATTACKS 2 (2011), available at http://www 
.mcafee.com/us/resources/reports/rp-critical-infrastructure-protection.pdf.  
17
Trope and Humes: Before Rolling Blackouts Begin: Briefing Boards on Cyber Attacks
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2014
 
664 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:2 
private industry has had no choice but to add this risk to the other 
risks that critical infrastructure boards oversee in order to ensure 
that senior management recognize, assess, and responsibly address 
cyber risks. 
The boards of directors of companies that operate critical 
infrastructure have struggled over the past few years to understand 
these new responsibilities and to determine how to fulfill their 
fiduciary duties to oversee management’s efforts to identify, assess, 
and address the cyber risks.32 But a major impediment they 
 
 32.  Direct evidence of these difficulties would be confidential and 
proprietary to each board; however, indirect evidence can be reasonably inferred 
from the fact that critical infrastructure company boards are well aware that their 
fiduciary duties include addressing any serious risks and threats to the enterprise, 
including those that originate with kinetic cyber attacks. Delaware corporate 
law, for example, requires boards to keep informed of serious risks to the 
enterprise. See Steven L. Caponi, Cybersecurity and the Board of Directors: 
Avoiding Personal Liability—Part II of III, KNOWLEDGE EFFECT (Aug. 6, 
2013), http://blog.thomsonreuters.com/index.php/cybersecurity-and-the-board 
-of-directors-avoiding-personal-liability-part-ii-of-iii/ (“The failure to exercise 
appropriate oversight in the face of known risks constitutes a breach of the duty of 
loyalty, a breach that cannot be exculpated under 8 Del. C. § 102(b)(7).”).  
However, the evidence of the lack of significant improvement in 
cybersecurity among critical infrastructure companies suggests, not that boards are 
ignoring the issue, but that they and management have been struggling to address 
the cybersecurity risks in balance with other risks that warrant their attention. 
Thus, a recent survey by FTI Consulting found strikingly contradictory results 
when comparing knowledge of cybersecurity risks, particularly to operations, with 
significant success in addressing the risks. For knowledge of the risks the survey 
found: 55% of general counsel said that data security was their top concern,” and 
“47% of general counsel said that operational risks, such as cybersecurity, were 
their most pressing concern.” Id.  
But for success in addressing the risks the survey found: “33% of general 
counsel believe that boards are not adequately managing cyber risk.” Id. These 
findings are not an isolated or a one-off result. A report by a major law firm a year 
later, in 2012, similarly observed: 
[A] recent survey of 1,957 general counsel and 11,340 corporate 
directors indicated that cybersecurity and data protection for the first 
time rank as top-of-mind concerns, edging out perennial priorities like 
operational risk and [Federal Corrupt Practices Act] compliance. But 
now that the issues are on boards’ radar screens, to what should limited 
corporate resources be directed so that key business assets are 
protected and legal and other risks are minimized? Unsurprisingly 
given the emerging nature of the challenge, the answer to how 
business should address cybersecurity-related risk is evolving. 
HOGAN LOVELLS, CYBERSECURITY: THE CORPORATE COUNSEL’S AGENDA 3 (2012) 
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continuously encounter is who has the responsibility for cyber-
security. Moreover, to the extent that standards for that 
responsibility are emerging, they are coming from different 
sources, with discrepant objectives, and they implicate different 
responsibilities for a board and senior management.33 As a result, if 
 
(footnote omitted), available at http://www.hoganlovells.com/custom/eDocs 
/Cybersecurity%20Advisory_Pearson_11152012.pdf. The report continued, “A 
strong consensus thus has emerged in the United States that neither the private 
sector nor government is doing enough.” Id. at 7.  
Perhaps most telling are sector-specific findings concerning preparations to 
address kinetic cyber attacks against critical infrastructure company operations. 
Another study’s conclusion further attests to the struggle that boards and 
management would appear to be having in addressing the risks and threats from 
coordinated cyber attacks designed to have kinetic effects: 
[I]ndustry executives made modest progress over the past year [2010–
11] in securing their networks—adopting about half of the security 
technologies we identified. The energy sector increased its adoption of 
security technologies by a single percentage point, to 51 percent, while oil 
and gas executives reported an increase of 3 percentage points, to 48 
percent. . . .  
   Almost exactly the same pattern held true when we asked about 
adoption of security measures for respondents’ Industrial Control 
(ICS) or Supervisory Control and Data Acquisitions (SCADA) 
systems. . . . They are doing something—but only a little more than 
they were doing last year. 
BAKER ET AL., supra note 31, at 1 (emphasis added).  
Further, “[b]etween one fifth and a third of all respondents told us that their 
company was not at all prepared, or not very prepared, for cyberattacks ranging 
from malware to denial-of-service—a figure that has not improved much since last 
year.” Id.  
 33.  One reason for the lack of clear guidance may be that one of the nation’s 
most prominent regulators of critical infrastructure companies in the energy 
sector has questioned publicly whether the agency has the authority to issue and 
enforce cybersecurity regulations and standards. Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) former Chairman Jon Wellinghoff stated that the 
Commission has no such authority, that authority can only come from Congress, 
and that Congress has not enacted a statute to provide it. As then-Chairman 
Wellinghoff explained in a September 2012 speech: 
No. 1, I don’t have an effective way to confidentially communicate 
[cyber threats] to the utilities . . . . And No. 2, I have no effective 
enforcement authority, and I’ve said this for six years now. And I’ve 
also said I don’t care who has the authority, but Congress should give 
someone the authority. 
Zack Colman, Official: Congress Must Establish Electric Grid Cybersecurity Authority, THE 
HILL (Sept. 5, 2012, 3:25 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2-wire/247635 
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a threat is reported against companies that operate the nation’s 
critical infrastructure, the operators and owners of those 
companies will not only ask if the threat is credible, but if 
responsibility for addressing the threat rests with their company 
and its limited resources or with governmental authorities and 
their potentially vast resources, including access to threat 
intelligence and offensive cyber weapons.34 
Adversaries can and have successfully attacked U.S. critical 
infrastructure.35 However, the question of who is responsible for 
 
-obama-official-congress-must-give-someone-electric-grid-cybersecurity-authority 
(quoting then-FERC Chairman Jon Wellinghoff). But Congress, while not yet 
enacting cybersecurity legislation per se, still gave FERC authority to establish an 
Electric Reliability Organization that establishes reliability standards. Specifically, 
the Electricity Modernization Act of 2005 (Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 
109-58, § 1211, 119 Stat. 594 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 8240 (2012))) 
added section 215 to the Federal Power Act (FPA), which authorized FERC to 
certify an organization as the national “Electric Reliability Organization,” which 
would be charged with establishing and enforcing mandatory reliability standards. 
Alcoa Inc. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 564 F.3d 1342, 1344 (D.C. Cir. 
2009) (citing 16 U.S.C. § 824o(a)(2) (2006)). On January 18, 2008, FERC issued a 
Final Rule (Order No. 706) approving, pursuant to section 215 of the FPA, eight 
Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Reliability Standards submitted to FERC 
for approval by the NERC. Mandatory Reliability Standards for Critical 
Infrastructure Protection, 73 Fed. Reg. 7368 (Feb. 7, 2008) (codified at 18 C.F.R. 
pt. 40). All eight of these CIP Standards cover cybersecurity mandates.  
 34.  For owners and operators of critical infrastructure companies, the 
potential availability of federal coverage cannot be a reassuring prospect when 
Congress plays “shut down” for political leverage as if adversaries would never take 
advantage of the resulting vulnerabilities. 
 35.  As noted in a 2013 Council on Foreign Relations Report: 
   Cyber threats to oil and gas suppliers pose an increasingly 
challenging problem for U.S. national security and economic 
competitiveness. Attacks can take many forms, ranging from cyber 
espionage by foreign intelligence services to attempts to interrupt a 
company’s physical operations. These threats have grown more 
sophisticated over time, making them more difficult to detect and 
defend against. So, too, have the actors behind them, which have 
evolved from lone hackers with few resources to state-sponsored teams 
of programming experts. Several of the world’s major oil and gas 
producers, including Saudi Aramco (officially the Saudi Arabian Oil 
Company) and Qatar’s RasGas, have fallen victim to cyberattacks since 
2009. Others, such as Chevron, have also had their networks infected.  
   Some damage was done in each of these cases, but the costs of 
future breaches could be much higher, whether to corporate assets, 
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addressing the attack and averting future similar attacks remains 
stubbornly unclear. Often, the Department of Defense (DoD) has 
played little or no role (or no publicly disclosed role) in defending 
critical infrastructure companies from these attacks.36 The 
responsibility for defending a critical infrastructure company from 
offshore kinetic cyber attacks, for determining whether a reported 
threat is credible, and for determining what preparations should be 
made in light of the reported threat arguably rests more with its 
board of directors than the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and more with its 
C-level officers than U.S. Central Command officers. 
The executive branch and the BPS regulator, NERC, have 
attempted through recent initiatives to remove some of the 
uncertainties that confront BPS company boards and management 
in their efforts to address cyber attack risks to their enterprises. 
The White House cybersecurity initiatives came out on 
February 12, 2013, when the president issued the EO entitled 
Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity37 and the related 
Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD-21).38 Since then, critical 
infrastructure boards have asked counsel to help them understand 
what, if anything, their industries are doing and what their 
companies’ legal obligations are in response to the EO and its 
 
public infrastructure and safety, or the broader economy through 
energy prices. 
BLAKE CLAYTON & ADAM SEGAL, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, ENERGY BRIEF: 
ADDRESSING CYBER THREATS TO OIL AND GAS SUPPLIERS 1 (2013), available at http:// 
i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Energy_Brief_Clayton_Segal.pdf.  
 36.  For example, one of the most successful cyber-attack campaigns against 
U.S. critical infrastructure companies targeted oil and gas firms (an attack dubbed 
“Night Dragon” by McAfee, the company that discovered and disclosed it). 
According to McAfee: 
Night Dragon was a “coordinated, covert, and targeted” campaign by 
China-based hackers to obtain confidential data from five major 
Western energy companies, beginning around 2008 and extending 
into early 2011. Night Dragon was able to steal gigabytes of highly 
sensitive material, including proprietary information about oil- and gas-
field operations, financial transactions, and bidding data. 
Id. at 1–2. 
 37.  Exec. Order No. 13,636, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,739 (Feb. 19, 2013).  
 38.  Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-21: Directive on Critical Infrastructure 
Security and Resilience, 2013 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 92 (Feb. 12, 2013) 
[hereinafter PPD-21], available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD 
-201300092/pdf/DCPD-201300092.pdf.  
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implementation of a two-pronged strategy: development of the 
Cybersecurity Framework (i.e., a collection of industry standards 
and best practices to be drafted by the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) and recommended to critical 
infrastructure owners and operators for their “voluntary” adoption) 
and issuance of federal cyber intelligence reports to be shared with 
critical infrastructure companies. 
However, such questions may need to be revised to address a 
significant and widening discrepancy between cybersecurity 
objectives pursued by the White House and cybersecurity objectives 
pursued by NERC. The White House’s cybersecurity objectives 
appear, from the EO and PPD-21, to be the improvement of cyber 
defenses and critical infrastructure resilience against cyber attacks. 
By contrast, NERC’s cybersecurity objectives (beyond those 
expressed in the Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) 
Standards) appear to focus on managing the BPS operating crisis 
that would follow a disruptive and damaging kinetic cyber attack on 
BPS companies. NERC Task Forces discuss such an incident by 
referring to it as a Severe Event—one in which the damage was so 
extensive and so far beyond any previously experienced by 
operators and owners of BPS companies that full restoration of 
electric power could not be achieved for months or years. 
As NERC Task Forces have described it, an attack may cause 
such extensive disruption and damage to BPS operations that it 
probably would result in operating isolated “islands” of electricity, 
scheduling rolling outages to maintain those “islands” while trying 
to bring new “islands” back on line with “black start”39 resources 
 
 39.  “Black start” is defined as 
the ability of a generating unit to start without an outside electrical 
supply, or is the demonstrated ability of a generating unit with a high 
operating factor to automatically remain operating at reduced levels 
when disconnected from the grid. Black start service is necessary to 
help ensure the reliable restoration of the grid following a blackout. 
Glossary, ELEC. STORAGE ASS’N, http://energystorage.org/energy-storage/glossary 
/b (click “Black start”) (last visited Dec. 27, 2013). FERC uses the term “black start 
service” with a somewhat different emphasis. FERC describes such “service” as 
allowing “a generating unit to start without an outside electrical supply or to 
continue operating at reduced levels when disconnected from the grid, and is 
needed for restoration of the transmission system in the event of a de-energizing 
event (e.g., a blackout).” PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 144 FERC ¶ 61,191, at 1 n.2 
(2013).  
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able to start generation without power supply to operate control 
systems and fuel ignition systems—in short, a grid fractured into an 
archipelago of illuminated islands surrounded by vast areas, 
populations, and regional economies without power or with power 
only in rotating shifts: four hours on, four hours off. We doubt that 
most BPS companies have had time or made it a priority to prepare 
for such far-reaching and unfamiliar consequences. If BPS 
companies have failed to prepare, it is reasonable to infer that 
most, if not all, critical infrastructure companies have yet to make 
such preparations or even to grasp the post-attack consequences 
that NERC’s Task Forces have identified after careful review of the 
probable operational impacts. 
Unlike the White House’s initiatives, which seem to offer the 
possibility of a successful defense, NERC’s cybersecurity initiatives 
assume that such defenses will ultimately be breached and that the 
highest priority should be to prepare to manage the consequences 
of a period of “New Normal” during which the grid would have to 
be operated at reduced levels of electric power with power being 
available only in multiple separate “islands” and requiring rolling 
outages in order to stabilize electric service within such “islands.” 
This is the objective set forth by the NERC Task Force reports that 
the NERC Board of Trustees approved on May 9, 2012—nine 
months before the President issued the EO.40 
Thus, the White House and NERC have surprisingly different 
objectives for their respective cybersecurity initiatives, and the gap 
between them appears to be widening because little, if any, 
attention is being given by the White House or NERC to 
coordinating those different objectives. Moreover, the White House 
and NERC do not appear to recognize that the BPS boards and 
management may find it financially and organizationally 
impracticable to pursue both sets of objectives. As a result, the BPS 
boards and management will need to choose which set of objectives 
to devote their resources and efforts to achieving—the objectives 
identified by the White House in the EO and Cybersecurity 
Framework or the objectives identified by the NERC Task Force 
reports. As boards recognize the divergence between those 
objectives, they may find the decision between such objectives 
difficult to make because pursuing either at the expense of the 
 
 40.  See CATF REPORT, supra note 13; SIRTF REPORT, supra note 13. 
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other could increase the exposure of the company, its 
management, and its board to post-cyber attack liability for failure 
to address cybersecurity risks responsibly. 
We believe that BPS company boards and management need 
to grasp the new operating environment that would result from a 
successful kinetic cyber attack against the BPS, and that those 
consequences pose the greatest risks to a BPS company and its 
operations, as well as to its finances, reputation, and survival. 
Responding responsibly to the White House initiatives will not 
suffice as a response to the NERC Task Forces’ initiatives. Many 
companies may find that they cannot allocate equal resources and 
oversight to make the preparations called for by the White House 
and those called for by their regulators. That recognition will 
create considerable tension for a board as it may force the board 
and management to choose whether to place the company’s 
priorities on responding to the White House or to the relevant 
sector regulator. Of course, in some sectors, including energy, such 
a choice would potentially expose the company to penalties that 
can accrue at the rate of one million dollars per day per violation, 
so complying with NERC requirements is mandatory whereas White 
House recommendations may be more aspirational.41 
 
 41.  In the Energy Policy Act of 2005, “Congress added section 215 to the 
Federal Power Act (FPA) [16 U.S.C. § 824o (2012)], which provides for the 
creation of a national Electric Reliability Organization [which is NERC] charged 
with establishing and enforcing” mandatory reliability standards. Alcoa Inc. v. Fed. 
Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 564 F.3d 1342, 1344 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Section 215 
authorizes the Electric Reliability Organization (ERO) to impose penalties for 
violations of reliability standards against “a user or owner or operator of the bulk-
power system,” subject to FERC review. 16 U.S.C. § 824o(e)(1). Title 16 U.S.C. 
§ 824o(b)(1) extends FERC’s jurisdiction for “enforcing compliance” with 
reliability standards to “all users, owners and operators of the bulk-power system.” 
In February of 2006, “FERC issued Order No. 672 to implement section 215.” Alcoa 
Inc., 564 F.3d at 1344; see Order Certifying North American Electric Reliability 
Corporation as the Electric Reliability Organization and Ordering Compliance 
Filing, 116 FERC ¶ 61,062 (July 20, 2006), reh’g denied, Order on Petitions for 
Rehearing and Clarification; Order on Compliance Filing, 117 FERC ¶ 61,126 
(Oct. 30, 2006), review denied, Alcoa Inc., 564 F.3d at 1342. FERC certified NERC as 
the national Electric Reliability Organization. Section 316A of the FPA imposes a 
statutory cap on monetary penalties of one million dollars per day, per violation, 
for violations of electric reliability standards. 16 U.S.C. § 825o(1). Unlike section 
316A, section 215 does not specify a monetary cap on FERC’s or NERC’s penalty 
authority. Therefore, in Order No. 672—in the absence of a monetary cap in 
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We think that the NERC objectives and accompanying 
recommendations seem better suited for protecting critical 
infrastructure from the worst-case scenarios.42 We therefore argue 
in this essay that, from a national security perspective, critical 
infrastructure is best protected by preparing for cyber defenses to 
fail and for incident response and recovery to be impaired and by 
concentrating efforts on managing the resulting crisis of months of 
reduced operation and service by critical infrastructure.43 
In the next two sections, we explore the kinds of reports or 
notices of cyber attack threats that NERC Task Force initiatives 
(beginning in May 2012) and the White House initiatives 
(beginning in February 2013) are bringing to the attention of 
boards and management of critical infrastructure companies. In 
each section, we analyze the challenges that such reports or notices 
create for boards and management as they seek to determine the 
scope of their responsibilities for addressing those threats and risks. 
IV. THE EVOLVING CYBERSECURITY REGULATORY CONTEXT 
In this section we discuss the emerging cyber threats to critical 
infrastructure, the identification and assessment of the most serious 
threats to the BPS, and the curiously different threats that the 
White House and NERC have focused on in their respective 
cybersecurity initiatives for critical infrastructure. 
A. Remotely Launched, Kinetic Cyber Attacks Against Critical 
Infrastructure Become Possible 
Prior to 2007, cyber threats to most companies involved attacks 
to exfiltrate valuable information (business plans, financial data, 
source code, patentable inventions, trade secrets and other 
intellectual property, etc.)—a trend that continues through the 
 
section 215—FERC determined that section 215 penalties should be subject to the 
same monetary caps that apply to civil penalties under section 316A. Order 
Denying Rehearing, 141 FERC ¶ 61,242, ¶ 50 (Dec. 20, 2012) (citing Order 
No. 672: Rules Concerning Certification of the Electric Reliability Organization; 
and Procedures for the Establishment, Approval, and Enforcement of Electric 
Reliability Standards, 71 Fed. Reg. 8662 (Feb. 17, 2006) (codified at 18 C.F.R. 
pt. 39)). Section 316A of the FPA applies to any FPA-related violation, whether the 
monetary penalty is levied by FERC, NERC, or a regional entity. 
 42.  See supra text accompanying notes 38–39; infra Part IV.F–G. 
 43.  See infra Part V. 
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present.44 The motives usually appeared to be financial gain, 
commercial advantage, and industrial and economic espionage.45 
The targets were usually a company’s business information systems, 
since that is where the targeted data tended to be stored. 
At least as early as the spring of 2007, the perception of the 
nature of cyber threats to operations of critical infrastructure 
underwent a “sea-change.” Evidence of this change in threat 
perception appeared in NERC’s first distribution of a “cyber-
vulnerability alert” prepared by the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) to certain BPS companies. The alert (dubbed 
“Aurora”) 
was intended to caution the industry to secure remotely 
accessible transmission relays and other devices from 
cyber attack. The perceived threat was based on 
simulations conducted at Idaho National Laboratory in 
December 2006, which demonstrated the possibility of 
 
 44.  
   Cyber attacks generally refer to criminal activity conducted via the 
Internet. These attacks can include stealing an organization’s 
intellectual property, confiscating online bank accounts, creating and 
distributing viruses on other computers, posting confidential business 
information on the Internet and disrupting a country’s critical national 
infrastructure. Consistent with the previous two studies, the loss or 
misuse of information is the most significant consequence of a cyber 
attack. Based on these findings, organizations need to be more vigilant 
in protecting their most sensitive and confidential information. 
PONEMON INST., 2012 COST OF CYBER CRIME STUDY: UNITED STATES 1 (2012), 
available at http://www.ponemon.org/local/upload/file/2012_US_Cost_of_Cyber 
_Crime_Study_FINAL6%20.pdf.  
 45.  For example, in December 2007, Britain’s MI5 issued an alert “to 300 
chief executives and security chiefs at banks, accountants and legal firms” warning 
that “Chinese state organizations” were targeting them for cyber attacks aimed at 
espionage with a goal of “steal[ing] confidential commercial information.” 
Britain’s MI5: Chinese Cyberattacks Target Top Companies, FOX NEWS (Dec. 3, 2007), 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/2007/12/03/britain-mi5-chinese-cyberattacks 
-target-top-companies/.  
Also, as noted in a study that considered attacks against military and non-
military entities, cyber espionage creates commercial advantage for competitors 
who gain information from the intruders: “We cannot accurately assess the dollar 
value of the loss in military technology but we can say that cyber espionage . . . 
shifts the terms of engagement in favor of foreign competitors.” JAMES LEWIS ET AL., 
CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF CYBERCRIME AND 
CYBER ESPIONAGE 4 (2013), available at http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources 
/reports/rp-economic-impact-cybercrime.pdf. 
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remotely accessing bulk power system (BPS) relays to 
damage rotating machines—such as generators, pumps or 
motors—that are connected to the power grid.46 
As cybersecurity expert Bruce Schneier explained at the time, 
the attack demonstration was launched remotely and destroyed a 
vital part of the rotating machinery: 
[T]hey were unable to hurt the generator you see in the 
video but did destroy the shaft that drives it and the power 
unit. They triggered the event from 30 miles away! Then 
they extrapolated the theory that a malfunctioning 
generator can destroy not only generators at the power 
company but the power glitches on the grid would destroy 
motors many miles away on the electric grid that pump 
water or gasoline (through pipelines).47 
Despite issuing the Aurora alert in Spring 2007, neither NERC 
nor its BPS member operators and owners made substantial 
changes in their cybersecurity practices, as if the alert were no 
more credible (and no less accurate) than a warning from a 
contemporary Cassandra.48 As a Congressional report critically 
observed in May 2013, NERC initiatives on cybersecurity do not 
appear geared to keep pace with the accelerating rapidity of the 
emerging cyber threats.49 
 
 46.  Bulk Power System Cyber Security, AM. PUB. POWER ASS’N 1 (Feb. 2013), 
http://www.publicpower.org/files/PDFs/BulkPowerCyberSecurityFeb2013IB.pdf.  
 47.  Bruce Schneier, Staged Attack Causes Generator to Self-Destruct, SCHNEIER ON 
SECURITY (Oct. 2, 2007, 6:26 AM), https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007 
/10/staged_attack_c.html (citing an anonymous email received regarding the 
Idaho National Laboratory video). 
Note that later, in the same blog post, Schneier asserts that “the vulnerability 
they hypothesize is completely bogus but I won’t say more about the details. Gitmo 
is still too hot for me this time of year.” Id. However, he may have reconsidered 
that view once reports of the success of Stuxnet emerged in 2010.  
 48.  In Greek mythology, Cassandra was a daughter of Priam, King of Troy 
depicted in the Iliad. The god Apollo endowed her with the gift of prophecy, but 
also deemed that no one would ever believe her prophecies. She prophesied the 
fall of Troy, and the Trojans refused to believe her. In contemporary English, a 
“Cassandra” is thus “anyone who expresses pessimistic views of the political or 
social future and is not listened to.” THE CHAMBERS DICTIONARY 263 (1993). 
 49.  The report noted that 
NERC’s record with regard to taking prompt action on grid security 
vulnerabilities and threats has raised concerns. For example, more 
than six years after the identification of the Aurora vulnerability 
discussed above, NERC still has not proposed any reliability standard 
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B. Stuxnet Worm Demonstrates Effectiveness of Remotely Launched, 
Kinetic Cyber Attacks Against Critical Infrastructure 
Simulations in a domestic national lab—and warnings issued 
on that basis—are one thing. It’s quite another thing when a cyber 
attack is tried against a major facility and works, damaging critical 
equipment and disrupting operations and product output.50 When 
that happened with the extraordinarily sophisticated, complex, 
stealthy, and potent worm launched against a major Iranian 
uranium processing facility with destructive consequences, the 
“handwriting was on the wall”—the cyber world had transitioned 
from science fiction and theoretical imaginings of an ominous 
 
directly addressing that vulnerability. Moreover, NERC’s CIP standards 
only apply to assets identified by utilities as critical. 
STAFF OF CONGRESSMEN EDWARD J. MARKEY & HENRY A. WAXMAN, 113TH CONG., 
ELECTRIC GRID VULNERABILITY: INDUSTRY RESPONSES REVEAL SECURITY GAPS 8 (May 
21, 2013), available at http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/sites/default 
/files/documents/Report-Electric-Grid-Vulnerability-2013-5-21.pdf.  
The arguably limited benefit of the CIP Standards to protect the BPS is 
evidenced also by the fact that “[p]ower plants under 1,500 MW are excluded even 
though that eliminates 70%–80% of the generation in North America.” David 
Savenije, Could a Cyberattack Take Out the U.S. Power Grid Today?, UTILITY DIVE 
(Sept. 6, 2013), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/could-a-cyberattack-take-out 
-the-us-power-grid-today. “The entire distribution network is excluded, as well as 
small transmission assets.” Id. 
 50.  Since 2007, as the ability to carry out kinetic cyber attacks has grown, so 
have efforts to use cyber tools to remotely collect intelligence about government 
organizations, military and defense sites, and energy sector company operations. 
As noted in a timeline posted on the website of NATO Review Magazine, such 
attacks have recently been widespread, and although they date back to 2007, their 
continuing exploits have only recently been discovered and disclosed publicly: 
   The Russian firm Kaspersky discovered a worldwide cyber-attack 
dubbed “Red October,” that had been operating since at least 2007. 
   Hackers gathered information through vulnerabilities in 
Microsoft’s Word and Excel programmes [sic]. The primary targets of 
the attack appear to be countries in Eastern Europe, the former USSR 
and Central Asia, although Western Europe and North America 
reported victims as well. 
   The virus collected information from government embassies, 
research firms, military installations, energy providers, nuclear and 
other critical infrastructures.  
The History of Cyber Attacks—A Timeline, NATO REV. MAG., http://www.nato.int 
/docu/review/2013/Cyber/timeline/EN/index.htm (select the “October 2012” 
entry on the timeline to access the quoted language) (last visited Dec. 27, 2013) 
(emphasis omitted). 
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future into a vivid demonstration of credible long-range, weapons-
grade cyber threats.51 The delivery system and its malware payload 
were dubbed “Stuxnet.”52 
Stuxnet’s effective attacks caused the Iranian uranium 
enrichment centrifuges at the Natanz facility to accelerate and 
decelerate at preset fifteen-minute intervals so that they rotated or 
spun at speeds above and below their specified operating range 
and then back within it (to disguise the disruption from the 
operators) until the centrifuges degraded and self-destructed. As 
explained in a Scientific American essay: 
Under normal operating conditions, the centrifuges spin 
so fast that their outer edges travel just below the speed of 
sound. Stuxnet bumped this speed up to nearly 1,000 
miles per hour, past the point where the rotor would 
likely fly apart, according to a December report by the 
Institute for Science and International Security. At the 
same time, Stuxnet sent false signals to control systems 
indicating that everything was normal.53 
The damage disrupted the facility’s product output for an 
extended period.54 Stuxnet reportedly caused over 900 rotating 
centrifuges at Natanz to self-destruct and severely damaged the 
rotating steam turbine in the Bushehr nuclear power plant.55 Initial 
reports of the discovery of Stuxnet appeared in June 2010.56 
 
 51.  See NICHOLAS FALLIERE ET AL., SYMANTEC SEC. RESPONSE, W32.STUXNET 
DOSSIER 1 (version 1.3, 2010), available at http://www.wired.com/images_blogs 
/threatlevel/2010/11/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  David M. Nicol, Hacking the Lights Out, SCI. AM., July 1, 2011, at 70, 71 
(arguing that the BPS “shares many of the vulnerabilities that Stuxnet exposed; 
being larger, its vulnerabilities are, if anything, more numerous”). 
 54.  See What Stuxnet Is All About, LANGNER (Jan. 10, 2011), 
http://www.langner.com/en/2011/01/10/what-stuxnet-is-all-about/. 
 55.  See Ed Barnes, Stuxnet Worm Still Out of Control at Iran’s Nuclear 
Sites, Experts Say, FOX NEWS (Dec. 9, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/scitech 
/2010/12/09/despite-iranian-claims-stuxnet-worm-causing-nuclear-havoc/ (“The 
Stuxnet worm . . . was equipped with a warhead that targeted and took over the 
controls of the centrifuge systems at Iran’s uranium processing center in Natanz, 
and it had a second warhead that targeted the massive turbine at the nuclear 
reactor in Bashehr.”).  
 56.  FALLIERE ET AL., supra note 51, at 4; PAUL K. KERR, JOHN ROLLINS & 
CATHERINE A. THEOHARY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE STUXNET COMPUTER WORM: 
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However, it appears that Stuxnet was launched two years earlier 
and had been infecting the Natanz enrichment plant and the 
Bushehr nuclear power plant for a year without the Iranian 
government’s (or the facilities’ operators’) awareness of the 
malware’s presence and stealthy conduct of sabotage in the 
facilities’ computer networks and system control and data 
acquisition (SCADA) systems.57 
Stuxnet’s makers apparently discovered that these plants were 
vulnerable to a cyber attack, not because the operational 
machinery and enrichment centrifuges are connected to the 
Internet—which they apparently are not—but because both plants’ 
operations and processes are monitored and controlled by SCADA 
systems, designed and manufactured by Siemens.58 The SCADA 
system, in turn, is operated by a “specialized assembly like code on 
programmable logic controllers (PLCs).”59 These PLCs tend to be 
programmed from Windows computers that also are not connected 
to the Internet (and certainly do not need to be Internet-
connected).60 The Stuxnet makers appear to have designed the 
malware to exploit vulnerabilities in the PLCs to then exploit 
vulnerabilities in the SCADA systems—tasks that required 
considerable intelligence on the PLCs and SCADA systems in these 
plants.61 
Equally alarming for operators and owners of critical 
infrastructure that depend on heavy equipment with spinning or 
rotating parts, Stuxnet not only hid its presence, but also created 
what is known as a “man-in-the-middle” attack to conceal from the 
SCADA system and plant operating personnel the unauthorized 
changes it was causing to the operations of the centrifuge motors.62 
Stuxnet took over the devices controlling the input to and output 
 
HARBINGER OF AN EMERGING WARFARE CAPABILITY 1 (2010), available at http://www 
.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41524.pdf.  
 57.  See The Short Path from Cyber Missiles to Dirty Digital Bombs, LANGNER 
(Dec. 26, 2010), http://www.langner.com/en/2010/12/26/the-short-path-from 
-cyber-missiles-to-dirty-digital-bombs/. 
 58.  See FALLIERE ET AL., supra note 51, at 3, 4. 
 59.  Id. at 3. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  See id. 
 62.  Ralph Langner, How to Hijack a Controller: Why Stuxnet Isn’t Just About 
Siemens’ PLCs, CONTROL (Jan. 13, 2011), http://www.controlglobal.com/articles 
/2011/IndustrialControllers1101.html.  
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from the centrifuges, without the controller devices recognizing 
it.63 Stuxnet did the same to the data being reported by the system 
to the operators: it substituted data it created, making it appear to 
the controller that the centrifuges were operating within their 
specified upper and lower ranges when in fact they were spinning 
at first too rapidly and then too slowly, destroying themselves in the 
process. As one analyst explained: “It’s just like you have seen it in 
movies where the bad guys feed observation cameras with 
unsuspicious pre-recorded video.”64 
C. Vulnerabilities of BPS Facilities to Remotely Launched, Kinetic Cyber 
Attacks 
By disguising the data input and output from the controlling 
devices and the plant operators, Stuxnet could carry out the 
ultimate aggressive cyber attack.65 Critical infrastructure plans often 
require continuous adjustment to operate properly—that is 
particularly true of BPS facilities.66 As explained in an MIT study, 
entitled The Future of the Electric Grid: 
The electric power system is operated through a 
combination of automated control and actions that 
require direct human (system operator) intervention. The 
main challenge in operating the electric power system is 
that there is negligible “electrical” storage in the system. 
Hence, supply and consumption of electrical power must 
be balanced at all times. Since the load is changing all the 
time in ways that cannot be perfectly predicted, 
generation must follow the load in real time. The balance 
between supply and demand is maintained using a 
hierarchical control scheme, with crude matching at the 
 
 63.  See FALLIERE ET AL., supra note 51, at 12–14.  
 64.  417 Attack Code: Doing the Man-in-the-Middle ON the PLC, LANGNER 
(Nov. 15, 2010), http://www.langner.com/en/2010/11/15/417-attack-code-doing 
-the-man-in-the-middle-on-the-plc/.  
 65.  For further discussion of Stuxnet and its relation to cybersecurity for 
nuclear power plants, see Roland L. Trope & Geoffrey Schwartz, Cyber Security for 
U.S.-Based Nuclear Power Plants (Jan. 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with author) (essay for continuing legal education program, ABA Cyberspace Law 
Committee’s annual Cyberspace Law Institute). 
 66.  MASS. INST. OF TECH., supra note 1, at 253–54. 
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longer timescale and finer matching at the shortest 
timescale . . . .67 
Unlike operations in many other industries, the “balancing” 
activities required to maintain stable operations in a BPS company 
require not only “24x7” monitoring, but close attention to the 
rapid, moment-to-moment changes in the electricity demand and 
supply that need to be continuously balanced—whenever they tip 
out of balance, they must be restored within seconds to avert 
tripping off cascading outages. In short, the operations must 
constantly protect the system from throwing itself out of balance 
and causing the company to fail to maintain the reliability of 
electric power required by the regulators to keep the system from 
degrading into blackouts. As the MIT study further explains: 
An important aspect of the operation of the electric 
power system is protection. This means ensuring the 
safety of the system, including generating units and other 
grid assets, and the people who may come in contact with 
the system. Protective action must be taken in fractions of 
a second to avoid equipment damage and human injury. 
Protection is achieved using sensing equipment as well as 
circuit breakers and other types of switches that can 
disconnect and de-energize parts of the system in the case 
of a fault, such as a damaged transmission line or a short 
circuit. . . . 
. . . Computers are regularly calculating system power 
flows and voltages under various possible contingencies, 
for example[,] the failure of a large generator or 
transmission line, to identify the best corrective action to 
take in each case. 
. . . [R]eal-time operation of the electric power 
system . . . ensure[s] that the system remains stable and 
protected while meeting end user power requirements. 
This requires a precise balance between power generation 
and consumption at all times. If this balance is not 
maintained the system can become unstable—its voltage 
and frequency can exceed allowable bounds—and result 
in damaged equipment as well as blackouts. If the balance 
is not restored sufficiently quickly, a local blackout can 
 
 67.  Id. at 254 (footnote omitted).  
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grow into a cascading blackout similar to the ones in the 
U.S. in 1965 and 2003.68 
The operators must therefore maintain and continuously 
update their situation awareness of a BPS facility’s equipment and 
electrical load balances so that if something starts to malfunction or 
electrical power generation and consumption begins to go out of 
balance the operators can start to correct it within a few seconds.69 
Any delay or error in the response could trigger cascading 
problems within the facility and to other parts of the 
interconnected BPS. The start of cascading outages that led to the 
August 2003 blackout across the Northeast United States and a 
Canadian province apparently could have been halted by operator 
intervention before it became widespread, but a “failure of the 
alarm processor in the control system of FirstEnergy, an Ohio-
based electric utility, prevented control room operators from 
having adequate situational awareness of critical operational 
changes to the electrical grid.”70 
 
 68.  Id. at 254–55.  
 69.  The general public and even most owners and operators of critical 
infrastructure tend to be unaware of or underestimate the precise, moment-to-
moment balancing required to maintain the reliability of a transmission grid like 
the BPS. NERC and its ten Regional Reliability Councils base their system 
operating and planning standards for ensuring grid reliability on seven crucial 
concepts: 
 Balance power generation and demand continuously. 
 Balance reactive power supply and demand to maintain scheduled 
voltages. 
 Monitor flows over transmission lines and other facilities to ensure 
that thermal (heating) limits are not exceeded. 
 Keep the system in a stable condition. 
 Operate the system so that it remains in a reliable condition even if 
a contingency occurs, such as the loss of a key generator or 
transmission facility . . . . 
 Prepare for emergencies. 
U.S.-CAN. POWER SYS. OUTAGE TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 6–7. 
 70.  Cybersecurity Challenges in Securing the Modernized Electricity Grid: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and 
Commerce, 112th Cong. 10–11 (2012) (statement of Gregory C. Wilshusen, Director 
of Information Security Issues), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/590 
/588913.pdf. Note, however, a different view is provided by the definitive study of 
the causes of the August 2003 blackout, which concluded that four causes 
combined to trigger it, including “[i]nadequate situational awareness at 
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An adversary planning a coordinated cyber attack against a 
BPS installation might attempt to disrupt, disorient, and mislead 
such real-time responses. If operators receive false information 
about equipment or system status (or information maliciously 
delayed to deprive it of its real-time accuracy and insight as needed 
for situational awareness71), they may fail to react in time (as 
happened during the Stuxnet attack) or they could be fed data to 
cause them to take the wrong—and thus damaging—corrective 
action (e.g., shedding electric loads when digital readouts indicate 
erroneously—at the direction of malware—that demand is 
slumping when it is, in fact, surging).72 
 
FirstEnergy. FE did not recognize or understand the deteriorating condition of its 
system.” U.S.-CAN. POWER SYS. OUTAGE TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 18.  
 71.  Nicol, supra note 53, at 74–75. 
Attackers could . . . simply attempt to delay messages traveling between 
control stations and substations. Ordinarily the lag time between a 
substation’s measurement of electricity flow and the control station’s 
use of the data to adjust flows is small—otherwise it would be like 
driving a car and seeing only where you were 10 seconds ago. (This 
kind of lack of situational awareness was a contributor to the Northeast 
Blackout of 2003.) 
Id. 
 72.  As explained in a recent research paper on cyber attacks against the 
smart grid: 
   An important class of cyber attacks are data integrity attacks. These 
consist of a set of compromised sensors (ex: power meters, relays) 
whose readings are altered by the attacker. . . .  
   Data integrity attacks are of consequence only when the system 
operator reacts to the compromised data and is misled into taking 
uneconomical or even catastrophic decisions.  
Annarita Giani et al., Metrics for Assessment of Smart Grid Data Integrity Attacks, 
IEEE Power & Energy Society General Meeting: Energy Horizons–Opportunities and 
Challenges, IDAHO NAT’L LABORATORY 1 (2012), available at http://www.inl.gov 
/technicalpublications/Documents/5517252.pdf (pre-print). 
   Intuitively the physical violation occurs when the data integrity 
attack increases load at bus 7 (decreasing load at bus 8). This causes 
the operator to think it can cheaply dispatch generation at bus 7 to 
satisfy the extra load at bus 7. As this extra load does not actually exist, 
the excess generation is shipped on the already saturated line (7, 8), 
causing an overload. 
Id. at 6.  
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D. Recently Discovered Vulnerabilities of BPS SCADA Systems 
These risks are not theoretical and certainly not limited to the 
world of espionage, as in the Stuxnet attack. Rather, as several 
engineers recently demonstrated repeatedly, vulnerabilities can be 
exploited and systems disabled in the communication protocol 
used by power and water utilities to remotely monitor substations 
and other infrastructure. In April 2013, engineers Adam Crain and 
Chris Sistrunk tested open-source software used in such utility 
SCADA systems and found that a widely used program called DNP3 
was vulnerable to cyber attack. The engineers demonstrated that a 
software product of Triangle MicroWorks, which uses DNP3, was 
vulnerable to cyber attack, allowing an attacker to infiltrate a power 
station’s control center from afar with the ability to take over the 
system and mask its entry, even bypassing traditional firewalls.73 
Despite the engineers’ prompt report of the vulnerabilities to ICS-
CERT,74 it took ICS-CERT four months to issue an alert and public 
advisory of the threats to critical infrastructure operators.75 In 
issuing the alert, ICS-CERT emphasized that it was encouraging 
asset owners to take additional defensive measures to protect 
against this and other cybersecurity risks by: 
 Minimizing network exposure for all control system devices. 
Critical devices should not directly face the Internet. 
 Locating control system networks and remote devices behind 
firewalls, and isolate them from the business network. 
 When remote access is required, using secure methods, such as 
Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing that VPN is only 
as secure as the connected devices.76 
 
 73.  Nicole Perlroth, The Electrical Grid Is Called Vulnerable to Power Shutdown, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2013), 2013 WLNR 26200409.  
 74.  ICS-CERT is the acronym for the Department of Homeland Security’s 
Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team. See ICS-CERT, 
http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2014). 
 75.  See Advisory, ICS-CERT, Triangle MicroWorks Improper Input Validation 
(rev. Sept. 17, 2013), https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-13-240-01. 
 76.  Id. 
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E. Chief Risks of Cyber Attacks Against BPS Companies Involve 
Targeting of Operational Systems 
Aware of these risks and the growing sophistication of 
potential cyber attacks, NERC perceived that the chief cyber risks to 
the BPS would be attacks that targeted operational systems, not 
business information systems. NERC therefore developed successive 
versions of cybersecurity standards (known as Critical 
Infrastructure Protection or CIP Standards77) and that, upon 
approval by FERC, became mandatory on BPS operators in the 
United States.78 Moreover, NERC took steps to identify the most 
serious threats—including cyber threats—to the reliability and 
resilience of the BPS. In July 2009, NERC and the U.S. Department 
of Energy (DoE) partnered on an effort to identify and address 
what became known as “high-impact, low-frequency” risks to the 
BPS.79 A year later, in June 2010, NERC and DoE released a report 
on those risks, which included cyber attacks: 
The risk of a coordinated cyber, physical, or blended 
attack against the North American bulk power system has 
become more acute over the past 15 years as digital 
communicating equipment has introduced cyber 
vulnerability to the system, and resource optimization 
trends have allowed some inherent physical redundancy 
within the system to be reduced. The specific concern 
with respect to these threats is the targeting of multiple 
key nodes on the system that, if damaged, destroyed, or 
interrupted in a coordinated fashion, could bring the 
system outside the protection provided by traditional planning 
and operating criteria. Such an attack would behave very 
differently than traditional risks to the system in that an 
intelligent attacker could mount an adaptive attack that 
 
 77.  See Critical Infrastructure Protection Committee (CIPC), N. AM. ELECTRIC 
RELIABILITY CORP., http://www.nerc.com/comm/CIPC/Pages/default.aspx (last 
visited Dec. 27, 2013); see also N. AM. ELECTRIC RELIABILITY CORP., RELIABILITY 
STANDARDS FOR THE BULK ELECTRIC SYSTEMS OF NORTH AMERICA (n.d.) [hereinafter 
BPS RELIABILITY STANDARDS], available at http://www.nerc.com/files/Reliability 
_Standards_Complete_Set.pdf (standards CIP-001-2a to -009-4).  
 78.  On January 18, 2008, FERC issued a Final Rule (Order No. 706) 
approving, pursuant to section 215 of the FPA, eight CIP Reliability Standards 
submitted to FERC for approval by NERC. 73 Fed. Reg. 7368 (Feb. 7, 2008) 
(codified at 18 C.F.R., pt. 40).  
 79.  See HILF REPORT, supra note 13. 
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would manipulate assets and potentially provide mis-
leading information to system operators attempting to 
address the issue.80 
A highly-coordinated and structured cyber, physical, 
or blended attack on the bulk power system, however, 
could result in long-term (irreparable) damage to key 
system components in multiple simultaneous or near-
simultaneous strikes. . . . An outage could result with the 
potential to affect a wide geographic area and cause large 
population centers to lose power for extended periods. 
. . . . 
The adversarial strategic advantage enjoyed by those 
targeting the bulk power system has been increased by the 
fact that sensitive information about critical bulk power 
system components and tools to carry out attacks are 
available and easily accessible in the public domain.81 
The High-Impact, Low-Frequency Report identifies eight 
examples of cyber threats, including two that clearly recognize that 
adversaries could deploy the Stuxnet-like capabilities against the 
BPS: 
 Unauthorized access attacks—attacks where the 
adversary exercises a degree of control over the 
system and accesses and manipulates assets without 
authorization 
 Unauthorized use of assets, resources, or infor-
mation—attack in which assets, services, or data are 
manipulated by an authorized user in an unauthorized 
manner. This can result in system operators being 
given inaccurate information from a ‘trusted’ source, 
and thereby being misled into making decisions based 
on this data that result in impacts to the system82 
 
 80.  Id. at 10 (emphasis added). 
 81.  Id. at 26–27. 
 82.  Id. at 29 (footnote omitted). 
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F. The Severe Event Cyber Attack Damage to BPS Operations That NERC 
Task Forces Anticipate Surpasses the Damage from Cyber Attacks 
Anticipated by Executive Order 13636 
If we compare the cyber threats and consequences anticipated 
by NERC and DoE, they appear to be far more severe than those 
identified by the President in the EO and PPD-21 several years 
later. During the period 2010–2013, however, NERC pressed 
forward to gain a greater understanding of the challenges that 
owners and operators of the BPS would face in the event that 
adversaries successfully launched the kind of attack foreseen by the 
High-Impact, Low-Frequency Report and that caused long-term 
damage to the grid and an impairment of the supply of electricity 
throughout the BPS. The NERC board approved a Coordinated 
Action Plan83 and formed task forces to study such events and the 
probable consequences in order to come up with recommended 
preparations for owners and operators of BPS companies. Two 
reports emerged from these task forces. Both reports were accepted 
by NERC’s Board of Trustees on May 9, 201284—nine months 
before the issuance of the EO and PPD-21. 
Interestingly, the 2012 NERC Task Force reports reflect a 
considerable advancement in NERC’s identification and 
understanding of the nature of anticipated coordinated cyber 
attacks. In our experience and review of sources,85 there are few 
 
 83.  See N. AM. ELECTRIC RELIABILITY CORP., IMPLEMENTING THE COORDINATED 
ACTION PLAN 4 (2011), available at http://www.nerc.com/comm/Other 
/Critical%20Infrastructure%20Strategic%20Coordinated%20Acti/Implementing 
_CAP_Feb_2011.pdf. 
 84.  CATF REPORT, supra note 13; SIRTF REPORT, supra note 13. 
 85.  Among its distinguishing features, the Cyber Attack Task Force included 
wholesale power generation and electric transmission and distribution, 
infrastructure manufacturing, and grid operating expertise in the United States 
and Canada (both IT and operational), discussions with federal agencies and law 
enforcement, and incorporated lessons learned from current and past initiatives. 
CATF REPORT, supra note 13, at 1, 42–43. The Severe Impact Resilience Task Force 
consisted of a team of energy industry subject matter experts with capabilities to 
respond to emergency situations to reliably restore and operate the 
interconnected bulk power system and contributed expertise in areas including 
power system operation, transmission planning, generating plant operation, 
protection and control, distribution operations, communications, logistics, 
emergency planning, crisis response, and cyber and physical security. SIRTF 
REPORT, supra note 13, at 8, 125–30. The authors have found no other reports or 
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that offer such intelligent, thoughtful, and well-written descriptions 
of what the current capabilities of cyber attacks pose in the way of 
threats to the BPS. 
The NERC Task Force report entitled Cyber Attack Task Force 
(the “CATF Report”) cautions that without the experience of a 
successful coordinated cyber attack against the BPS, “it is difficult 
to confidently determine the potential impact on the reliability of 
the bulk power system and what additional actions may need to be 
taken”86 by owners and operators to deal with the post-event 
damage, partial restoration of service, and prolonged recovery.87 
The CATF Report did not attempt to determine the likelihood of 
such an attack or to determine which functional entities might be 
more susceptible or vulnerable to attack. Instead, the CATF Report 
assumed that a coordinated cyber attack has occurred and adopted 
the following scenario to guide its work: 
An organized cyber disruption disables or impairs the 
integrity of multiple control systems, or intruders take 
operating control of portions of the bulk power system 
such that generation or transmission system[s] are 
damaged or operated improperly. 
1. Transmission Operators report unexplained and 
persistent breaker operation that occurs across a wide 
geographic area (i.e., within state/province and 
neighboring state/province). 
2. Communications are disrupted, disabling Transmission 
Operator voice and data with half their neighbors, 
their Reliability Coordinator, and Balancing Authority. 
3. Loss of load and generation causes widespread bulk 
power system instability, and system collapse within 
state/province and neighboring state(s)/province(s). 
Portions of the bulk power system remain operational. 
4. Blackouts in several regions disrupt electricity supply to 
several million people.88 
 
analyses that have so comprehensively and collaboratively considered the potential 
impacts of a severe cyber attack on the bulk power system and the anticipated 
response, recovery, and restoration efforts that will be required.  
 86.  CATF REPORT, supra note 13, at 1. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. at 2. 
39
Trope and Humes: Before Rolling Blackouts Begin: Briefing Boards on Cyber Attacks
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2014
 
686 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:2 
The success for an adversary in such a scenario (and indeed in 
any coordinated cyber attack against the BPS) depends on the 
occurrence of two events: “1) situational awareness needs to have 
been compromised and 2) there must be a bulk power system event 
or instability.”89 
The immediate and long-term consequences of such an attack 
were detailed in the NERC Task Force report entitled Severe Impact 
Resilience: Considerations and Recommendations (“SIRTF Report”).90 
The SIRTF Report looked at three “high-impact, low-frequency” 
scenarios as the initiating events—one of which was a coordinated 
cyber attack—described as follows: “A coordinated disruption 
disables or impairs the integrity of multiple control systems, or 
intruders take operating control of portions of the BPS such that 
generation or transmission system is damaged or mis-operated.”91 
The SIRTF Report anticipated that such an attack would push 
BPS companies “beyond the emergency response capabilities 
entities typically have in place,” resulting in a “Severe Event” and a 
post-attack “New Normal” for BPS operations.92 The SIRTF Report 
defined a “Severe Event” as “an emergency situation so catastrophic 
that complete restoration of electric service is not possible.” The 
BPS is operated at a reduced state of reliability and supply for 






 89.  Id. at 12. The CATF Report explains that “Situational Awareness is 
impacted IF 
 There is a Disruption / Compromise in Communications OR 
 There is a failure of the Energy Management System or Generation 
Management System OR 
 The Control Center is inaccessible or uninhabitable.” 
Id. at 13 (emphasis in original). The CATF Report also explains that “BPS 
Instability can occur IF 
 There is a Loss/Change in Generation OR 
 A Loss of Load OR 
 A Disruption to Transmission or Distribution.” 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
 90.  See SIRTF REPORT, supra note 13. 
 91.  Id. at 1. 
 92.  Id. at 2. 
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A Severe Event would challenge BPS operators and owners 
because their companies would not be able to meet all electricity 
consumers’ demands for rapid restoration of service.94 Instead, they 
would have to prioritize customers and attempt to serve the highest 
 
 93.  Id. at 2. This image from the North American Electric Reliability 
Corporation’s website is the property of the North American Electric Reliability 
Corporation and is available at http://www.nerc.com/comm/OC/SIRTF 
%20Related%20Files%20DL/SIRTF_FinalDraft_Feb_24_2012.pdf. This content 
may not be reproduced in whole or any part without the prior express written 
permission of the North American Electric Reliability Corporation. 
Note that NERC’s Task Force reports are not alone in foreseeing the 
duration of a post-attack, New Normal period of substantially reduced electric 
power. As one federal study reported in 2012: 
[I]f [a terrorist cyber attack] were carried out in a carefully planned 
way, by people who knew what they were doing, it could deny large 
regions of the country access to bulk system power for weeks or even 
months. An event of this magnitude and duration could lead to 
turmoil, widespread public fear, and an image of helplessness that 
would play directly into the hands of the terrorists. If such large 
extended outages were to occur during times of extreme weather, they 
could also result in hundreds or even thousands of deaths due to heat stress or 
extended exposure to extreme cold.  
. . . . 
   Electric systems are not designed to withstand or quickly recover 
from damage inflicted simultaneously on multiple components. 
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 19, at 1.  
 94.  SIRTF REPORT, supra note 13, at 2. 
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priority customers with limited resources.95 The SIRTF Report 
provides recommendations and suggestions for BPS companies to 
consider as guidance to assist them in developing “their own 
approaches and flexible plans that would be applicable under a 
wide variety of circumstances” in the post-Severe Event period or 
New Normal of degraded service and limited resources.96 An 
important characteristic of the New Normal period is that BPS 
companies would not operate as part of a “large interconnected 
(and therefore more stable) grid[;]” instead, operators would need 
to prepare to “manage a number of small electrical islands and 
implement load shedding or rotating blackouts for extended 
periods of time (weeks, months or years).”97 Although “island 
operation” is not new for BPS companies—and in fact, the BPS 
itself consists of four large “islands” referred to as 
“Interconnections”98—the post-Severe Event situation would go 
beyond anything BPS companies had experienced or to date have 
planned to handle: 
[T]he islands will be much smaller, more numerous, may 
comprise areas that fall under the authority of several 
different operating entities, and last for significantly 
longer periods of time (weeks, months or years) than 
previously experienced . . . . 
. . . Rotating blackouts help manage the supply and 
demand balance by rotating supply to different blocks of 
load, typically on a geographic basis, on a defined 
schedule or timeline. 
. . . Following a Severe Event, it is not possible to 
predict what islands will be formed and this is further 
complicated when these island boundaries cross the 
balancing areas that are very familiar during normal 
operation. In fact, this occurred following the August 14, 
2003 blackout . . . .99 
 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. at 3. 
 98.  Id. at 18. 
 99.  Id. As the SIRTF Report emphasizes, even the August 2003 blackout, by 
definition, was within the operating experience of the BPS. By contrast, the SIRTF 
Report points out, “The SIRTF [Report] uses the term ‘New Normal’ to describe 
degraded planning and operating conditions unlike anything the industry has ever 
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The NERC Task Forces, however, do not view the August 14, 
2003, blackout as providing the kind of experience from which BPS 
owners and operators can merely extrapolate in order to make 
plans and preparations for a Severe Event. The August 2003 
blackout lasted only a few days; did not damage long lead-time 
equipment; did not involve an ongoing coordinated, adaptive 
attack that disrupted internal BPS company communications (or 
 
experienced in North America that could exist for months or years.” Id. at 14 
(emphasis added). 
The similarity of certain aspects of operations does not equate with creating 
something the industry has experienced before because the magnitude of 
disruption, extent of confusion, and duration of degraded operations remove 
operations and operators far from what they can extrapolate from in their 
experiences of previous outages. As the SIRTF Report carefully explains, 
[m]any aspects of operations in the New Normal are not entirely 
different from what entities have experienced to date but will be much 
more challenging for a number of reasons. For example, island 
operation in itself is nothing new—the North American grid is 
operated in four large islands known as the Interconnections. The 
challenge in operating islands following a Severe Event scenario is that 
the islands will be much smaller, more numerous, may comprise areas 
that fall under the authority of several different operating entities, and 
last for significantly longer periods of time (weeks, months or years) 
than previously experienced. Load shedding activities are also likely to 
be similar to, and very likely based upon, existing load shedding and 
rotating blackout plans required to respond to EEA-3 conditions 
(interruption of firm load). However, experience with implementing 
load shedding plans has been limited to relatively short periods of 
time—a few hours or at most a day or two. In contrast, under Severe 
Event conditions, rotating blackouts may need to be implemented for 
an extended period of time and for significantly longer rotation 
intervals.  
   Following a Severe Event on the BPS entities should expect that it 
will not be possible to fully restore the BPS to pre-event conditions and 
the system will be significantly degraded. In order to operate the BPS it 
will likely be necessary to operate in multiple electrical islands, and use 
emergency criteria, rotating blackouts, and a number of independent 
control actions to maintain the supply and demand balance and 
manage frequency and voltage. Rotating blackouts help manage the 
supply and demand balance by rotating supply to different blocks of 
load, typically on a geographic basis, on a defined schedule or 
timeline. 
Id. at 18 (footnotes omitted). “The New Normal operating environment may 
require system operators to operate with far more risk of potentially damaging 
equipment and/or cascading islands.” Id. at 33. 
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communications between BPS companies); and did not involve the 
generation by malware of false and misleading system status 
information to operators to deprive them of situational awareness. 
For such reasons, the August 2003 blackout does not rise to the 
magnitude of disruption and damage that would qualify an 
incident as a Severe Event. 
The NERC Task Forces carefully define and use the term 
Severe Event. The term should not become a synonym for a kinetic 
cyber attack or other disruptive cause that permits a restoration of 
pre-event levels of BPS operations and services as occurred shortly 
after the August 14, 2003 outage or after Hurricane Sandy in 2012 
(where most BPS customers had power restored by early 
December—less than six weeks after Hurricane Sandy struck). A 
better example of a Severe Event (not caused by a cyber attack) was 
the combination of the earthquake and tsunami that caused the 
long-term consequences at Fukushima, and which exceeded 
decades of experiences by Japanese critical infrastructure operators 
and have continued to date (and thus years later) to overwhelm the 
recovery efforts.100 
 
 100.  Among the continuing unsolved consequences are that as of August 
2013, more than two years after the tsunami initially exposed the local 
environment to radiation from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant, 
radioactive water is still leaking into the ocean, spelling more trouble 
for the local fishing industry along the coast of Fukushima prefecture.  
   Last month the plant’s owner, Tepco, finally admitted what many 
had suspected—that the plant was leaking. Now Japan’s Nuclear 
Regulatory Authority is calling the situation an emergency, and says 
Tepco’s plans to stop the leak are unlikely to work. 
Michael Marshall, Fukushima Leaks Will Keep Fisheries Closed, NEW SCIENTIST, Aug. 10, 
2013, at 01, available at 2013 WLNR 19567859.  
The use of the word “leak,” in such reportage, minimizes and trivializes the 
ongoing contamination. “Leak” suggests something diminutive (as in “a faucet 
leak” or “roof leak”). In fact, the “leak” admitted by Tepco on October 1, 2013, 
turned out to be “four tonnes of rainwater contaminated with low levels of 
radiation.” Fukushima Plant Operator Reports New Leak, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 1, 
2013, 3:29 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/01/fukushima-leak_n 
_4020972.html.  
Moreover, NERC’s concept of high-impact, low-frequency events has gained 
recognition by other organizations attempting to prepare critical infrastructure for 
incidents that far exceed previous experience, surpass what emergency plans had 
contemplated, and stress all efforts at recovery and restoration of operations and 
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There are several major causes for the prolonged New Normal 
period, including: 
 if the cyber attack caused overvoltage conditions (as occurred 
during the geomagnetic disturbance in North America on 
March 13–14, 1989), generator step-up transformers, among 
other equipment, could be damaged;101 
 if such damage is widespread, it could deplete the inventory of 
spare units and parts that BPS companies maintain; 
 if several kinds of heavy equipment, such as transformers, are 
no longer manufactured in the United States and would have 
 
services. See, for example, the observation by a recent report from The Chatham 
House: 
   The frequency of ‘high-impact, low-probability’ (HILP) events in 
the last decade signals the emergence of a new ‘normal.’ Apparent 
one-off high-profile crises such as 9/11, Hurricane Katrina, the 
Macondo oil spill and the Japanese earthquake and tsunami were all 
mega-disasters requiring rapid responses at a global level, marking the 
beginning of a crisis trend. But lower-profile, persistent events such as 
flooding, droughts, and cyclones have been shown to have equally 
serious impacts, raising new questions about the way in which we 
perceive risk and prepare for disruptive events.  
. . . . 
   Despite considerable efforts to improve scientific understanding 
and reform risk management approaches, governments and business 
remain insufficiently prepared to confront HILP crises and effectively 
manage their economic, social, political and humanitarian 
consequences. 
   Current contingency planning often assumes the return of the 
status quo ante after a crisis. But this approach may be inadequate in a 
world of complex economic and social risks, especially when combined 
with slow-motion crises like climate change and water scarcity. Slow-
motion crises such as these build over many years, but are likely to 
result in a higher frequency and greater severity of shocks. 
BERNICE LEE ET AL., ROYAL INST. OF INT’L AFFAIRS, PREPARING FOR HIGH-IMPACT, LOW-
PROBABILITY EVENTS 2 (2012), available at http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites 
/default/files/public/Research/Energy,%20Environment%20and 
%20Development/r0112_highimpact.pdf. 
 101.  Two such transformers were damaged as a result of the large impulse 
that occurred in the earth’s geomagnetic field along the U.S./Canadian border 
early on March 13, 1989, and the resulting collapse of the Quebec 
Interconnection (which started a mere ninety-two seconds after the impulse). 
See Gerry Cauley, Electric Infrastructure Security Summit: Industry Perspectives Panel, 
N. AM. ELECTRIC RELIABILITY CORP. 2 (Apr. 12, 2011), http://www.nerc.com/news 
/testimony/Testimony%20and%20Speeches/EISS_Cauley_12APR11.pdf.  
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to be procured from Asia, the lead times from order to 
delivery may exceed six months or longer.102 
 
 102.  See N. AM. ELECTRIC RELIABILITY CORP., INDUSTRY ADVISORY: PREPARING FOR 
GEO-MAGNETIC DISTURBANCES 5–6 (2011), available at http://www.nerc.com 
/fileUploads/File/Events%20Analysis/A-2011-05-10-01_GMD_FINAL.pdf 
(containing recommendations that include: “Inventory assessment: Due to their 
long-lead manufacture time, identify those installed high voltage transformers . . . 
that could be damaged from high levels of GIC [geomagnetically induced 
currents].”).  
The length of the long lead times for damaged BPS equipment is 
summarized in a report by the Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Commission from 
2008, and the facts set forth appear to continue to be an accurate assessment of 
the acquisition times: 
   Recovery from transmission system damage and power plant 
damage will be impeded primarily by the manufacture and delivery of 
long lead-time components. Delivery time for a single, large 
transformer today is typically one to two years and some very large 
special transformers, critical to the system, are even longer. There are 
roughly 2,000 transformers in use in the transmission system today at 
345 kV and above with many more at lesser voltages that are only 
slightly less critical. No transformers above 100 kV are produced in the 
United States any longer. The current U.S. replacement rate for the 
345 kV and higher voltage units is 10 per year; worldwide production 
capacity of these units is less than 100 per year. Spare transformers are 
available in some areas and systems, but because of the unique 
requirements of each transformer, there are no standard spares. The 
spares also are owned by individual utilities and not generally available 
to others due to the risk over the long lead time if they are being used. 
Transformers that will cover several options are very expensive and are 
both large and hard to move. 
EMP COMM’N, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO ASSESS THE THREAT TO THE UNITED 
STATES FROM ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE (EMP) ATTACK 49 (2008), available at 
http://www.empcommission.org/docs/A2473-EMP_Commission.pdf. 
Even if such equipment were only partially damaged by a kinetic cyber 
attack, there would be a prolonged period for restoration of service because the 
equipment would need to be tested before being returned to service. As the EMP 
Commission’s report explained: 
   Even if partially disabled control systems successfully protect the 
critical generating equipment, all affected plants would face a long 
process of testing and repairing control, protective, and sensor systems. 
Protective and safety systems have to be carefully checked out before 
start up or greater loss might occur. Repair of furnaces, boilers, 
turbines, blades, bearings, and other heavy high-value and long lead-
time equipment would be limited by production and transportation 
availability once at-site spares are exhausted. While some spare 
components are at each site and sometimes in spare parts pools 
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The initial challenge after what appears to be the end of the 
cyber attack might be that the attack is not singular, that only the 
first stage has ended, and that subsequent stages may further 
damage equipment, compromise situational awareness with 
misinformation displayed to operators, and create confusion and 
fatigue that leads operators to make more errors and gradually 
become less capable of handling the multiple crises.103 As explained 
in the CATF Report: 
During a cyber attack and the following aftermath, 
responders may be lulled into the false sense of security 
that there is only one wave of assault. As with a storm, 
once the storm passes, everyone pitches in to begin the 
restoration process with a clear and understood recovery 
plan. If the attack vector(s) and techniques/tools for the 
attack are not fully understood and mitigated, the attacker 
could launch subsequent attacks to disrupt recovery 
efforts or respond to mitigation efforts. These later attack 
waves may hold devastating impact potential if not 
understood and expected.104 
In order for a BPS company’s operations to survive and to be 
available for the highest priority customers (including hospitals, 
telecommunications, first responders, and service stations), the 
owners and operators would need to have planned for isolation of 
service in “islands” of electric power and to manage for an 
extended time with degradation of reliable operations. This would 
“result[] in the gradual reduction in services and functions until 
essential operations are no longer possible. The key is trying to 
maintain reliable operations in a reduced state for as long as 
 
domestically, these would not cover very large high-value items in most 
cases, so external sources would be needed. Often supply from an 
external source can take many weeks or several months in the best of 
times, if only one plant is seeking repair, and sometimes a year or 
more. With multiple plants affected at the same time, let alone 
considering infrastructure impediments, restoration time would 
certainly become protracted. 
Id. at 31. We doubt that most critical infrastructure owners and operators have 
plans for Severe Events, and if they do not, then they probably also have not 
included in contingency plans an expectation for a prolonged New Normal period 
and the extent to which that may vary as a result of these extraordinarily long lead 
times to acquire replacement parts and equipment. 
 103.  See CATF REPORT, supra note 13, at 29. 
 104.  Id. 
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possible. This resilience characteristic is known as graceful 
degradation of service.”105 In such circumstances, monitoring and 
situational awareness would decline as “automated processes 
designed to inform operational staff are systemically severed.”106 
Communications between neighboring system control centers 
would deteriorate and could pose hazards to one another via their 
communications links as a result of “[i]nternal data corruption, 
man in the middle scenarios, [and] malicious code injections.”107 
The SIRTF Report identified operational problems that BPS 
companies would experience during the post-event New Normal, 
presenting an inexorably complicated situation. 
 Although power is reliably restored to some 
consumers, planned and unplanned rotating blackouts 
disrupt service without warning as system operators 
manage BPS reliability with limited generation and 
transmission resources and unfamiliar operating 
conditions. 
. . . . 
 Other critical infrastructures are affected by electricity 
disruptions. For example, gasoline and diesel fuel 
shortages will occur as oil refineries take several days or 
longer to recover from each electricity service 
disruption. 
. . . . 
 Consumers experience large fluctuations in voltage 
and frequency that may trip sensitive electronic 
equipment.108 
What emerges from the SIRTF Report is a cold, hard look at 
what the BPS could be reduced to following a Severe Event 
involving a coordinated, sequential, and adaptive cyber attack. The 
SIRTF Report carefully distinguishes its use of the term “rapid” 
recovery from its colloquial usage in other critical infrastructure 
sectors, noting that “‘[r]apid’ recovery as used by the SIRTF 
[Report] does not mean rapid recovery to the pre-crisis operation 
level but to the New Normal.”109 The ensuing prolonged New 
 
 105.  Id. at 28 (emphasis added). 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  SIRTF REPORT, supra note 13, at 16. 
 109.  Id. at 13 n.17. 
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Normal period110 would ration electricity along what would appear 
to be an archipelago of electric “islands.” Keeping each of those 
“islands” operational and preventing each from tripping outages in 
any of the others to which it might still or eventually be 
interconnected would be challenging for BPS companies. 
Customary maintenance and repair would become extraordinary 
because so much would be unfamiliar, resources would be depleted 
and not quickly or cost-effectively replenished, and the BPS would 
be operated in a continuously stressed condition.111 As the SIRTF 
Report describes it: 
A highly stressed system should be expected during the 
New Normal period, characterized by islanded operation, 
rotating blackouts, lower system inertia and higher 
network impedance (i.e., reduced synchronizing torque), 
different short circuit currents and critical clearing times, 
and reduced stability margins. Through the New Normal, 
protection relay settings may not be optimal and 
unwanted operations may occur.112 
Because the SIRTF Report’s audience is the BPS operators and 
owners, it does not address (except in an occasional sentence) the 
significance of Severe Events for other critical infrastructure 
companies outside the electric power industry.113 Instead, the 
Report focuses its recommendations on helping BPS companies 
prepare to respond to a Severe Event and to maintain and restore 
service during the anticipated prolonged New Normal period.114 
 
 110.  See id. at 57. 
 111.  Id.  
 112.  Id.  
 113.  Id. at 10–11.  
 114.  The SIRTF Report places primary emphasis on planning and doing so in 
an evolutionary way throughout the crisis: “The tasks of system planners will evolve 
through the mitigation, restoration, and New Normal phases of a Severe Event.” 
Id. at 47. 
   A highly stressed system should be expected during the New 
Normal period, characterized by islanded operation, rotating 
blackouts, lower system inertia and higher network impedance 
(i.e., reduced synchronizing torque), different short circuit currents 
and critical clearing times, and reduced stability margins. Through the 
New Normal, protection relay settings may not be optimal and 
unwanted operations may occur.  
Id. at 57. 
   By [the return to Normal Reliability] the restoration of system 
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Thus, the SIRTF Report’s suggestions “are in the form of industry 
guidelines that describe practices that may be used by individual 
entities according to local circumstances” and are not intended to 
be adopted or proposed as cybersecurity standards or as a 
supplement to NERC’s cybersecurity CIP Standards.115 However, 
the CATF Report and the SIRTF Report continue the approach 
adopted in the High-Impact, Low-Frequency Report by focusing on 
preparations that companies should make in order to put their 
personnel in a position to handle post-attack consequences for 
which they have no previous experience, that existing contingency 
plans do not address or contemplate, and that the success in 
handling will therefore depend on the extent to which senior 
management was willing to extend its previous understanding of 
what constituted a “worst case scenario” and to make preparations 
accordingly.116 
Interestingly, the NERC approach to such situations resembles 
that of the U.S. Navy’s handling of “damage control” for onboard 
incidents that threaten lives and the integrity of the ship or boat.117 
 
planning capabilities will be complete, although it may differ from the 
original. System planning efforts may be required to reconcile short 
and longer-term plans with the requirements of the post-New Normal 
system and its remaining loads. . . . Factors may include: Permanent 
loss of load, in particular, industrial load . . . .  
Id. at 50. 
 115.  Id. at 2. 
 116.  Id. at 47–48; CATF REPORT, supra note 13, at 1–2, 12–13. 
 117.  NERC’s SIRTF Report attempts to prepare owners and operators of BPS 
companies for being thrust into Severe Events that take them beyond any crisis 
they or the industry has previously experienced—and to place the emphasis on 
rigorous, serious preparations, not mere compliance with a minimal standard. 
The Navy emphasizes such preparations not only through its damage control 
training, but through the ship integrity checks it routinely conducts. A vivid 
example, which occurs on surface ships and submarines, is a compartment test for 
“leaks”—to ensure that each compartment is, indeed, watertight. Notice the Navy’s 
requirements for such tests—and the ultimate use of something as simple, reliable, 
and available as a “lighted candle” during such checks, which one of the authors of 
this essay has observed on board a submarine before submerging. The test starts 
with sealing it and then evacuating the air: 
   While the compartment is under test, leaks will be disclosed by 
hissing or whistling noises as the air escapes. All leaks should be 
located, marked, and listed for corrective action. You should repair all 
leaks that were found and then test the compartment again. If the 
allowable pressure drop is again exceeded on this test, apply a soap 
 
50
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 9
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol40/iss2/9
 
2014] BEFORE ROLLING BLACKOUTS BEGIN 697 
The Navy trains its officers and crews to recognize that the initial 
response to dangerous incidents, such as onboard fires, hull 
breaches, and compartment flooding, will probably be the single 
most important influence on whether the response is ultimately 
successful.118 The Navy thus trains in “damage control” by not only 
simulating the worst-case accidents, but making unavailable certain 
key personnel so that crews learn to respond to an incident 
correctly at the start even if the key officers and non-commissioned 
officers (NCOs) are not present or too injured to give orders and 
supervise efforts.119 Similarly, the High-Impact, Low-Frequency 
Report emphasized: 
 
solution to the boundaries of the compartment and to all joints, 
fittings, and closures. When the air pressure is applied, bubbles will be 
formed by escaping air, thus indicating the location of the leaks. 
   The observer inside the compartment will have a lighted candle. As 
the observer goes over areas where leaks are suspected, the deflection 
of the flame will indicate the location of leaks. 
U.S. NAVY, DAMAGE CONTROLMAN: NAVEDTRA 14057, at 3-23 (2003), 
available at http://www.everyspec.com/USN/NAVEDTRA/download.php?spec= 
NAVEDTRA_14057_AUG2003.018403.PDF. 
 118.  Edward H. Lundquist, Damage Control Training Makes Sailors Feel the Heat, 
DEF. MEDIA NETWORK, (June 18, 2012), http://www.defensemedianetwork.com 
/stories/sailors-feel-the-heat-2/ (“A crew must be trained to do the right thing, 
and do it quickly. Thorough and realistic training can truly save lives, and the ship, 
especially before the extent of the damage gets out of control. According to a 
World War II Navy manual, The Handbook of Damage Control, published by the Naval 
Damage Control Training Center, Philadelphia in May 1945, ‘[i]f the ship does 
not sink within a very few minutes after damage, she probably will survive for 
several hours.’”). 
 119.  On board ship, the term “damage control” does not mean “spin” as in 
the corporate context. “[D]amage control is serious business and an ‘all-hands’ 
responsibility.” U.S. NAVY, supra note 117, at 1-4. Current damage control 
procedures, set forth in NTTP 3-20.31 (Surface Ship Survivability), chapter 5, are 
under restricted access and not available to the general public. Our experience in 
working and speaking with U.S. and foreign navy personnel and navy engineers 
informs our statements in this section. In addition, passages from U.S. Navy 
publication Damage Controlman, NAVEDTRA 14057, reflect the Navy’s view that 
each member of a damage control party should be capable of acting correctly if 
orders are not quickly received and capable of taking the place and discharging 
the responsibilities of other members of the damage control party. Illustrative are 
the following passages: 
Your ability to lead others is particularly important because in casualty 
situations damage control often becomes an ‘all-hands’ evolution. In 
these situations, a Damage Controlman holds a key position in the 
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As HILF [high-impact, low-frequency] risks occur very 
infrequently, the success or failure of a response is more 
dependent on thorough planning and preparation than on 
operational experience. The ability to effectively respond to a 
changing threat environment—especially in the case of an 
adaptive attack—will be measured by the efficacy of the 
system operator’s initial response. The operator will rely on 
the sophistication of the tools under his immediate 
control and his training in those circumstances, neither of 
which can be provided in the minutes preceding an event. 
These tools and the training needed to ensure an 
appropriate response must be developed and deployed 
well in advance of the event.120 
In short, the focus of the NERC Task Force reports is on 
preparedness for infrequent, unprecedented Severe Events and the 
resulting New Normal conditions. Those conditions of uncertainty, 
stress, and impaired situational awareness and the challenges 
requiring a resourceful response cannot be adequately handled 
with “last minute” preparations or plans that have been rehearsed 
under good conditions instead of those that stress their underlying 
assumptions. 
 
damage control organization and is required to coordinate the efforts 
of others for the successful control of damage.  
. . . . 
   . . . [E]ach repair party needs to monitor the reports from all the 
other repair parties. By monitoring these reports, each repair party will 
be able to assume the duties of DCC [the damage control center] if 
DCC becomes a battle casualty.  
. . . . 
   Provide for a repair party, remotely located from DCC [the damage 
control center], to assume the responsibilities of DCC, in the event 
that DCC becomes a battle casualty.  
. . . . 
   No two emergency situations are identical. Therefore, the 
corrective action taken will vary to some extent. The responsibilities of 
each member of the fire party will normally remain the same. However, 
there are times when a person will have to assume other 
responsibilities. As an example, the nozzleman is injured while fighting 
a fire. The hoseman then takes the nozzleman’s place. The nozzleman 
is evacuated from the scene and another person replaces the hoseman.  
Id. at 1-1, 2-2, 2-8 to -9, 2-11. 
 120.  HILF REPORT, supra note 13, at 23. 
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If the White House initiatives and NERC initiatives were both 
directed at addressing cyber attacks that might cause a Severe 
Event, then their respective recommendations to critical 
infrastructure companies might be creating a coherent plan of 
action for such companies and their operators and owners. Instead, 
as we explain in the next section, the White House initiatives do 
not expressly reflect the findings of NERC’s CATF Report and 
SIRTF Report, nor do they view a Severe Event as a definitive worst-
case scenario or contain any recommendations or directions that 
would do much to urge critical infrastructure to prepare to address 
such a degradation of services. In short, although the White House 
initiatives speak in terms of “catastrophic” consequences, those 
initiatives have much lower objectives, and achievement of them 
would appear to do little to protect critical infrastructure against 
the consequences of a Severe Event. 
G. Cyber Threats as Envisioned by Executive Order 13636, PPD-21, and 
Explanations by White House Staff 
Although the EO cites “[r]epeated cyber intrusions into 
critical infrastructure” and characterizes their occurrence as “one 
of the most serious national security challenges,”121 the EO only 
gives a hint about the consequences of such intrusions.122 The hint 
consists simply of the EO assertion that certain critical 
infrastructure, if affected by a “cybersecurity incident,” could result 
in “catastrophic regional or national effects.”123 The EO, moreover, 
does not use cyber-threat terms, such as “coordinated cyber attack,” 
“severe impact,” “Severe Event,” or “New Normal,” adopted by the 
NERC Task Force reports, which were issued nine months earlier 
and thus available to the White House drafting team.124 
 
 121.  Exec. Order No. 13,636, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,739, 11,739 (Feb. 19, 2013). 
 122.  Moreover, the term “intrusions” does not equate with “attacks” and often 
intelligence-gathering “intrusions” precede the launch of a cyber attack. Thus, it is 
unclear from the EO what percentage of such “intrusions” are attacks and which 
kinds of “intrusions” the EO seeks to address and might assign the highest priority 
to averting. 
 123.  78 Fed. Reg. at 11,742. 
 124.  The EO also does not use any of the supplemental terminology that the 
SIRTF Report adopts for discussing “resilience” of the BPS, such as “robustness” 
(“[t]he ability to absorb shocks and keep operating”), “resourcefulness” (“[t]he 
ability to manage a disruption as it unfolds”), and “rapid recovery” (“[t]he ability 
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We received an advanced copy of the EO, read those words 
early that evening, and anticipated that the President would draw 
attention to and express the gravity of that threat in his State of the 
Union address, which he was to deliver that night. Instead, he 
mentioned the threat and the EO in passing, treating it as just 
another item on a State of the Union checklist. The President 
described it in terms that minimized and trivialized the threat 
(words that we put in italics) in the following text of the President’s 
address: 
America must also face the rapidly growing threat 
from cyber-attacks. We know hackers steal people’s 
identities and infiltrate private e-mail. We know foreign 
countries and companies swipe our corporate secrets. Now 
our enemies are also seeking the ability to sabotage our 
power grid, our financial institutions, and our air traffic 
control systems. We cannot look back years from now and 
wonder why we did nothing in the face of real threats to 
our security and our economy. 
And that’s why, earlier today, I signed a new executive 
order that will strengthen our cyber defenses by 
increasing information sharing, and developing standards 
to protect our national security, our jobs, and our 
privacy.125 
The President’s State of the Union address made cyber threats 
to the nation’s critical infrastructure seem anything but urgent or 
imminent. And more surprisingly, the President made the threat 
and the response to it appear neat, clean, clear, and 
straightforward. However, to owners and operators of critical 
infrastructure companies, the cyber threats targeting their 
enterprises and the allocation of responsibilities for addressing 
those threats appear quite different—complicated, messy,126 murky, 
and disorienting. Operators and owners of critical infrastructure 
 
to get back to [n]ormal as quickly as possible”). See SIRTF REPORT, supra note 13, 
at 102. 
 125.  Barack Obama, President of the U.S., State of the Union Address 
(Feb. 12, 2013) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press 
-office/2013/02/12/remarks-president-state-union-address) (emphasis added). 
 126.  T.E. Lawrence observed: “Analogy in human things was fudge, anyhow; 
and war upon rebellion was messy and slow, like eating soup with a knife.” SEVEN 
PILLARS OF WISDOM: A TRIUMPH 193 (1935). Cyber war too is “messy” and slow only 
in the preparation, not in the execution.  
54
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 9
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol40/iss2/9
 
2014] BEFORE ROLLING BLACKOUTS BEGIN 701 
companies—and their companies’ boards of directors—were left 
asking just how “credible” is the cyber threat if the President 
describes it with no sense of urgency, no sound of alarm, and no 
clear statement of the actions the federal government will take to 
address it. 
Moreover, the conclusory assertion that the nation’s cyber 
defenses would be strengthened by “increasing information sharing 
[with private industry]” may have been puzzling to owners and 
operators of BPS companies who may have recalled that a few 
months earlier FERC Chairman Wellinghoff made “information 
sharing” appear of limited, if any, use to a cyber-targeted BPS 
company. As Chairman Wellinghoff put it, “If I had a cyber threat 
that was revealed to me in a letter tomorrow, there is little I could 
do the next day to ensure that that threat was mitigated effectively 
by the utilities that were targeted.”127 
Owners and operators of BPS companies and their boards of 
directors cannot ignore or fail to prepare for federal information 
sharing that might put them on notice of imminent cyber threats 
against their enterprises. Moreover, as PPD-21 (issued that same 
night) makes clear, the White House views the owners and 
operators of critical infrastructure as ultimately responsible for the 
cybersecurity of their enterprise and, in some mysterious, 
unexplained way, for integrating their preparations with the 
“national preparedness system.” As PPD-21 states in its 
introduction: 
Critical infrastructure owners and operators are uniquely 
positioned to manage risks to their individual operations 
and assets, and to determine effective strategies to make 
them more secure and resilient. 
Critical infrastructure must be secure and able to 
withstand and rapidly recover from all hazards. Achieving 
this will require integration with the national 
preparedness system across prevention, protection, 
mitigation, response, and recovery.128 
PPD-21 purports to establish national policy on “critical 
infrastructure security and resilience.”129 Inexplicably, for two key 
policy directives originating in the White House on the same day, 
 
 127.  Colman, supra note 33.  
 128.  PPD-21, supra note 38, at 1. 
 129.  Id.  
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PPD-21 emphasizes a concept—“resilience”—that appears only 
once in the EO.130 The term “resilience” appears forty-four times in 
PPD-21, which defines it to mean 
the ability to prepare for and adapt to changing 
conditions and withstand and recover rapidly from 
disruptions. Resilience includes the ability to withstand 
and recover from deliberate attacks, accidents, or 
naturally occurring threats or incidents.131 
Throughout PPD-21 the term “security” tends to be paired 
with “resilience” (e.g., “security and resilience”)132 suggesting that 
while the EO aims more at protecting critical infrastructure from 
an attack, PPD-21 aims at defense and also at withstanding an 
attack and post-attack recovery. However, PPD-21’s use of 
“resilience” consistently denotes a capability to “recover rapidly” 
from cyber attacks, without drawing any distinction between the 
severities of such attacks.133 As a result, the federal government 
personnel who read PPD-21 will not be encouraged by its text to 
consider Severe Event consequences of the kind identified by the 
NERC Task Force reports. They will not be contemplating or 
attempting to prepare for incidents whose causes and 
consequences extend beyond previous experience and create a 
prolonged New Normal period of reduced levels of service. Nor will 
they feel the need to prepare to mitigate the damage in the orderly 
manner recommended by the NERC Task Force reports, in 
essence, preparing to manage a “graceful degradation” of the BPS 
and related services. 
Equally important, while the NERC Task Force reports make 
clear their recommendations are for voluntary adoption and 
implementation by the private industry owners and operators of 
the BPS and thus are private industry responsibilities,134 the EO and 
 
 130.  Compare id., which references “resilience” forty-four times (including 
the title), with Exec. Order No. 13,636, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,739, 11, 739 (Feb. 19, 
2013), which only refers to “resilience” in section 1. 
 131.  PPD-21, supra note 38, at 12. 
 132.  The phrase “security and resilience” appears forty-two times in PPD-21. 
See id. 
 133.  Id.  
 134.  Compare CATF REPORT, supra note 13, and SIRTF REPORT, supra note 13, 
at 10, 7 (“This report addresses important aspects related to enhancing the 
resilience of the bulk power system in the face of a Severe Event. It provides 
entities with practical options to enhance their capabilities to prepare, mitigate 
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PPD-21 speak repeatedly and ambiguously of government and 
private industry sharing responsibilities without making very clear 
how owners and operators of critical infrastructure will know which 
responsibilities are the government’s and which are private 
industry’s.135 For example, PPD-21 asserts a defense and rapid 
recovery objective and then identifies all the potentially responsible 
parties under the ambiguous rubric—“shared endeavor respon-
sibility”—without drawing lines to distinguish one party’s 
responsibilities from another’s: 
Critical infrastructure must be secure and able to 
withstand and rapidly recover from all hazards . . . .136 
This directive establishes national policy on critical 
infrastructure security and resilience. This endeavor is a 
shared responsibility among the Federal, state, local, tribal, 
and territorial (SLTT) entities, and public and private 
owners and operators of critical infrastructure (herein 
referred to as “critical infrastructure owners and 
operators”).137 
 
and restore the operation of the bulk power system.”), with PPD-21, supra note 38, 
at 1 (“The Federal Government also has a responsibility to strengthen the security 
and resilience of its own critical infrastructure, for the continuity of national 
essential functions, and to organize itself to partner effectively with and add value 
to the security and resilience efforts of critical infrastructure owners and 
operators.”).  
Compare the options considered and “Key Recommendations” set forth in 
CATF REPORT, supra note 13, and SIRTF Report, supra note 13, at 7 (“suggestions 
offered . . . are intended to prompt entities to develop their own approaches and 
flexible plans that would be applicable under a wide variety of circumstances”), 
with PPD-21, supra note 38, at 1 (“[Critical infrastructure security and resilience] is 
a shared responsibility among the Federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial 
(SLTT) entities, and public and private owners and operators of critical 
infrastructure.”). 
 135.  See Exec. Order No. 13,636, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,739, 11,739 (Feb. 19, 2013); 
PPD-21, supra note 38, at 1 (“This endeavor is a shared responsibility . . . .”) 
(emphasis added).  
 136.  PPD-21, supra note 38, at 1. Note the unadmitted or unwitting internal 
contradiction in that sentence. If critical infrastructure is “secure and able to 
withstand . . . all hazards,” then the ability to “rapidly recover from all hazards” 
would not be a necessary and equal objective. The more one reads such sentences, 
the more they appear to gloss over the harsh realities of a damaging cyber attack 
and to posit objectives as if the language of asserting them also achieved them—a 
kind of “mission accomplished” by “mission defined” assertion. 
 137.  PPD-21, supra note 38, at 1 (emphasis added). 
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The ambiguous boundary lines of responsibility for “security 
and resilience” become even murkier and harder to distinguish 
when PPD-21 proceeds to make vacuous statements asserting that 
things will happen that no one could intelligently identify, quantify, 
or observe.138 For example: “The Federal Government also has a 
responsibility . . . to organize itself to partner effectively with and add 
value to the security and resilience efforts of critical infrastructure 
owners and operators.”139 The verb “to partner” suggests an equality 
between parties, which clearly does not exist between the federal 
government and “owners and operators of critical infrastructure” 
and is thus both ambiguous and misleading. The verbal phrase 
“add value” is worse because it suggests the adding of a non-existent 
and unquantifiable “value” to “security and resilience efforts,” 
which is clearly not intended as monetary, financial, or marketable 
and comes across as mere bureaucratic puffery.140 When trying to 
 
 138.  Such broad PPD-21 statements include: “Critical infrastructure must be 
secure and able to withstand and rapidly recover from all hazards. Achieving this 
will require integration with the national preparedness system across prevention, 
protection, mitigation, response, and recovery.” Id. (emphasis added).  
 139.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 140.  The federal government’s offer of adding “value” to the private efforts of 
critical infrastructure owners and operators in this context essentially means the 
federal government is offering to add the heft, might, and law enforcement 
powers of the government, not financial or monetary value. The authors are 
aware, however, from confidential interviews with critical infrastructure owners 
and operators, that during heightened security events, such as major public 
gatherings that have occurred for national events, law enforcement, and 
Homeland Security officials have installed computer tools and software on local IT 
infrastructure deemed to be particularly temporarily vulnerable to a cyber attack. 
While the private critical infrastructure operators appreciated federal offers of 
resources and assistance, the resources are perceived to be of limited value in part 
because they are the IT equivalent of sharing a “no fly list” with the pilots of an 
aircraft. A tool aiding in spotting past bad actors of cyber incidents offers little 
comfort of spotting a future bad actor. Furthermore, providing the federal 
government with access to help a critical infrastructure operator means potentially 
breaching (1) confidentiality obligations with respect to personally identifiable 
customer information by opening private computer systems to federal government 
screening and surveillance tools, and (2) NERC’s Critical Infrastructure Protection 
standards by allowing unauthorized persons with access to critical infrastructure. 
In fact, the NERC SIRTF Report contemplated that a critical infrastructure 
operator may be forced into a “Hobson’s Choice” at times by needing to violate 
certain NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection standards in responding to a 
Severe Event: “Although a Severe Event may put entities in a position where they 
cannot comply with all standards, entities are in the best position to ‘do the right 
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summon private industry to work with the federal government to 
meet a national security challenge, it is rarely helpful to address 
owners and operators of critical infrastructure in terms that they 
will not understand, will find devoid of meaning, and will therefore 
have good reason to infer may have been drafted with serious 
intent but without rigorous and serious thought. 
PPD-21 includes other examples of policy platitudes, vacuous 
statements, and internal inconsistencies: 
Although the roles and responsibilities identified in this 
directive are directed at Federal departments and 
agencies, effective partnerships with critical infrastructure 
owners and operators . . . are imperative to strengthen the 
security and resilience of the Nation’s critical infra-
structure.141 
. . . . 
An effective national effort to strengthen critical 
infrastructure security and resilience must be guided by a 
national plan that identifies roles and responsibilities and 
is informed by . . . capabilities . . . and responsibilities 
of . . . Federal departments and agencies with critical 
infrastructure roles . . . and critical infrastructure owners 
and operators.142 
Any time a directive states that an “effective national effort” must 
be “guided by a national plan that identifies . . . responsibilities” 
and that is “informed by . . . responsibilities,” the effort at 
reasoning has become painfully circular and unhelpful, if not 
counterproductive, to its audience of federal personnel and owners 
and operators of critical infrastructure. 
As a result, what can boards and management of critical 
infrastructure draw from the EO and PPD-21 regarding the nature 
of the cyber threat to their enterprises? Nothing definitive can be 
drawn, we submit, beyond the fact that the “repeated intrusions”143 
 
thing’ for reliability and public safety, and self-report any violation of NERC 
standards as time and circumstances permit.” SIRTF REPORT, supra note 13, at 8, 
10, 17.  
 141.  PPD-21, supra note 38, at 2. 
 142.  Id. at 5–7. 
 143.  Although not described in the EO or PPD-21, boards and management 
of critical infrastructure companies, known as DHS’s ICS-CERT, reported in July 
2013 that cybersecurity attacks on the energy sector continue to outpace attacks on 
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pose a “national security” challenge and that both the federal 
government and private industry have responsibilities that remain, 
for private industry, ill defined. 
What do the EO and PPD-21 tell boards and management 
about the White House objectives for improving critical infra-
structure cybersecurity? Again, critical infrastructure companies 
can infer very little, except that the objectives appear not to address 
Severe Events, managing “graceful degradation” during and after 
them, and the resulting consequences of a prolonged New Normal 
of reduced levels of services.144 
The wide divergence between the objectives of the White 
House initiatives and those of NERC’s CATF and SIRTF Reports 
becomes clearest when one reviews the explanation of the EO’s 
objectives by the White House Senior Director for Cybersecurity, 
Andy Ozment: 
The main [cybersecurity] problem is advanced persistent 
threats [“APTs”]—cyber hygiene will not protect you from 
APTs. The adversaries’ use of APTs is their “A-Game”—
but the adversaries are not using their A-Game. They 
don’t need to. But if we can force them to focus on their 
A-Game, we can focus our resources on defeating that. So 
we want to raise the water level for all companies’ 
cybersecurity.145 
Boards and management of critical infrastructure companies 
therefore must decide how their companies will respond to the 
White House’s cybersecurity objectives and measures to achieve 
them, detailed by the EO, and NERC’s cybersecurity objectives and 
 
all other critical infrastructure sectors, with fifty-three percent or 111 confirmed 
cyber attacks occurring on the energy sector. See Brute Force Attacks on Internet-Facing 
Control Systems, ICS-MONITOR (U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Wash., D.C.), 
Apr./May/June 2013, at 2, available at http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/sites/default 
/files/ICS-CERT_Monitor_April-June2013.pdf.  
 144.  See SIRTF REPORT, supra note 13, at 2, 10, for discussions of Severe 
Events and New Normal and CATF REPORT, supra note 13, at 10, 27, for discussion 
of “graceful degradations.” These concepts are not discussed in the EO or PPD-21. 
 145.  Andy Ozment, Senior Dir. Cybersecurity, White House, Fifteen Years of 
Being Nervous: Security U.S. Critical Infrastructure, Address Before RSA 
Conference 2013 (Feb. 28, 2013) (notes on file with author) (quotation based on 
notes taken by author Roland Trope, who was in the audience for Mr. Ozment’s 
talk). 
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measures to achieve them, set forth in the CATF and SIRTF 
Reports. 
In the previous sections, we highlighted the differences 
between the CATF and SIRTF Reports’ objectives and the EO’s 
objectives. In the next two sections, we review their substantially 
different approaches and measures for achieving their respective 
objectives and the cybersecurity choices they present to boards and 
management of critical infrastructure companies. 
V.  CYBERSECURITY STRATEGIES OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 13636 
In this section, we highlight the EO’s objectives and its 
strategies for achieving them. The EO, although directed at federal 
agencies, is ultimately concerned with, as Mr. Ozment put it, raising 
the “water level for all companies’ cybersecurity.”146 To accomplish 
that, the EO attempts indirectly to coax companies into making 
substantial changes in their cybersecurity habits by two 
fundamental strategies: one involves increasing the federal 
government’s sharing of cyber intelligence reports with private 
industry, and the other involves assembling a select set of standards 
and industry best practices (referred to as the “Cybersecurity 
Framework”) that industry will be encouraged to adopt and comply 
with voluntarily. 
A.  Information Sharing 
The EO authorizes three kinds of information sharing by the 
federal government with qualified critical infrastructure 
companies. 
1.  Classified Information Shared Through Third-Party Vendors 
First, to assist owners and operators of such companies, the EO 
directed the Secretary of Homeland Security (“DHS Secretary”), in 
collaboration with the Secretary of Defense, to “establish 
procedures to expand the Enhanced Cybersecurity Services 
program” in order to “provide classified cyber threat and technical 
information” to “eligible critical infrastructure companies or 
 
 146.  Id. 
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commercial service providers that offer security services to critical 
infrastructure.”147 
As explained by the White House, this kind of classified 
information sharing would actually be indirect: DHS would give the 
classified information to qualified (government contract) vendors 
with the capability to store and protect it, and they in turn would 
release it, for a fee and under protective conditions, to eligible 
critical infrastructure companies.148 The information would consist 
of “classified signatures . . . to block malicious traffic.”149 The White 
House justification for releasing only this limited scope of threat 
information is that to release more sensitive information would 
only cause the adversaries to respond rapidly and change the attack 
vectors and other behavior, which companies would then again 
have to detect and attempt to thwart.150 
By early August 2013, DHS had approved only two vendors and 
vetted seven companies to participate in the program, but they 
“haven’t gone live yet.”151 Boards and management might find 
serious drawbacks to this offer of information sharing. The vendor 
intermediaries would be in a position to filter what information or 
portion of information they sold and perhaps to sell different 
portions to different customers. There might also be potentially 
significant delays in transfer of the information from DHS to the 
vendor and then on to the critical infrastructure company. It is 
doubtful to us whether such companies will welcome or find much 
use for such information by this route, and as of yet at an 
undetermined price. 
 
 147.  Exec. Order No. 13,636, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,739, 11,739 (Feb. 19, 2013) 
(emphasis added). 
 148.  See Joseph Menn, Government to Share Cyber Security Information with Private 
Sector, INS. J. (May 15, 2013), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national 
/2013/05/15/292065.htm. 
 149.  Andy Ozment, Senior Dir. Cybersecurity, White House, Protecting 
the Electric Grid from Cyber Attacks: Where Do We Stand, Address Before 
Electric Grid Cyber Security Initiative, (Aug. 6, 2013) (notes of speech available 
from author), available at http://bipartisanpolicy.org/events/2013/08/protecting 
-electric-grid-cyber-attacks-where-do-we-stand. 
 150.  See Menn, supra note 148.  
 151.  Ozment, supra note 149. 
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2. High Risk Companies Identified in “Catastrophic Target Notices” 
The second kind of information would also appear to be of 
limited benefit to critical infrastructure company recipients 
because it will tell them what they already know. The EO authorizes 
what could be termed “Catastrophic Target Notices.” These Notices 
purportedly attempt to use “consistent, objective criteria” to 
identify the critical infrastructure at the greatest risk from cyber 
attack. However, they actually identify critical infrastructure 
companies that, if damaged by a cyber attack, would cause 
widespread damage to other companies.152 The DHS Secretary is to 
use a “risk-based approach to identify critical infrastructure where a 
cybersecurity incident could reasonably result in catastrophic 
regional or national effects on public health or safety, economic 
security, or national security.”153 
The Notices would also provide recipients with the basis for 
that determination and give them a “process through which owners 
and operators of critical infrastructure may submit relevant 
information and request reconsideration” of their identification.154 
That the EO would give owners and operators a procedure for, 
in essence, challenging the identification, strongly suggests that the 
identification imposes some burdens that owners and operators 
may prefer to avoid. Being identified could hardly come as a 
surprise to most critical infrastructure owners and operators. For 
example, BPS owners and operators know from their experience 
with outages caused by severe weather that if their ability to provide 
electric power to their customers substantially declines for even a 
short period their customers will probably experience damage.155 
 
 152.  See Roland L. Trope & Stephen J. Humes, By Executive Order: Delivery of 
Cyber Intelligence Imparts Cyber Responsibilities, IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY, Mar./Apr. 
2013, available at http://www.hklaw.com/publications/By-Executive-Order 
-Delivery-of-Cyber-Intelligence-Imparts-Cyber-Responsibilities-04-01-2013/. 
 153.  Exec. Order No. 13,636, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,739, 11,742 (Feb. 19, 2013). 
 154.  Id. (providing owners and operators of critical infrastructure with an 
“opt-out” procedure by allowing them to “submit relevant information and request 
reconsideration of identifications”).  
 155.  Energy sector critical infrastructure companies are already subject to 
NERC’s Critical Infrastructure Protection standards, one of which already requires 
them to characterize their operations and infrastructure to identify assets subject 
to the reliability standards. See, e.g., Standard CIP-002-3—Cyber Security—Critical 
Cyber Asset Identification 1 (Dec. 16, 2009), in BPS RELIABILITY STANDARDS, supra 
note 77. 
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And the longer it takes to restore full electric power to customers, 
the greater the damage will likely be to customers. Critical 
infrastructure owners and operators would probably not succeed in 
a request to be removed from the group of companies identified by 
a Catastrophic Target Notice.156 Something else would appear to 
have motivated the provision for an opt-out procedure. 
We think that there are three plausible reasons that may have 
motivated the White House to make an opt-out procedure 
available. First, the White House presumably recognized that 
delivery of a Catastrophic Target Notice to owners and operators of 
a company will not be neutral and without significance. On the 
contrary, receipt of such notice will in all likelihood impose on 
owners and operators a documented “formal notice” of the 
identification. Since that Notice will be based on a federal 
government determination, it will in all likelihood be accorded 
significant evidentiary weight in lawsuits wherein plaintiffs allege 
that they would not have suffered damage from a cyber attack 
against the defendant critical infrastructure company but for the 
negligent failure of the company to act responsibly after receipt of 
such notice. In such a lawsuit, recipient owners and operators will 
 
 156.  NERC will vigorously defend its regulatory reach over any company that 
is connected electrically to the nation’s BPS at greater than 100 kV, whether the 
entity is a load-serving entity (which directly supplies electricity to end-use 
customers), distribution provider, wholesale generator, or other transmission 
owner or operator. NERC’s position is based on Rule 501.1.4 of the NERC Rules of 
Procedure, which provides: 
   For all geographical or electrical areas of the Bulk Power System 
[(“BPS”)], the Registration process shall ensure that (1) no areas are 
lacking any entities to perform the duties and tasks identified in and 
required by the Reliability Standards to the fullest extent practical, and 
(2) there is no unnecessary duplication of such coverage or of required 
oversight of such coverage. 
N. AM. ELECTRIC RELIABILITY CORP., RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE NORTH AMERICAN 
ELECTRIC RELIABILITY CORPORATION 46 (2013), available at www.nerc.com 
/FilingsOrders/us/RuleOfProcedureDL/NERC_ROP_Effective_20131004.pdf. 
NERC’s Compliance Registry lists entities that are subject to, and obligated to 
comply with, mandatory and enforceable Reliability Standards in accordance with 
Appendix 5B to the NERC Rules of Procedure. Id. NERC recently challenged a 
FERC order that found a certain company could be removed from its Compliance 
Registry. See S. La. Elec. Coop. Ass’n, 144 FERC ¶ 61,050 (July 18, 2013), appeal 
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not be able to argue plausibly that they and their companies did 
not “foresee” the risks to others of a cyber attack damaging their 
own operations. And, by definition, the risks extend not only to 
customers and suppliers, but to a much broader category of 
“catastrophic regional or national effects on public health or safety, 
economic security, or national security.”157 Unless the Catastrophic 
Target Notice specifically limited its scope to one of those potential 
impacts, then by definition the owner and operator recipients have 
been “put on notice” that unless they improve their preparations to 
thwart cyber attacks, mitigate their impacts (including perhaps 
preparing for a “graceful degradation” of operations), and restore 
services as soon as practicable, they may not be able to raise a “lack 
of foreseeability” defense in the event they are sued (by customers, 
suppliers, and other indirectly damaged critical infrastructure 
companies) for negligently failing to avert or mitigate such 
damages. 
The second reason is that although an executive order, unlike 
a federal statute, is not law and cannot impose duties or obligations 
on any organization or person outside of the executive branch, it 
can nonetheless impart certain responsibilities by sharing sensitive 
information that concerns threats and risks to owners and 
operators of critical infrastructure that the general public does not 
receive. Recipients cannot simply read such notices, file them in a 
drawer (or save them to a file), and ignore them. Instead, as we 
explained in an article shortly after issuance of the EO: 
[R]ecipients [of a Catastrophic Target Notice] must come 
to terms with the possibility that the DHS has imposed on 
owners and operators, directors and officers, a set of 
undefined, ambiguous but possibly extraordinary 
corporate cyber responsibilities. Imagine a specter of 
burgeoning liability that could attach to your company or 
its board if a cyberattack strikes and demonstrates the 
accuracy of the DHS’s warning of catastrophic regional or 
national damage. Cyber insurance policies might start 
excluding from coverage recipients of DHS notices or 
condition coverage on steeply priced premiums.158 
The third reason derives from the other two: no company will 
want the burden of being identified by a Catastrophic Target 
 
 157.  Exec. Order No. 13,636, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,742. 
 158.  Trope & Humes, supra note 152, at 63, 66.  
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Notice. It’s the equivalent of having a bull’s-eye placed on the 
company—making it a target for regulators’ scrutiny, post-attack 
investigations by government entities, and parties seeking to 
recover damages from the “deep pockets” of a critical 
infrastructure company. Such a Notice brings no added prestige or 
reputational boon. Thus, owners and operators of smaller critical 
infrastructure companies will want, if possible, to avoid 
identification by a Catastrophic Target Notice. If they receive a 
Catastrophic Target Notice, they may want to give serious 
consideration to attempting to persuade DHS to withdraw the 
Notice, using the appeal of Notice procedure that the EO requires 
the DHS Secretary to establish for “reconsideration of 
identifications.”159 
If a company’s request for reconsideration of identification is 
unsuccessful the first year, it may want to attempt again the 
following year because the EO requires the DHS Secretary to 
“review and update the list” of companies identified by a 
Catastrophic Target Notice.160 Owners and operators of the largest 
critical infrastructure enterprises who receive such Notices will 
almost certainly view them as identifying their company as a high-
risk target—and presumably a high-value target for a cyber 
adversary. As a consequence, these owners and operators may 
perceive (and will have good reason to perceive) that a Notice 
enhances their responsibility to make preparations to improve the 
company’s resilience, their ability to mitigate damages flowing 
directly across a region or the nation from any disruption and 
impairment of the company’s services, their capability to manage a 
“graceful degradation” of such services, and their resourcefulness 
in handling a prolonged New Normal until full service can be 
restored. 
Our interpretation of the EO’s intended purpose for 
Catastrophic Target Notices is supported by explanations provided 
by the White House: 
[I]n some places, we want to focus on the most critical of 
the critical—an elevated threshold—where harm to that 
infrastructure can cause catastrophic harm regionally or 
nationally. 
 
 159.  78 Fed. Reg. at 11,742. 
 160.  Id. § 9(a), at 11,742. 
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We are going to be particularly sensitive about 
cascading risks and interdependencies of harm to those who 
depend on these most critical of the critical 
infrastructures. 
We will confidentially notify you, then concentrate our 
out-reach efforts on you. We want to focus our efforts on you—
make sure you improve your understanding of the national risk, 
and have that baseline to improve the national risk 
management.161 
This passage appears to leave little doubt that the White House 
believes—and will encourage others to believe (be they regulators, 
commercial parties, judges, or juries)—that receipt of a 
Catastrophic Target Notice imparts an enhanced set of 
responsibilities. Not only will such recipients be expected (and 
told) to improve their “understanding of the national risk,” but 
also, based on that improvement, to implement preparations that 
reduce that risk.162 Such an undertaking may impose prodigious 
costs on the “most critical of critical infrastructure” recipients of 
these notices. And who will they most likely be? The answer can be 
derived from Mr. Ozment’s reference to “cascading risks”163 (like 
cascading outages) and, more definitively, from a passage in PPD-
21, which states: “This directive also identifies energy and 
communications systems as uniquely critical due to the enabling 
functions they provide across all critical infrastructure sectors.”164 
As owners and operators try to make sense of the significance 
of receiving a Catastrophic Target Notice, they may also ask why the 
EO expressly exempts a remarkably important sector of critical 
infrastructure companies from identification by such Notices—
even those involved in operating or developing “communications 
systems” which PPD-21 identified as “uniquely critical” to the 
cybersecurity of the nation. The EO expresses the exemption as 
follows: “The Secretary shall not identify any commercial information 
 
 161.  Ozment, supra note 145 (emphasis added). 
 162.  78 Fed. Reg. at 11,742. Risk mitigation is not limited to recipients of 
catastrophic target notices. Pursuant to section 10(e), even independent federal 
agencies, such as FERC and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, are encouraged 
to “consider prioritized actions to mitigate cyber risks for critical infrastructure 
consistent with their authorities.” Id. at 11,743.  
 163.  Ozment, supra note 145. 
 164.  PPD-21, supra note 38, at 2.  
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technology products or consumer information technology services under this 
[Catastrophic Target Notice] section.”165 
The EO does not define the terms “commercial information 
technology products or . . . services,”166 but it is hard to imagine a 
definition that would not overlap with an interpretation of the term 
“communications systems.”167 Moreover, it is reasonable to infer 
that companies eager to qualify for that exemption will include: 
developers and providers of software (e.g., Microsoft), internet 
search engines (e.g., Google), cloud-computing services 
(e.g., Amazon), smart phone and smart tablets (e.g., Apple), social 
network services (e.g., Facebook), and short-burst communications 
(e.g., Twitter). This list could reasonably grow to include most of 
the major Silicon Valley companies. Exempting these companies 
from Catastrophic Target Notices seems inexplicable, particularly 
because many of them are arguably among those most responsible 
for creating cybersecurity vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure 
companies that the EO seeks to reduce; many of these Silicon 
Valley companies have sold products with security deficiencies for 
decades, but they have seldom been held liable.168 
The EO gives no justification or rationale for the exemption, 
and the need for a justification would appear compelling since the 
EO seeks to address a national security challenge. One suspects 
that the exemptions reflect successful lobbying by these 
companies.169 The apparent desire of information technology 
 
 165.  Exec. Order No. 13,636, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,739, 11,742 (Feb. 19, 2013) 
(emphasis added). 
 166.  See id. at 11,742. 
 167.  The phrase “communications systems” is coupled with “energy” twice in  
PPD-21 as essential for all critical infrastructure sectors. PPD-21, supra note 38, at 
2, 9. 
 168.  See Doug Lichtman & Eric Posner, Holding Internet Service Providers 
Accountable 3 (Univ. of Chi. Inst. For Law & Economics, Working Paper No. 217, 
2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=573502 
(arguing that “ISPs should, to some degree, be held accountable when their 
subscribers either originate malicious Internet code or propagate that code by, for 
example, forwarding a virus over email or adopting lax security precautions that in 
turn allow a computer to be co-opted by a malevolent user”).  
 169.  Most likely, the source of the EO’s exemption for these commercial 
information technology companies is an import by the White House from the 
prior failed legislation, the Cyber Security Act (CSA) of 2012, the so-called 
Lieberman–Collins bill that failed to pass the Congress in November 2012. See 
Jennifer Martinez & Ramsey Cox, Senate Votes Down Lieberman, Collins Cybersecurity 
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companies to avoid identification with a Catastrophic Target Notice 
adds further weight to the argument that receipt of such Notices 
imparts a heavy burden of new corporate cyber responsibilities. 
Information technology companies appear to have foreseen the 
risks that notices would create for them and persuaded the White 
House to add a special exemption just for them. It is, however, the 
kind of exemption that will strike owners, operators, and boards of 
other critical infrastructure companies as evidencing a lack of 
seriousness of purpose in the EO, especially since several of the 
exempt companies have been among those that have suffered the 
most significant exfiltrations of valuable data and intellectual 
property from cyber attacks170 (e.g., Google).171 
3. Targeted Companies Identified in “Imminent Target Notices” 
The EO’s third kind of authorized information sharing 
imparts an even larger burden of responsibilities to its recipients. 
In these instances, the EO authorizes the DHS to share federal 
intelligence about cyber attacks planned against the U.S. homeland 
whose targets are known or suspected.172 The notices will omit any 
classified intelligence from which they derive and will thus be 
limited in what they tell the recipients, beyond the fact that the 
recipient company has been identified as one of the planned cyber 
attack’s targets. For that reason, we refer to them as “Imminent 
 
Act a Second Time, THE HILL (Nov. 14, 2013, 11:12 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs 
/hillicon-valley/technology/268053-senate-rejects-cybersecurity-act-for-second 
-time. The CSA defined a “commercial information technology product” as “a 
commercial item that organizes or communicates information electronically.” 
Cybersecurity Act of 2012, S. 2105, 112th Cong. § 2(1) (2012). The failed bill 
exempted such “commercial information technology products” from regulation as 
critical infrastructure. Id. § 103(b)(2)(C). This exemption included “installation 
services, maintenance services, repair services, training services, and any other 
services provided in support of the product.” Id. § 103(b)(2)(D). 
 170.  See GA. INST. OF TECH., EMERGING CYBER THREATS REPORT 2013, at 4 (n.d.), 
available at http://gtsecuritysummit.com/pdf/2013ThreatsReport.pdf. Among 
others, the report notes a Microsoft vulnerability that allowed hackers to 
manipulate firmware on a PC until Microsoft released Windows 8 with Secure Boot 
technology. See id. at 5. 
 171.  See Matthew Prince, Post Mortem: Today’s Attack; Apparent Google 
Apps/Gmail Vulnerability; and How to Protect Yourself, CLOUDFLARE (June 2, 
2012, 12:22 AM), http://blog.cloudflare.com/post-mortem-todays-attack-apparent 
-google-app.  
 172.  Exec. Order No. 13,636, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,739, 11,739–40 (Feb. 19, 2013). 
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Target Notices.” Unlike the Catastrophic Target Notices, the 
unclassified versions of these notices can be delivered to companies 
whether or not they operate critical infrastructure.173 The EO says 
little about the substance of these Notices other than that they will 
be “unclassified reports of cyber threats to the U.S. homeland that 
identify a specific targeted entity.”174 
As the EO describes this more informative type of Imminent 
Target Notice: 
(a) . . . . Within 120 days of the date of this order, 
the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland 
Security . . . , and the Director of National Intelligence 
shall each issue instructions consistent with their 
authorities and with the requirements of section 12(c) of 
this order to ensure the timely production of unclassified reports 
of cyber threats to the U.S. homeland that identify a specific 
targeted entity.175 
(b) The [DHS] Secretary and the Attorney General, in 
coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, 
shall establish a process that rapidly disseminates the 
reports . . . to the targeted entity.176 
The EO explains that both the classified and unclassified 
Notices reflect U.S. policy “to increase the volume, timeliness, and 
quality of cyber threat information shared with U.S. private sector 
entities so that these entities may better protect and defend 
themselves against cyber threats.”177 
Since the EO describes the purpose of Imminent Target 
Notices as enabling recipients to “better protect and defend 
themselves,”178 it is reasonable to infer that delivery of such Notices 
imparts a corporate cyber responsibility to the recipients to make 
good use of that timely, sensitive information. Boards and 
management of potential recipients of such Notices will need to 
 
 173.  Id. at 11,739 (“The instructions shall address the need to protect 
intelligence and law enforcement sources, methods, operations, and inves-
tigations.”). Recipients therefore will presumably not receive any information that 
could reveal anything about the investigations and probably would not identify the 
source or even the kind or timing of the planned cyber attack. 
 174.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 175.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 176.  Id. 
 177.  Id. 
 178.  Id. 
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address to what extent their companies will attempt to fulfill such 
responsibilities. Such considerations may include the following: 
If you’re an owner or operator, a director or officer, and 
the government alerts you that your company [is] a target, 
it’s probably going to be hard to avoid asking yourself, 
your executive management team, your board, and your 
counsel a battery of questions: “We can’t ignore this, can 
we? Does this trigger any disclosure or reporting 
obligations? Do stockholders have the right to know this 
company has been identified a target so they can make 
informed investing decisions? What should we be doing 
before we’re attacked? Shouldn’t we reexamine our cyber 
defenses and disaster recovery plans? If we don’t, and 
we’re severely damaged and slow to restore operations (as 
after super-storm Sandy), it will drive up the recovery 
costs, tank our reputation, and hammer the company’s 
valuation. If our customers, suppliers, and stockholders 
learn that we had warning and didn’t prepare to limit 
damage and recover quickly, they’ll blame us for their 
losses—direct or collateral—and they’ll sue us.”179 
Perhaps prompted by those and other concerns, directors, 
management, and their counsel might ask what else these notices 
will reveal. From the text of the EO and public speeches by White 
House officials, these Imminent Target Notices will not reveal any 
of the following concerning the planned cyber attack: 
 Originating country or organization, or identity of 
participants; 
 Nature of attack; 
 Number and identity of other known “targets” (i.e., Imminent 
Target Notices will not alert recipients to who else has or will 
receive such Notice); 
 Anticipated start time or date or duration of the attack; and 
 Counter-measures by the DoD or other federal agencies that 
might be attempted to thwart the attack.180 
Here is how the White House describes what these Notices will 
contain and why all other information will be withheld: 
 
 179.  Trope & Humes, supra note 152, at 3. 
 180.  See Ozment, supra note 145 (demonstrating a lack of the considerations 
regarding imminent target notices). 
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In information sharing there is always a risk: the risk 
of exposing our methods and intel sources, and we must 
balance that against the value of having the intel shared 
with industry. We have to weigh the risks with the benefits. 
But now, we are going to put our thumb on the scale, and 
we will press the scale to share more and respond less to 
the risk of revealing sources. 
When you get [the] information [contained in these 
Notices], you will see that much of it is fragmentary and 
vague. We may say your sector faces an unknown type of 
attack, at an unknown time, and of unknown intensity and 
we can’t tell you more than that or how to use it. But you 
are [in] the best position to make use of that 
information.181 
4. Cybersecurity Framework 
While the EO’s information-sharing directives aim chiefly at 
improving the “cyber hygiene” of critical infrastructure companies, 
the EO also aims to act where Congress did not and coax such 
companies towards adoption of a common set of cross-sector 
cybersecurity standards and best practices.182 The EO directs the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to 
coordinate development of what the EO terms a Cybersecurity 
Framework (Framework), which it explains as a set of “voluntary 
consensus standards and industry best practices to the fullest extent 
possible.”183 The express purpose is to enable owners and operators 
of critical infrastructure to “identify, assess, and manage cyber 
risk.”184 
The EO directs NIST to complete the Framework by February 
2014.185 The latest development, as of this writing, is NIST’s release, 
on October 22, 2013, of the Preliminary Cybersecurity Framework 
(Preliminary Framework).186 Until a final draft appears, directors 
 
 181.  Id. (emphasis added).  
 182.  Exec. Order No. 13,636, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,740–41. 
 183.  Id. at 11,741. 
 184.  Id. 
 185.  See id. (“Within 1 year of the date of this order, and after coordination 
with the Secretary to ensure suitability under section 8 of this order . . . .”). 
 186.  Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity: Preliminary Cybersecurity 
Framework, NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH., at i, http://www.nist.gov/itl/upload 
/preliminary-cybersecurity-framework.pdf (last visited Dec. 27, 2013) [hereinafter 
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and management of critical infrastructure will be unable to assess 
what benefits or potential improvements, if any, the Framework will 
provide their company’s cybersecurity. 
The Preliminary Framework provides no examples of cross-
sector standards or industry best practices, and thus its ultimate 
substance remains opaque.187 Instead, the Preliminary Framework 
provides complex scaffolding for the Framework.188 The Preli-
minary Framework explains that the Framework will be “composed 
of three parts: the Framework Core, the Framework Profile, and 
the Framework Implementation Tiers.”189 We focus here on 
the Framework Core, which the Preliminary Framework explains 
is “a set of cybersecurity activities and references that 
are common across critical infrastructure sectors . . . . The Core 
presents standards and best practices . . . for communication of 
cybersecurity risk across the organization . . . .”190 
The Preliminary Framework provides a schematic of the 
Framework Core, instead of its substance. The Framework Core will 
consist of five “Functions”: “Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, 
[and] Recover.”191 The Preliminary Framework envisions the 
Framework Core as providing a “strategic view” for an organi-
zation’s management of cybersecurity risk.192 
The Framework purports to provide critical infrastructure 
companies with “guidance . . . on managing cybersecurity risk.” The 
“guidance” consists first of encouraging organizations to “consider 
cybersecurity risk as a priority similar to financial, safety, and 




 187.  The Preliminary Framework emphasizes that it “relies on existing 
standards, guidance, and best practices to achieve outcomes that can assist 
organizations in managing their cybersecurity risk. By relying on those practices 
developed, managed, and updated by industry, the Framework will evolve with 
technological advances and business requirements.” Id. at 1 (emphasis added). 
However, the Preliminary Framework gives no examples of cross-sector standards 
or best practices. 
 188.  See id. at 2–3. 
 189.  Id. at 2.  
 190.  Id.  
 191.  Id. 
 192.  Id.  
 193.  Id. at 1. 
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The Framework proposes a strategy that, on first reading, 
seems reasonable. The Framework disclaims any effort to “replace” 
an organization’s existing cybersecurity risk management process 
and represents that it “complements” such process.194 The 
Framework purports to offer organizations a method to “identify 
opportunities,” which appears to be a euphemism for recognizing 
cybersecurity deficiencies. This becomes evident in the following 
passages from the Preliminary Framework: 
Profiles are . . . used to identify opportunities for im-
proving cybersecurity by comparing a “Current” Profile 
with a “Target” Profile. The Profile can then be used to 
support prioritization and measurement of progress 
toward the Target Profile . . . . In this sense, Profiles can 
be used to conduct self-assessments and communicate 
within an organization or between organizations.195 
The Framework’s authors, however, appear unaware or 
indifferent to the risks to which their methodology would expose 
an adopting organization. We see two sets of risks: one set related 
to the documenting of a company’s “Current Profile” and “Target 
Profile,” and one set related to the curious reference of 
communication “between organizations.” 
Regarding the risks from documenting Current and Target 
Profiles, the Framework proposes that an organization do a self-
assessment of and describe its cybersecurity posture.196 There is, 
however, no assurance that the resulting documented “current 
cybersecurity posture” would remain confidential and not be 
required to be disclosed, after a cyber intrusion or cyber attack, to 
regulators, government investigators, and potential plaintiffs. The 
Framework appears to proceed on the assumption that a 
company’s “current cybersecurity posture” document would 
demonstrate that a company treated cybersecurity as a “priority.” 
The Framework fails, however, to recognize that regulators, 
investigators, and plaintiffs in hindsight could cite such a 
document as evidence of the opposite, that the organization had a 
poor “current cybersecurity posture” and did not do as much as it 
should have to remedy and improve that “posture.” Evidence of 
 
 194.  Id. at 2. 
 195.  Id. at 3. 
 196.  Id. at 1. 
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that possible outcome appears in several passages in the 
Preliminary Framework, including: 
The Framework utilizes risk assessment to help 
organizations select optimized target states for cybersecurity 
activities. 
. . . . 
. . . A Framework Profile can be used to describe both 
the current state and the desired target state of specific 
cybersecurity activities, thus revealing gaps that should be 
addressed to meet cybersecurity risk management 
objectives.197 
In the second quotation, the Preliminary Framework authors 
make the unwarranted and risky assumption that any cybersecurity 
“gaps” must be “addressed.” It is for management and the board to 
decide which kinds of “gaps” should be addressed, and since 
cybersecurity is but one of several risks for which management and 
the board are responsible, it is not necessarily unreasonable or 
irresponsible for management and a board to decide that certain 
“gaps” will not be immediately addressed. However, the 
Framework’s expressed position on this subject gives leverage to 
regulators, government investigators, and potential plaintiffs who 
can point to any unaddressed “gap” and allege negligence, 
malfeasance, or deficient cybersecurity. The first quotation 
contributes to that risk.198 An improved “target state” is a relatively 
 
 197.  Id. at 3, 7 (emphasis added). 
 198.  One commentator on the Preliminary Framework has drawn similar 
inferences about the potential risks the Framework will create:  
   The preliminary framework . . . what it will do if it takes hold is 
provide a common way for people to talk about and understand 
cybersecurity risks, and those people include regulators and judges, 
juries and others involved in deciding a lawsuit’s outcome . . . . 
. . . . 
   The reality is that as private parties are litigating issues related to 
companies’ security practices and compliance with industry standards, 
it is highly foreseeable that litigants will refer to the framework as a 
statement of industry standards . . . . 
   Even if a company is following the practices set forth in the 
framework, it can still run the risk of being faulted by private parties 
for describing its practices in a way that is inconsistent with the 
common language established by the framework . . . . 
Allison Grande, Cybersecurity Framework Risks Becoming Litigation Fodder, LAW360 
(Oct. 25, 2013, 9:24 PM), http://www.law360.com/privacy/articles/483418?nl_pk 
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neutral position, but advocating that organizations “select 
optimized target states” imposes a responsibility on adopters of the 
Framework to make sure that the “target state” they select is 
appropriately high enough to be “optimal.” If they fail to do that, 
they may be at considerable risk. 
Similarly, the Framework proposes that an organization 
“describe” its “target state for cyber security,” but here again there 
is no assurance that the resulting documented “target state” would 
remain confidential and not be subject to enforceable demands 
that it be disclosed to regulators, government investigators, and 
potential plaintiffs. Each such recipient could second-guess an 
organization’s selection of its “target state” and criticize the pace of 
progress from “current posture” to “target state.” It is not clear that 
the “business judgment” rule would protect a board from such 
second-guesses. Unless there is some assurance of immunity (which 
would require a congressional enactment), companies that 
document their Current and Target Profiles might be able to point 
to them as evidence of treating cybersecurity as a priority and 
acting responsibly, but in a post-cyber-attack context where 
judgments can be easily swayed and skewed by hindsight, a 
company could be exposing itself to risks when the purpose of the 
exercise should be limited to improving a company’s resilience to 
cyber attacks. 
The second set of risks, related to communications “between 
organizations,” finds evidence in both the Preliminary Framework 
and in the press release that accompanied it. The Framework will 
purportedly provide a “common language to communicate 
requirements among interdependent partners responsible for the 
delivery of essential critical infrastructure services. Examples 
include: . . . A critical infrastructure sector may establish a baseline 
Target Profile that can be used among its constituents as an initial 
baseline.”199 
If a sector establishes a Target Profile for its “constituents,” 
then the Framework’s authors are encouraging the use of the 
Framework as an involuntary and enforceable device, which is 
contrary to what the EO represented it to be. Our impression—that 
 
=367d7227-22e4-438f-90bd-9b35 (quoting Ronald Lee, a partner at Arnold and 
Porter LLP, and Gerald Ferguson, a privacy, security, and social media team co-
leader at BakerHostetler).  
 199.  Preliminary Framework, supra note 186, at 12. 
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the Framework’s authors intend the Framework to serve as an 
enforcement of cybersecurity standards—is further supported by a 
statement in NIST’s press release that accompanied release of the 
Preliminary Framework: “The framework will foster communi-
cations among internal and external stakeholders and help 
organizations hold each other accountable for strong cyber 
protections . . . .”200 
We think such statements portend an unfortunate evolution in 
the Framework, from a purportedly “voluntary” mechanism into an 
involuntary enforcement device that a “sector” or another 
organization might use to hold an adopting organization 
“accountable” for a lack of cyber protections. Thus, although 
announced as a means for reducing cyber risks, we think that the 
Framework as currently drafted and as described by its authors is 
evolving into a mechanism that will increase, rather than decrease, 
a company’s risks. 
In light of the risks the Framework might create, it is all the 
more important that the document be clear and easily understood 
by board and C-suite officers. Unfortunately, the Preliminary 
Framework is a formidable and unwieldy read for directors and 
officers, because of the additional schema that is attached to it in 
the form of an identification of “underlying key Categories and 
Subcategories for each of these [five] Functions, and matches them 
with example Informative References such as existing standards, 
guidelines, and practices for each Subcategory.”201 
One of its infirmities is that the Preliminary Framework tries to 
do too much for too many segments of critical infrastructure 
interests: “The Framework is designed to complement existing 
business and cybersecurity operations. It can serve as the 
foundation for a new cybersecurity program or a mechanism for 
improving an existing program.”202 
The following example provided by the Preliminary 
Framework illustrates the complexity and the cross-referencing that 
readers will have to navigate and sort through to comprehend: 
 
 200.  Press Release, NIST, NIST Releases Preliminary Cybersecurity 
Framework, Will Seek Comments (Oct. 22, 2013), http://www.nist.gov/itl 
/cybersecurity-102213.cfm (emphasis added). 
 201.  Preliminary Framework, supra note 186, at 2. 
 202.  Id. at 11. 
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For instance, the “Protect” Function, categories include: 
Data Security; Access Control; Awareness and Training; 
and Protective Technology. [At the next level down,] 
ISO/IEC 27001 Control A.10.8.3 is an informative reference 
which supports the “Data during transportation 
/transmission is protected [sic] to achieve confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability goals” Subcategory of the “Data 
Security” Category in the “Protect” Function.203 
We think that any director or officer will need fortitude, 
patience, and more time than they can spare to comprehend that 
passage. We doubt that counsel will find it easy to explain to a 
board because the illustrative passage is so ungrammatical and 
complex that a framework consisting of such passages will turn a 
proposed cybersecurity tool into a blunt, useless instrument. 
What we think boards and management of BPS companies will 
probably be most interested to know is whether the Framework, 
when published in final form, will create another set of standards 
and recommendations that compete with those already published 
and in preparation by NERC and its Task Forces (or any other 
critical infrastructure regulator). Boards and management will also 
want to know whether the Framework shares a common objective 
or places priorities on the same cybersecurity efforts as those 
expressed in the NERC Task Force reports. 
On the question of whether the Framework will be intended or 
might become a set of standards that compete with other standards 
applicable to BPS companies, there are two answers—one clear, the 
other speculative. The clear answer is that the Framework is derived 
from an executive order, not from a federal statute or regulation 
issued pursuant to a federal statute. Therefore, unless later 
incorporated into a statute or adopted by NERC as part of a CIP 
Standard (which is highly improbable), it cannot be binding on 
BPS companies. The EO cannot require a critical infrastructure 
company to adopt and implement the Framework’s standards and 
best practices (that will appear in its Framework Core204). 
 
 203.  Id. at 2. 
 204.  The Framework Core is described in the Preliminary Framework as a set 
of cybersecurity activities and references that are common across critical 
infrastructure sectors and organized around particular outcomes. See id. at 2. The 
Framework Core presents standards and best practices in a manner that allows for 
communication of cybersecurity risk across the organization from the senior 
executive level to the implementation/operations level. See id. at 2.  
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Moreover, once released, the Framework will be available for 
companies to consider. If companies decide to adopt it, there 
would appear to be no authority in the EO to require an adopting 
company to accept the entire Framework or to adhere to it after 
adoption. However, there are unconfirmed reports that when 
Catastrophic Target Notices are issued to the approximately one 
hundred companies that appear likely to be so identified, these 
Notices will include a statement “encouraging” the recipient to 
adopt the Framework. Expressed in that context, such an invitation 
may be perceived as an invitation a company should be careful not 
to refuse, which is therefore a coercive use of the Notices and 
further evidence that the Framework is evolving away from a 
“voluntary” set of standards. 
In addition, presumably, companies may pick and choose 
among the standards and best practices that they think most 
suitable for their operations and security risks—and that fit the 
budget they are willing to allocate to the effort. As companies 
improve their enterprise-wide cybersecurity profile, they may find 
that certain Framework standards cease to be applicable or relevant 
and may decide that other standards in the Framework are useful. 
The Preliminary Framework does not address such issues or 
whether there would be a coherent result if companies could, from 
time to time, decide what parts of the Framework they will use and 
what parts they will no longer use. The Preliminary Framework 
does, however, offer users the option to adopt and use some of the 
scaffolding offered in the Basic Overview.205 It also, as noted above, 
emphasizes the need to address any “gaps” found between Current 
and Target Profiles, which makes the Framework appear something 
other than “voluntary.” 
The speculative answer derives from another way in which the 
Framework’s standards could achieve a nearly binding status. 
Consider the result of the following events occurring: first, the 
President and other executive branch officials make repeated 
 
 205.  The Preliminary Framework states that organizations can choose the 
details and their capabilities already implemented in the five “high-level 
Functions” identified in the Framework Core: identify, protect, detect, respond, 
and recover, emphasizing that critical infrastructure companies should have at 
least basic capabilities implemented in each of these areas and can begin to review 
what particular categories and subcategories they currently use to help achieve 
those outcomes. Id. at 11. 
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public statements about the national security need for companies 
to adopt the Framework in order for critical infrastructure to be 
protected from cyber attacks; second, the President and other 
executive branch officials then ask companies to disclose if they 
have formally adopted the Framework; and third, thereafter the 
DHS posts on one of its websites a list of the early adopters of the 
Framework (and DHS updates that list as others adopt the 
Framework). In that event, critical infrastructure companies that 
have refrained from or decided against adopting the Framework or 
disclosing their status would in all likelihood experience 
considerable public pressure. If, despite such pressure, they did not 
then adopt the Framework (while others in their sector had 
adopted it) or opted against disclosing their status, they almost 
certainly would experience substantial reputational damage among 
other adverse consequences. 
Benchmarking may also force such companies to respond in a 
manner similar to their peers. Their boards and management 
might decide that, similar to the receipt of Catastrophic and 
Imminent Target Notices, a failure to adopt the Framework might 
impart enhanced corporate cyber responsibilities to ensure that 
notwithstanding that failure, the company has taken all reasonable 
actions to improve its cybersecurity. Companies may decide that 
there are greater risks in being identified—publicly or in a post-
cyber-attack lawsuit or regulatory enforcement action—as an 
adopter of the Framework (i.e., arguing that “adoption shows we 
took reasonable precautions”) than as an abstainer (i.e., arguing 
that “we thought we knew ways to improve our cybersecurity better 
than those in the federally developed Framework”). In short, 
boards and management will need to be aware that non-adopting 
companies may experience a variety of forms of “shunning” and 
“shaming” and that third parties—including customers, suppliers, 
insurers, and other stakeholders—may condition terms of 
agreement on a demonstration that the company adopted and 
implemented the Framework. It is not hard to imagine, for 
example, that a major customer could demand that all of its 
suppliers certify that they have adopted and implemented the 
Framework. 
This conclusion is reinforced by language in the EO that 
suggests the Framework may not even be intended as “voluntary” 
but is to be treated as something companies can be coaxed or 
pressured into adopting. Consider the following passage from the 
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EO: “The Cybersecurity Framework shall include guidance for 
measuring the performance of an entity in implementing the 
Cybersecurity Framework.”206 
If the Framework is intended to be “voluntary” and allows 
companies (as the Preliminary Framework explains) to “leverage 
the Framework . . . to improve an organization’s management of 
cybersecurity risk,”207 then there should be no need for a means of 
“measuring the performance” of companies as they adopt or 
selectively implement the Framework. The EO’s language of 
“measuring the performance” suggests that the White House might 
already be considering ways to apply public pressure to companies 
that ignore or that elect not to adopt the Framework. Once they do 
adopt it, they may be subject to federal government publication of 
whether the measurement of their performance in “implementing” 
the Framework meets White House or DHS approval or 
disapproval. 
There is, however, an alternative interpretation to the metric 
language in the Framework.208 It will be offered to companies for 
self-assessments of their progress in implementing the Frame- 
work. We notice that the Preliminary Framework contains, in 
 
 206.  Exec. Order No. 13,636, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,739, 11,741 (Feb. 19, 2013) 
(emphasis added). 
 207.  Preliminary Framework, supra note 186, at 2.  
 208.  The Preliminary Framework points to the use of current and target 
profiles as a resource for users to prioritize and measure progress toward the 
target profile while considering other sector-specific factors and business needs 
including cost-effectiveness and innovation. Therefore, profiles can be used to 
conduct self-assessments and communicate within an organization or between 
organizations. Id. at 3. Compare the Preliminary Framework to the NERC CATF 
Report, which includes NERC’s own framework, developed by a working group of 
the Critical Infrastructure Protection Committee, featuring what NERC calls 
“attack trees.” See CATF REPORT, supra note 13, at 4. These attack trees provide a 
solid structure to build on, such as for each revision to the CIP Standards, allowing 
new requirements to be incorporated into the attack trees and analysis rerun to 
determine any positive or negative consequences of the proposed changes. NERC 
recommends to compliance entities that, prior to release of a NERC Alert, the BPS 
operator should compare mitigation measure actions against the attack trees to 
determine if the recommendations provide the greatest likelihood of reducing the 
potential for compromise. At least annually BPS operators should evaluate the 
attack trees to incorporate new information. CATF REPORT, supra note 13, at 33. 
Clearly, the Preliminary Framework offers a meaningless structure compared to 
the industry-specific framework presented by NERC, so critical infrastructure 
companies in the energy sector will find little value in the Preliminary Framework.  
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Appendix C, Section C.3, a discussion entitled “Conformity 
Assessment,” which purports to provide guidance for a company’s 
self-assessment of its implementation of the Framework: 
Industry has a long history of developing conformity 
assessment programs to meet society’s needs. 
An organization can use conformity assessment 
activities to assess the implementation of requirements 
related to managing cybersecurity risk. The output of 
conformity assessment activities can enhance an 
organization’s understanding of its implementation of a 
Framework profile.209 
That language discusses a company’s self-assessment. By contrast, 
the EO’s language appears to request a way for “measuring the 
performance of an entity”210 by outsiders, and probably DHS. 
Moreover, a later passage in the same section suggests that NIST 
contemplates these self-assessments to be made public,211 which 
would expose a company to considerable risks when customers, 
suppliers, lenders, and insurers view and evaluate the company’s 
self-assessment of its implementation of the Framework. The 
Preliminary Framework emphasizes the public disclosure of such 
assessments, the need for “confidence” in them by third parties, 
and the disadvantages that might flow from failing to conform with 
the Framework and having others in the market know it: 
The need for confidence in conformity assessment 
activities must be balanced with cost to the private and 
public sector including, . . . additional legal obligations, 
and the cost of non-conformity in the market. 
Successful conformity assessment provides the needed 
level of confidence . . . . Critical infrastructure’s evolving 
implementation of Framework profiles should drive the 
identification of private sector conformity assessment 
activities that address the confidence and information 
needs of stakeholders.212 
That passage appears to assume that “conformity [to the 
Framework] assessments” should (and will) be made public, that 
transactors will rely on them in negotiations of deals, and that such 
 
 209.  Preliminary Framework, supra note 186, at 37. 
 210.  78 Fed. Reg. at 11,741. 
 211.  Id. 
 212.  Preliminary Framework, supra note 186, at 37. 
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assessments are essential to provide “the needed level of 
confidence.”213 
We doubt that boards and management will welcome being 
publicly pressured into adopting the Framework, but that appears 
to be the intent of the EO and the Preliminary Framework. We also 
doubt that boards and management will approve public release of a 
company’s own “conformity [to the Framework] assessment” or 
one conducted by a third party. Critical infrastructure companies 
no doubt find it important to know if their suppliers, customers, 
lenders, and insurers are reliable and may view cybersecurity as 
among the crucial indicia to be considered during negotiations of a 
transaction. But such negotiations and the accompanying “due 
diligence” are an appropriate and risk-based way for parties to 
examine each other’s reliability to perform the terms of an 
agreement. The parties can then modify those terms to reflect the 
findings of their respective “due diligence” reviews. Although NIST 
may be eager to have the Framework exert a strong influence on 
the commercial and financial markets, if that proves to be the case 
in the final draft and interpretation of the Framework by the 
executive branch, then we think that will dissuade many companies 
from adopting the Framework. 
We should add that comments by White House officials give 
the clear impression that DHS will be directed to use the 
Framework to “bootstrap” and enhance existing cybersecurity 
regulations, creating yet another way by which the Framework’s 
standards will not really be “voluntary.” As the White House Senior 
Director for Cybersecurity explained shortly after issuance of the 
EO: 
So once we have this Cybersecurity Framework in a year—
what will we do? In regulated industries, we will ask the 
regulators to look at the Framework, but we are not 
seeking change for change sake, and if the industry is in 
good shape, we won’t ask them to change. But some 
regulators need to improve, and we will ask them to 
consider the Framework and to issue new regulations 
through the usual process of issue, ask for comment, 
revise and reissue . . . . If you have read the Executive 
Order, there is not a lot of description of this voluntary 
program—because we want industry to help us identify 
 
 213.  Id. 
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what would be a helpful program and encourage 
participation in it.214 
Finally, if boards and management ask whether the 
Framework’s “core” of standards and best practices share common 
objectives and priorities with those expressed in NERC’s CATF and 
SIRTF Reports, the answer at this point appears to be that the 
Framework aims at a much lower set of objectives—daily cyber 
hygiene of companies—not at helping them prepare for the worst 
of all possible post-attack scenarios flowing from Severe Events. 
Recall that the White House Senior Director for Cybersecurity 
emphasized that “cyber hygiene will not protect you” from the 
adversaries’ A-Game—Advanced Persistent Threats—but that is not 
the Framework’s objective.215 Instead, it is to be designed to “help 
companies that are the least sophisticated to bring them up the 
curve in cybersecurity” and thus improve the cyber hygiene of 
critical infrastructure throughout the nation, thereby forcing the 
adversaries to use their “A-Game.”216 
We think that whatever standards and best practices NIST does 
eventually place within that schematic, none appear likely to 
address the Severe Event and New Normal challenges identified by 
the SIRTF Report.217 Our view is not changed by the fact that the 
Preliminary Framework contains the following description of the 
fifth “Core” element: 
Recover—Develop and implement the appropriate 
activities, prioritized through the organization’s risk 
management process, to restore the capabilities or critical 
infrastructure services that were impaired through a 
cybersecurity event.218 
Rather than reflecting a convergence of the EO’s objectives and 
NERC’s Task Force objectives, that passage suggests a serious gap. 
The post-attack consequences envisioned by that passage are not as 
disruptive, damaging, and enduring to BPS operations as a Severe 
Event, as evidenced by the characterization of the recovery or 
restoration effort as seemingly simple, straight-forward, and 
requiring no new preparations, just an application of the usual 
 
 214.  Ozment, supra note 145. 
 215.  Id. 
 216.  Id. 
 217.  See SIRTF REPORT, supra note 13.  
 218.  Preliminary Framework, supra note 186, at 7.  
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methods. That is quite unlike the Task Force view that the 
electricity industry lacks experience in “planning for and 
responding to high-impact events that have a low probability of 
occurring or have not yet occurred.”219 For that reason, the SIRTF 
Report focused its recommendations on a Severe Event that 
“stresses the electricity industry’s capabilities well beyond its already 
robust emergency response capabilities”220 and thus beyond any 
company’s “comfort zone” of existing plans and table-top exercises 
and other rehearsals.221 In short, these are situations for which 
there is no prior experience to draw upon—and the planning 
therefore needs to be imaginative and resourceful. Thus the SIRTF 
Report gives concrete examples of kinds of post-attack 
circumstances that will go beyond a BPS company’s prior 
experience and should be anticipated: 
 The event is beyond the scenarios typically exercised by 
entities as part of the NERC Emergency Preparedness 
and Operations standards. 
. . . . 
 As a result of insufficient generation and transmission 
resources, system operators must shed load without 
advanced notice and regularly implement rotating 
blackouts to manage BPS reliability. 
. . . . 
 Multiple information technology and communications 
have failed-entities contend with issues that restrict the 
ability of system operators to effectively communicate, 
operate, and monitor the BPS. 
 The event is persistent or recurring throughout the 
mitigation and restoration phases, further hindering 
recovery and restoration. 
. . . . 
 BPS entity staff experience a high degree of physical 
and psychological demands for an extended period of 
time. 
. . . . 
 
 219.  CATF REPORT, supra note 13, at 1.  
 220.  SIRTF REPORT, supra note 13, at 10. 
 221.  Id.  
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 The resources required to respond exceed the 
financial capacity of some entities.222 
The Preliminary Framework makes no effort to prepare critical 
infrastructure for such realities.223 As a result, there is a significant 
and perplexing gap between the Preliminary Framework and the 
NERC Task Force reports in what each contemplates as 
consequences from the cyber-attack threats, in the kind of attacks 
(kinetic or non-kinetic, operational target or business information 
target) they are most concerned to address, in their respective 
objectives, and in the preparations that each recommends. The 
more one compares the recommendations to be expressed in the 
Preliminary Framework and the recommendations contained in 
the NERC Task Force reports, the wider the gap appears to be 
between their objectives and the actions each seeks to persuade 
BPS owners and operators to pursue to improve cybersecurity. As a 
result, this gap is so wide it may force companies to choose which 
set of objectives—and which set of plans and preparations—to 
pursue. This is because companies have limited resources and the 
need to train personnel to implement one set of recommendations 
may make it impossible for many critical infrastructure companies 
to respond to both to the Preliminary Framework (as intended by 
the White House) and to the NERC Task Force recommendations 
(as intended by NERC and its trustees who approved the Task 
Force reports).224 Moreover, the need to make such a choice may 
become more compelling because the gap between these objectives 
will widen as the adversaries continue to improve their capabilities 
to launch cyber attacks that target, damage, and disrupt critical 
infrastructure. The gap between those two objectives—cyber-
hygiene improvements and Severe Event preparations—should give 
boards and management some cause for concern and make them 
 
 222.  SIRTF REPORT, supra note 13, at 11 (footnote omitted). 
 223.  The Preliminary Framework’s introduction describes the document as 
providing guidance to an organization on managing cybersecurity risk. It states 
that its key objective is to “encourage organizations to consider cybersecurity risk 
as a priority similar to financial, safety, and operational risk while factoring in 
larger systemic risks inherent to critical infrastructure.” Preliminary Framework, supra 
note 186, at 1. 
 224.  SIRTF REPORT, supra note 13, at 1; see also CATF REPORT, supra note 13, 
at 1–2, 12–13. 
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wonder which should be the higher priority for their company in 
the immediate future. 
We worry that adoption and implementation of the 
Framework will increasingly be viewed in illusory and misleading 
terms, for example, as meeting a high standard (which it is not) 
and as fulfilling the White House summons to private industry to 
help protect national security (which it surely will not do since it 
does not address Severe Events and their catastrophic 
consequences). It is ironic that the same EO that directs that DHS 
identify critical infrastructure that could cause widespread damage 
regionally or nationally if damaged by cyber attacks, nonetheless 
aims with its Framework at the lowest of objectives—a removal of 
easy targets from the adversaries’ reach. 
Moreover, we think that the White House’s rationales for the 
Framework will prompt some boards and management to ask their 
counsel, “If the Framework is designed to force sophisticated, well-funded 
and presumably state-sponsored adversaries to shift to and invest heavily in 
their ‘A-Game,’ shouldn’t we be preparing for that? The Government isn’t 
saying it will protect our company from advanced persistent threats, so isn’t 
the strategy going to put our company at greater risk of successful and 
damaging attacks?” The Preliminary Framework appears to overlook 
those questions, but those and similar questions will almost 
certainly be at the core of discussions by boards and management 
of what response their company should be making to the 
implementation of the EO; to the receipt of Catastrophic Target 
Notices and Imminent Target Notices; and to the “encouragement” 
to adopt the Framework followed by “conformity assessments” 
(whatever they turn out to be). Addressing the probable results of a 
successful coordinated cyber attack that seeks to cause kinetic 
damage to BPS operations remains the focus of NERC’s CATF and 
SIRTF Reports. As a result, these reports take a much longer and 
more critical view of what characteristics in a kinetic cyber attack 
could destabilize and damage BPS company operations.225 
We also note that the Preliminary Framework may create the 
unintended consequences that have resulted from other sets of 
standards; namely, the encouragement of a “compliance culture” 
 
 225.  In the next section, we will briefly review some of the recommendations 
contained in those reports, but only to identify some that highlight why boards 
and management of BPS companies may want to focus more on these 
recommendations than on the Preliminary Framework. 
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that focuses solely on meeting the applicable standards’ 
requirements and encouraging companies to believe that will be 
sufficient. The General Accountability Office (GAO) warned of 
such results from cybersecurity standards back in January 2011 (two 
years before the EO): 
Utilities are focusing on regulatory compliance instead of 
comprehensive security. The existing federal and state 
regulatory environment creates a culture within the utility 
industry of focusing on compliance with cybersecurity 
requirements, instead of a culture focused on achieving 
comprehensive and effective cybersecurity. Specifically, 
experts told us that utilities focus on achieving minimum 
regulatory requirements rather than designing a 
comprehensive approach to system security. In addition, 
one expert stated that security requirements are 
inherently incomplete, and having a culture that views the 
security problem as being solved once those requirements 
are met will leave an organization vulnerable to cyber 
attack. Consequently, without a comprehensive approach 
to security, utilities leave themselves open to unnecessary 
risk.226 
Moreover, there is considerable controversy concerning the 
prolonged, staggered approval and adoption of various overlapping 
versions of CIP Standards by NERC and the significant deficiencies 
in those currently applicable. Such delays and deficiencies result in 
the BPS companies continuing to be seriously deficient in their 
cybersecurity defenses and preparations for addressing the 
consequences of a Severe Event and New Normal of degraded 
operations and services. The extent to which cybersecurity 
deficiencies continue to exist in this sector were reported in a 
Department of Energy Inspector General Audit Report, issued in 
January 2011: 
Despite their importance to protecting the power grid, 
the CIP standards did not include a number of security 
controls commonly recommended for government and 
industry systems. . . . In certain cases, Commission officials 
noted that the lack of stringent requirements for defining 
 
 226.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-117, ELECTRICITY GRID 
MODERNIZATION: PROGRESS BEING MADE ON CYBERSECURITY GUIDELINES, BUT KEY 
CHALLENGES REMAIN TO BE ADDRESSED 23–24 (2011), available at http://www.gao 
.gov/new.items/d11117.pdf. 
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critical assets contributed to significant under reporting of 
these assets.227 
For example, the CIP Standards did not clearly define what 
constituted a critical asset or critical cyber asset. Absent a standard 
definition, entities that are part of the bulk electric system were 
permitted to use their discretion when identifying critical assets 
and critical cyber assets, a practice that could have allowed them to 
determine whether the cybersecurity standards were even 
applicable to their organization. Specifically, if an entity 
determined that no critical assets or critical cyber assets existed, it 
was exempt from the remaining original CIP Standards.228 
VI. CYBERSECURITY RECOMMENDATIONS BY NERC’S CATF REPORT 
AND SIRTF REPORT 
Unlike the Framework, which attempts to collect a core of 
cross-sector standards and best practices, the CATF and SIRTF 
Reports offer recommendations and guidance as points of 
departure from which companies may then develop plans and 
preparations that will fit the kinds of damage such operations 
might experience during and after the first wave of a coordinated 
cyber attack.229 As explained by the SIRTF Report: 
The suggestions offered throughout this report are 
intended to prompt entities to develop their own 
approaches and flexible plans that would be applicable 
under a wide variety of circumstances. . . . Entities are 
encouraged to critically examine their current 
capabilities, and to consider what else they may need to 
do to manage restoration and operations during a Severe 
Event.230 
 
 227.  OFFICE OF AUDITS & INSPECTIONS, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, AUDIT REPORT: 
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION’S MONITORING OF POWER GRID CYBER 
SECURITY 2 (2011), available at http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/igprod 
/documents/IG-0846.pdf.  
 228.  Id. The Inspector General noted that FERC, in exercising its 
responsibility to oversee and approve NERC’s cybersecurity standards, “had not 
always acted to ensure that the cybersecurity standards” NERC proposed “were 
adequate. In addition, [FERC] had not always effectively monitored how NERC 
and the regional entities assessed implementation of the cybersecurity standards.” 
Id. 
 229.  SIRTF REPORT, supra note 13, at 7. 
 230.  Id. 
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The SIRTF Report inferred that, having mapped out Severe 
Event scenarios and described what a New Normal post-attack 
period of reduced reliability of services might be like, NERC would 
be asked by BPS boards and management whether, during a Severe 
Event and post-attack New Normal period, entities could be 
exempt from compliance with the FERC-approved CIP Standards 
for cybersecurity developed and proposed by NERC.231 The SIRTF 
Report observes that the standards should still apply, but 
realistically noted that violations in these circumstances would 
probably occur: 
The SIRTF reviewed the NERC standards and concluded 
that standards support safe and reliable operation and 
should be applicable during a Severe Event. While it is 
conceivable that during a Severe Event an entity will 
violate certain standard requirements given the intensity 
of planning and operating challenges through the New 
Normal period, it would be impossible to predict these 
circumstances in advance. 
. . . . Although a Severe Event may put entities in a 
position where they cannot comply with all [CIP 
cybersecurity] standards, entities are in the best position 
to “do the right thing” for reliability and public safety, and 
self-report any violation of NERC standards as time and 
circumstances permit.232 
Although the SIRTF Report decided against recommending 
suspension of the applicable CIP Standards during and after a 
Severe Event, it suggests that if violations in those challenging 
circumstances occur, the penalties imposed might be substantially 
reduced provided that the entity acted to reinforce and restore 
reliable operations and self-reported all violations when the crisis 
had subsided sufficiently.233 Note, however, that the New Normal is 
not merely a period of reduced services. In the context of BPS 
operations, NERC, in the CATF and SIRTF Reports, consistently 
emphasizes that what most characterizes the New Normal is that 
the “BPS is operated at a reduced state of reliability and supply for 
months or possibly years.”234 
 
 231.  Id. at 17. 
 232.  Id. at 7–8.  
 233.  Id. 
 234.  Id. at 2 (emphasis added). 
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A review of the recommendations by the CATF Report and 
SIRTF Report reveals that, while most recommendations concern 
internal operations unique to a BPS entity, several would be 
important for owners and operators of other critical infrastructure 
to be aware of and take into account when attempting to 
understand what impact a Severe Event and New Normal of 
reduced reliability and supply of electric power would have on their 
operations. Knowing those impacts should enable such entities to 
make preparations accordingly, and thus be spared the chaos and 
confusion that might otherwise result from being confronted with 
unanticipated and unimagined challenges. 
We therefore limit our discussion to the recommendations in 
the CATF and SIRTF Reports that have a wide cross-sector 
application. As a result, we omit discussion of important Severe 
Event and BPS operational issues, such as “real-time assessments” 
and “step-by-step restoration procedures,” and instead concentrate 
on the formation and stabilization of “islands” of electric power 
through “load shedding” (rotating outages) and the jury-rigging of 
“situational awareness” needed for stabilizing the “islands” and the 
recovery efforts. These activities need to be understood by other 
critical infrastructure, and the CATF and SIRTF Reports therefore 
deserve to be read by management and discussed by boards of such 
companies. When doing so, it would help to remember that, unlike 
NERC-developed, FERC-approved CIP Standards, or the NIST-
prepared Preliminary Framework with its “core” of standards and 
best practices, the recommendations in the CATF and SIRTF 
Reports are not standards nor intended to set a minimum level of 
assurance for a check-box compliance-driven company. The reports’ 
recommendations are instead designed to prompt companies to 
consider what they might do to improve their management of the 
consequences following a Severe Event cyber attack.235 Thus, the emphasis 
is on helping a company carefully think through its manageable, 
best courses of action when challenged by the probable, worst-case 
scenario of a Severe Event. 
Thus, unlike the White House strategy of emphases on cyber 
hygiene and defense through voluntary adoption of cybersecurity 
standards, NERC’s CATF and SIRTF Reports assume the worst—
that adversaries can and someday may cause a Severe Event by 
 
 235.  See id. at 9–10. 
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cyber attacks that target the BPS.236 The NERC reports therefore 
assume that, instead of the futility of defending what is, and will 
likely remain, vulnerable to attack, BPS companies should put their 
emphasis on managing “restoration and operations during a Severe 
Event.” The SIRTF Report explains: 
This report examines the aspects of emergency operation 
and restoration that would be particularly challenged 
through a Severe Event and provides options to enhance 
the resilience237 of the bulk power system. The suggestions 
offered throughout this report are intended to prompt 
entities to develop their own approaches and flexible 
plans that would be applicable under a wide variety of 
circumstances. . . . Entities are encouraged to critically 
examine their current capabilities, and to consider what 
else they may need to do to manage restoration and 
operations during a Severe Event.238 
With those objectives and emphases in mind, we now look at what 
may be the most unfamiliar aspect (and most important for other 
critical infrastructures to learn): how the BPS might attempt to 
recover from a “severe event.” 
A. Formation of “Electrical Islands” Following Severe Events 
Each company managing a critical infrastructure operation 
depends on the reliable supply of electric power for its survival. For 
such companies to be prepared for the worst-case scenario, such as 
that of a cyber-attack Severe Event, they should give consideration 
to reviewing the preparations for Severe Events and the post-attack 
New Normal being made by the operators of the BPS services on 
which they rely. The better that an electric power customer knows 
and understands how the BPS operator will handle that crisis, the 
better the chances the critical infrastructure customer has of 
enhancing its own plans to be in a position to maximize 
cooperation with the BPS operator and to have contingency plans 
that address the potentially catastrophic consequences. 
 
 236.  CATF REPORT, supra note 13, at 2; see SIRTF REPORT, supra note 13, at 19–
20.  
 237.  As used in the SIRTF Report, “resilience” is “generally defined as the 
ability to recover or adjust to misfortune or change.” SIRTF REPORT, supra note 13, 
at 11. 
 238.  Id. at 7. 
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Perhaps foremost among the preparations recommended by 
NERC’s SIRTF Report are those for managing “graceful 
degradation”239 (a concept that may be quite unfamiliar to 
operators and owners of other critical infrastructure), as well as 
stabilizing, repairing, and expanding “electrical islands.”240 If a 
critical infrastructure company relies on the BPS and has not 
considered how it would cope during the New Normal period 
being located inside a surviving “electrical island” (with rolling 
outages)—or worse, outside such “islands”—then such a company’s 
cybersecurity plans will leave it unprepared for the worst 
circumstances and at high risk of being overwhelmed when it might 
otherwise have coped with them. Let’s consider how the “islands” 
would form and some of the SIRTF Report recommendations of 
preparations for stabilizing them. 
1. Characteristics of Post-Severe Event “Islands” 
The SIRTF Report assumes that immediately following (or 
during) a persistent Severe Event, “islands are likely to form as 
transmission lines between areas of the system trip.”241 These islands 
would be far smaller than the four major “Interconnections.”242 The 
SIRTF Report assumes that “a substantial number of supply 
resources are unavailable for an extended period of time and as 
much as or more than 50% of total instantaneous demand cannot 
 
 239.  In the event of a severe cyber attack on the BPS, NERC’s CATF Report 
observes that survivability involves focusing on protecting those systems and 
functions that are essential to maintaining reliable operations. Reliable operations 
will degrade over time, resulting in the gradual reduction in services and functions 
until essential operations are no longer possible. “The key is trying to maintain 
reliable operations in a reduced state for as long as possible. This resilience 
characteristic is known as graceful degradation of service.” CATF REPORT, supra 
note 13, at 28. 
 240.  Upon a Severe Event, “[r]ather than operating as part of a large 
interconnected (and therefore more stable) grid, system operators may need to 
manage a number of small ‘electrical islands’ and implement load shedding or 
rotating blackouts for extended periods of time (weeks, months, or years)” until 
the interconnected grid stabilizes and returns to pre-incident normal. These 
islanding scenarios might have to be the New Normal for a BPS operator. SIRTF 
REPORT, supra note 13, at 3. 
 241.  Id. at 20. 
 242.  See id. at 18. 
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be served in the islands.”243 These “islands” would be unstable.244 
They might have to be operated by entities that “are not normally 
responsible for system operator functions.”245 The substitute 
operators would be further challenged by the duration of instability 
and their lack of experience in prolonged stabilizing activities such 
as “load shedding”246: 
[E]xperience with implementing load shedding plans has 
been limited to relatively short periods of time—a few 
hours or at most a day or two. In contrast, under Severe 
Event conditions, rotating blackouts may need to be 
implemented for an extended period of time and for 
significantly longer rotation intervals.247 
While “[l]arge interconnected power grids are inherently 
stable because they have many sources of governor-controlled 
generation and relatively predictable load patterns,”248 the smaller 
“islands” formed following a Severe Event would provide electrical 
power of uncertain reliability: “Islands with small amounts of 
generation and load have less inertia and as such experience larger 
frequency swings, are harder to control, and are more likely to 
collapse from subsequent generation loss than are the existing four 
Interconnections.”249 
Thus, being within an “island” of electric power would improve 
a company’s chances of being able to continue operations (albeit at 
a degraded level between scheduled rolling outages) or to restore 
full operations at the earliest practicable time. However, being 
within an “island” would provide no certainty of being able to 
receive electric power. Moreover, the instability of the “island” 
would pose risks to critical infrastructure, computers, and other 
equipment that can be damaged by surges and drops in frequency 
or voltage. These are risks that would need to be addressed in such 
companies’ Severe Event planning and preparations: 
[M]any of today’s loads are frequency or voltage sensitive 
or both (such as computers, industrial control systems, 
 
 243.  Id. at 19. 
 244.  See id. at 18. 
 245.  Id. 
 246.  Id. at 25. 
 247.  Id. at 18. 
 248.  Id. at 23. 
 249.  Id. at 20. 
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[and] other electronic devices) and may trip off-line as a 
result of these swings. The challenge with frequency or 
voltage sensitive load loss [for electric power customers 
and their sensitive equipment] is that it will come back on 
the system once electrical parameters are within the 
prescribed range. Also this can be further complicated 
with the increase in automatic schemes within the 
distribution system for “self healing” (smart grids). This 
uncoordinated load restoration possibly increases the risk 
of island collapse.250 
2. Use of “Load Shedding” to Build and Stabilize “Islands” and 
Need for Information Sharing 
In the immediate aftermath of a Severe Event, BPS operators 
will probably find that, in order to manage the load-generation 
balance, they must resort to “load shedding.”251 A BPS operator in 
control of an “island” cannot supply all customers equally and will 
need to set priorities among its customers. Knowing that these 
decisions need to be made should alert owners and operators of 
other critical infrastructure of the need to discuss the issue in 
advance with not only their regular BPS operator but any others 
who might become responsible for control of an “island” 
containing these other critical infrastructure companies. The 
discussions will need to cover being excluded from “load shedding” 
areas and developing strategies for maintaining communications so 
that critical infrastructure companies will know the amount of 
power that will be available to them and when power may be lost. 
As the SIRTF Report explains: 
Load shedding plans need to consider the priority or 
importance of loads such as critical power system loads 
and other dependent critical infrastructures such as 
telecommunications. 
. . . . 
. . . [It is important to e]nsure that critical power 
system loads and other critical infrastructure loads such as 
certain telecommunications centers are excluded from 
load shedding plans. 
. . . . 
 
 250.  Id. 
 251.  See id. at 25–27 (load shedding). 
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In the event of sustained rotational load shedding 
(rotating blackouts) communication becomes a key factor 
to ensure that affected areas understand what power 
supply they will have, at what time[,] and for how 
long. . . . [T]hese communications need to be carefully 
considered and coordinated with local distribution 
companies, local law enforcement agencies, emergency 
responders[,] and government officials.252 
More companies than just telecommunication critical 
infrastructure companies need to be involved in such planning and 
discussions. For example, the experience with Hurricane Sandy 
and the rapid depletion of gasoline at service stations253 suggests 
that, although service stations are often not viewed as high-priority 
customers during an emergency recovery, they need to be 
considered for that priority in preparations for a Severe Event. 
However, the SIRTF Report cautioned that, as with the other 
recommendations, these are not standards for rigid adoption, but 
guidance from which companies can then develop their own plans 
and preparations which, by necessity, must be flexible and should 
seek to be more comprehensive and more customized to their 
circumstances and operations than CIP and other cybersecurity 
standards. Instead, companies need to coordinate their plans and 
negotiate information sharing agreements so that when the extent 
of the damage and outages becomes known they can work together 
to develop plans for the New Normal of “electric power islands.” As 
the SIRTF Report explains: 
Since it is impossible to predict the extent of islanding 
formation following a Severe Event, it may not be 
practical to share operational information ahead of time. 
It is important therefore that information-sharing stra-
 
 252.  Id. at 25–26. 
 253.  New Jersey’s largest electric utility, Public Service Electric & Gas 
Company, has explained to its state regulatory body, the New Jersey Board of 
Public Utilities, that during the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Sandy, many 
gasoline service stations were without power at a time when many residents 
needed gasoline to fuel emergency generators. Access to gasoline, therefore, 
became a much more severe crisis than simply a matter of mobility, and it became 
necessary to expedite storm restoration efforts to prioritize service stations. Cf. In 
re Petition of Public Service Electric and Gas Company, PUB. SERV. ELECTRIC & GAS CO. 
¶ 85 (Feb. 20, 2013), http://www.pseg.com/family/pseandg/tariffs/reg_filings 
/pdf/EnergyStrong.pdf.  
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tegies are established in preparation for such events to 
expedite this information dissemination and address any 
confidentiality concerns.254 
In reviewing information-sharing agreements, BPS operators 
and other critical infrastructure companies will also need to review 
the probable impairment of communications following a Severe 
Event and how they will communicate during the New Normal 
period in order to share information and maintain situation 
awareness despite misinformation that might be generated by the 
cyber attack’s malware. 
3. Severe Event Impact on Communications Infrastructure 
Because of the moment-to-moment need to balance loads and 
other delicate potential triggers of cascading outages, the BPS is 
heavily dependent on communications infrastructure, and Severe 
Events to the BPS cannot be realistically discussed without 
discussing the impaired communications that would result and 
their impact on detecting a cyber attack, as well as managing efforts 
at stabilizing “electric islands” after a Severe Event. Other critical 
infrastructure needs to be aware that the widely dispersed 
operations of the BPS make the reliable flow of accurate (not 
cyber-corrupted) communications vital to BPS reliability. As the 
SIRTF Report explains: 
The reliable operation of the BPS depends on a highly 
reliable communications infrastructure. North America’s 
BPS has been described as the world’s largest machine; 
generation resources, consumer load, field operations, 
and centralized controls are all separated by significant 
geographic distances and the actions of any single entity 
can significantly impact others. Although communication, 
both voice and data, is very important in normal 
operations, during a crisis situation it is absolutely 
critical.255 
Where the CATF Report assumes that a Severe Event will degrade 
communications, the SIRTF Report lays out the challenge it poses 
and the preparations that BPS operators will need to make in order 
to carry out necessary continuous communications (i.e., going for 
 
 254.  SIRTF REPORT, supra note 13, at 27. 
 255.  Id. at 39 (footnote omitted). 
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days or even hours without communications must not be allowed to 
happen). The SIRTF Report states: “During a Severe Event 
communications will be degraded to some extent, and entities may 
experience the complete loss of normal communications. Despite 
this, operating entities must strive to continue to monitor the 
system and direct operations at all times regardless of 
circumstances.”256 
Since “load shedding” will be needed in order to manage 
“graceful degradation” of electric power from the large 
interconnections into surviving, smaller, potentially isolated 
“electric islands” (or widely distributed electric archipelagos), the 
BPS operators will also need to make sure that they maintain 
situational awareness over such “islands.”257 That, in turn, requires 
that they prepare to salvage or jury-rig communications that permit 
the requisite internal system information updates and external 
sharing of information with customers, suppliers, first responders, 
and the federal government (whose role, unfortunately, the CATF 
and SIRTF Reports do not attempt to illuminate or explore).258 
A BPS operator’s loss of communications, both within its 
organization and with other organizations, appears a foregone 
conclusion in the CATF and SIRTF Reports.259 The CATF Report 
presumes loss of communications (and of long lead-time 
equipment), as evident in this passage on the challenges of 
restoration of impaired or disrupted situational awareness after a 
Severe Event: 
Restoration of situational awareness may have to be 
manually implemented with staff physically stationed at 
key locations until communication with monitoring 
equipment and associated telemetry is restored. 
Restoration may also involve repair or replacement of 
parts suffering physical damage from a cyber event. Some 
of these may require long lead times for replacement due 
to supply chain or skilled installation workforce 
availability issues.260 
 
 256.  Id. 
 257.  Id. at 33. 
 258.  Id. at 26. 
 259.  CATF REPORT, supra note 13, at 2 (Executive Summary). 
 260.  Id. 
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The SIRTF Report notes, of course, that the loss of 
communications may derive from disruptions of the BPS, damage 
to telecommunications, or communications overload.261 Thus, the 
SIRTF Report assumes degradation of communications as a result 
of a Severe Event for a variety of reasons, including: 
 Loss of BPS power supply to telecommunications 
facilities; 
 Physical damage to telecommunications facilities; 
 The user volume of communications exceeds the 
capacity of communications facilities, especially cellular 
and satellite telephone networks.262 
Of those causes, the one most easily overlooked is the third: 
communications overload.263 And it is the one that many in the 
Northeast have experienced during and after emergencies,264 as 
explained in an August 2011 Scientific American article: 
Anyone in the eastern portion of the U.S. this week 
who was forced to evacuate an office, home or school 
following Tuesday’s magnitude 5.8 earthquake soon 
noticed that cell phone service was spotty or, in many 
cases, nonexistent. For New Yorkers herded outside of 
their skyscrapers and into the streets, it was a 
communication blackout reminiscent of (although of 
course not the same as) the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In both 
situations, mobile phone users were unable to connect to 
the cell network to communicate with loved ones. 
Whereas the 9/11 cell phone outage was the result of 
many factors—including the downing of cell phone 
towers—this week’s problems (though brief) were caused 
purely by volume. Countless cell phone users were 
fighting for limited access, leaving most without service.265 
The overload problem will be exacerbated by the emerging 
plans of the large telecommunications providers (e.g., Verizon and 
 
 261.  SIRTF REPORT, supra note 13, at 39. 
 262.  Id. 
 263.  During emergency situations, many more people attempt to make 
telephone calls on wireless networks than normal conditions, overloading cell 
towers and network switches. 
 264.  Larry Greenemeier, Can Mobile Phone Networks Be Improved to Better 
Cope with Emergencies?, SCI. AM. (Aug. 26, 2011), available at http://www 
.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=smart-phone-emergency. 
 265.  Id. 
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AT&T) to refuse to replace or rebuild landlines destroyed by 
storms (such as Hurricane Sandy) and to install in their place 
wireless or fiber-optic—less reliable—service “even though the new 
services often fail during a blackout.”266 The difference in reliability 
between wireless or fiber optics and landlines is substantial and will 
burden any BPS or other critical infrastructure operator whose 
landline service has been removed or replaced.267 
Traditional copper landlines use electric pulses to carry voice 
and data signals over a metal wire, which also carries power, so the 
phone works during a blackout. Fiber-optic lines are made of a thin 
glass filament and transmit voice and data at high speeds using 
pulses of light, but they cannot carry electricity and do not work 
during a power failure without a battery. Cable television wires, 
which can also transmit telephone service, are made of copper, but 
they require a modem powered by electricity. Even cell phones 
require power at the cell tower—something that was knocked out 
during Sandy.268 
To our knowledge, most BPS emergency and contingency 
plans and preparations were derived from operations based on—
and continue to presume and rely ultimately on the reliability of—
land line telecommunications for voice and data.269 The general 
 
 266.  Edward Wyatt, On a New Jersey Islet, Twilight of the Landline, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 15, 2013, at B1, available at 2013 WLNR 25792525. 
 267.  See id. Note also that in some instances, Verizon is installing a wireless 
service called “Voice Link” instead of repairing damaged landlines. Voice Link’s 
wireless service will “not work if power fails—a backup battery provides two hours 
of talking time, hardly reassuring to people battered by Sandy,” and  
calls to 911 under normal conditions might not go through because of 
network congestion. Medical devices that require periodic tests over 
phone lines, like many pacemakers, cannot transmit over Voice Link. Fax 
machines do not work over most wireless phone networks . . . . Neither 
do many home security systems, which depend on a copper phone line to 
connect to a response center.  
Id.  
 268.  Id.  
 269.  NERC’s emergency operations standard, for example, requires BPS 
operators to have emergency plans with communications protocols to be used 
during emergencies, but the standards, plans, and reliability assessment tools 
appear to assume that conventional, wireless, and satellite communications will be 
functioning as normal. See, e.g., Standard EOP-001-0b Emergency Operations Planning, 
N. AM. ELECTRIC RELIABILITY CORP. (2011), http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand 
/ReliabilityStandards/Reliability%20Standards%20DL/EOP-001-0b.pdf. 
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public (and probably most boards) view electric outages as posing 
risks to voice communications; but they probably underestimate 
the risks to wireless and data communications, which are vital to 
maintaining situational awareness during and after a Severe 
Event.270 Thus, the SIRTF Report, in a rare and emphatic caution, 
points out: “Effective BPS restoration and continued operation is 
highly dependent upon the ability to communicate, both voice and 
data, at all times. The highly interdependent aspect of BPS recovery 
and the communications infrastructure cannot be over-
emphasized.”271 
To address this interdependence of communications after a 
Severe Event, the SIRTF Report does not recommend BPS owners 
and operators search for answers in the CIP Standards272 or in the 
after-action report from NERC’s first sector-specific, large-scale grid 
security exercise, GridEx 2011.273 Instead, the SIRTF Report urged 
 
 270.  See Surprise! Your High-Tech Home Phone System Could Go Dead 
in an Emergency, CONSUMER REP. (Jan. 2012), http://www.consumerreports.org 
/cro/2012/01/surprise-your-high-tech-home-phone-system-could-go-dead-in-an 
-emergency/index.htm.  
 271.  SIRTF Report, supra note 13, at 62. 
 272.  The SIRTF Report reflects an awareness that the CIP Standards process is 
flawed by the glacial pace of its progress, by its inconsistent coverage (applying 
only to identified “critical assets”), by its over-emphasis toward the narrow limits of 
a compliance culture, by its failure to address any vision of the Severe Event 
scenario, and by the awkward nature of FERC’s limited authority over 
cybersecurity of the BPS. Such flaws are increasingly the subject of discussion in 
the federal government as evidenced by the following observations: 
   Under section 215 [of the Energy Policy Act of 2005], FERC cannot 
prescribe its own standards or directly amend NERC’s standards . . . . 
The process of developing these reliability standards is lengthy . . . . It 
can take NERC six months or longer to respond to FERC’s initial order 
to submit reliability standards. It then takes FERC months to review 
these proposed standards . . . . 
   For example, the first critical infrastructure protection (CIP) 
standards approved by FERC in January 2008 took more than three 
years for NERC to develop . . . . It subsequently took NERC 43 months 
to develop and submit the most recent Version 5 of the CIP standards 
to FERC for approval. Such timeframes are not well suited to address 
rapidly evolving grid security vulnerabilities. 
STAFF OF CONGRESSMEN EDWARD J. MARKEY & HENRY A. WAXMAN, supra note 49, at 7. 
 273.  From the after-action report from GridEx 2011, it appears that exercise 
did not provide the challenges of a Severe Event, but instead revealed the 
weaknesses in “vertical” information sharing between BPS companies and the 
regulatory authorities during a cyber attack scenario throughout which 
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an approach that BPS owners and operators could quickly 
understand and apply, tailor to their own unique operational 
environment, and negotiate with telecommunications service 
providers without undue concern for regulatory oversight and 
compliance concerns.274 The recommendations are grounded in 
common sense practicalities that a BPS board and management 
would probably find refreshingly clear and appealing because these 
would allow BPS and telecommunications companies to share their 
respective worst-case scenario plans and “lessons learned and 
applied” from the previous experiences that might most closely, 
albeit imperfectly, approximate Severe Event challenges: 
Entities should work closely with their communications 
service-providers to better understand mutual depen-
dencies, identify priorities, and seek ways of mitigating the 
impact of severe disruptions. 
 Identify specific interdependencies between telecom-
munication infrastructure and BPS infrastructure, such as 
voice and protection circuits, SCADA, remote terminal 
units and smart grid devices, necessary for BPS 
operations . . . . 
 
telecommunications appeared to operate reliably. Such an assumption would be 
unrealistic in a Severe Event exercise, and it is unclear as of this time whether the 
next GridEx, scheduled for November 2013, will include the Severe Event 
challenges identified in the CATF and SIRTF Reports. The kind of information 
sharing problems revealed by GridEx 2011 included: 
The quality of information sharing and reporting to NERC’s ES-ISAC 
[Electricity Sector—Information Sharing and Analysis Center] and 
relevant government agencies was not as frequent or comprehensive as 
the communication occurring across the BPS . . . . Despite the 
assurance that NERC reporting would not be used for compliance 
purposes, several entities expressed hesitation in sharing sensitive 
information regarding compromised critical cyber infrastructure. One 
entity indicated that it was contacting corporate legal for “permission” 
to report to the ES-ISAC. This trust deficit significantly impeded entities’ 
willingness to share information that could have supported the ES-
ISAC’s role in ensuring grid reliability. 
N. AM. ELECTRIC RELIABILITY CORP., 2011 NERC GRID SECURITY EXERCISE: AFTER 
ACTION REPORT 12 (2012), available at http://www.nerc.com/files/NERC_GridEx 
_AAR_16Mar2012_Final.pdf (emphasis added).  
 274.  SIRTF REPORT, supra note 13, at 62. 
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 Ensure that critical telecommunications users are 
registered for priority wireless and land-line 
services . . . . 
 Identify risks and hazards such as failures, attacks, High 
Impact Low Frequency Events and/or congestion etc., 
that could impair the quality of service continuity, 
readiness, performance and time response of 
telecommunications. 
 Take mitigation measures . . . . 
Consider working with communications service providers 
to identify which of their facilities are critical to BPS 
operations. Determine which BPS and distribution 
facilities supply them and what backup power capacity is 
in-place (e.g., batteries, standby generators).275 
While providing guidance for BPS and telecommunications 
owners and operators to coordinate their Severe Event plans and 
preparations, the SIRTF Report avoids making the common 
mistake of thinking that a sensible recommendation will necessarily 
lead to a satisfactory result.276 Consistent with the underlying 
assumption of preparing for successful attacks and their 
consequences, the SIRTF Report also addresses the preparations 
that would be needed should telecommunications plans go awry.277 
Personnel need to know what “damage control” actions they should 
take on their own initiative in the absence of orders from senior 
management. As the SIRTF Report recommends in its discussion of 
“Standing Orders for Personnel”: 
Standing orders are a prescribed set of instructions for 
people to take action in the absence of communications 
or leadership direction. Standing orders could be 
developed to direct key personnel to report to designated 
locations following a Severe Event or direct a sub-station 
technician to clear each bus and open each breaker 
following a large scale blackout.278 
 
 275.  Id. at 62–63. 
 276.  The SIRTF REPORT, for example, observes: “If fuel is not prioritized to 
communications facilities, the ability to operate portions of the BPS will be 
severely limited.” Id. at 74. This is yet another instance in which the SIRTF Report 
carefully imagines the worst and does not fail to reduce it to its realistic elements 
and to address those with resourceful and practical recommendations.  
 277.  Id. at 44. 
 278.  Id.  
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This is yet another instance in which the SIRTF Report carefully 
imagines the worst and does not fail to reduce it to its realistic 
elements and addresses those with resourceful and practical 
recommendations. 
When BPS companies try out and test their Severe Event 
preparations, they should consider extending the “Standing Orders 
for Personnel” to incorporate “damage control” training methods 
used by the U.S. Navy. On submarines, for example, the Navy trains 
damage control through realistic rehearsals and then runs them 
again; on the rerun, the crew is told that certain key personnel 
(officers or NCOs) are incapacitated or dead, and the crew has to 
perform the “damage control” without communications from 
leaders and still accomplish the objective of making the right initial 
decisions and adjusting to potentially deteriorating 
circumstances.279 
VII. COUNSEL’S DISCUSSION OF THE SALIENT CYBERSECURITY 
QUESTIONS WITH A BOARD AND MANAGEMENT 
Counsel advising a critical infrastructure board and 
management on the company’s approach to cybersecurity need to 
be aware that the most serious cyber threats to such companies will 
often not be those that involve reporting of data breaches 
(notwithstanding the considerable importance of such incidents 
and the reporting obligations that they trigger). As the NERC Task 
Force reports make clear, the most serious cyber threats create 
“high-impact, low-frequency” risks that the company’s operations 
 
 279.  Although current Navy “damage control” procedures and training are 
not released to the public, Navy representative statements posted on Navy websites 
confirm that the Navy “damage control” training emphasizes ensuring that crews 
have the skills, initiative, and resourcefulness to step in and perform in an 
emergency if those assigned to such tasks are unavailable. As a statement on one 
such website explained in 2009 concerning the U.S.S. Wasp’s Damage Control 
Academy (DCA): 
If an emergency happens and you dial 9-1-1, we’re the ones who 
respond,” said Damage Controlman 2nd Class (SW/AW) Adrian 
Edwards, Wasp’s DC office work center supervisor. “But we also train the 
rest of the crew to fight fires because there’s always the chance that we 
could be incapacitated in some way. 
Christopher Koons, Damage Control Academy Provides Vital Training, U.S. NAVY 
(Oct. 24, 2009, 11:08 PM), http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id= 
49222.  
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will be damaged and disrupted, and that its ability to meet its 
contractual and regulatory obligations for reliability may be 
irreparably degraded.280 Such companies, therefore, find it 
challenging to hire a Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) 
who has the necessary qualifications. Candidates with experience 
and expertise in business information systems will bring that 
background into a company where it may appear to be the right 
skill set, but prove to be a liability. Business information system 
security expertise is not a skill set that can easily be transferred into 
critical infrastructure operational system security.281 
Unless the CISO understands the end-to-end features of a 
critical infrastructure company’s operations, such as a BPS running 
of electricity generation and transmission services, the CISO will 
tend to make errant assumptions, apply the wrong solutions, 
overlook critical issues, and, ultimately, fail to address the most 
serious issues.282 For those reasons, some BPS companies have 
decided instead to hire as a CISO an individual who understands 
the technical side of their operations and to let that individual 
learn the applicable cybersecurity tools because then there is far 
less risk of mistakenly thinking that business information security 
will transfer to operational system security. Counsel needs to realize 
that to advise such a company, counsel must avoid the same pitfalls 
and master the operational system of the client company; only then 
can counsel advise on the applicable cybersecurity issues. 
Even then, counsel will find that advising a BPS company or 
other critical infrastructure company requires a much broader 
 
 280.  See SIRTF REPORT, supra note 13, at 1. 
 281.  Put another way, the training needed to operate the BPS generally 
requires years of education and field experience to understand the control room; 
SCADA resources; and interconnected generation, transmission, substation, and 
field circuitry that delivers power throughout the grid under normal 
circumstances. NERC emphasizes that there is no training that can be offered to 
an electric system operator on exactly how the system will fail upon a cyber attack 
as a Severe Impact event from a cyber attack has never happened and the exact 
mechanisms of such an attack are not yet known. Therefore, operators need to 
develop a “sixth sense” on how to react to loss of systems and resources based on 
existing experience and learn to adapt to and execute the attack scenario. See 
CATF REPORT, supra note 13, at 16–20. The authors submit that generalized 
computer security expertise is insufficient especially in the control rooms where 
critical decisions will need to be made.  
 282.  See id. 
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grasp of technical issues and divergent and conflicting legal 
standards and norms than when advising on business information 
system security.283 And, as explained in the recently published ABA 
Cybersecurity Handbook, counsel needs to know the limits of effective 
advice while at the same time knowing when to initiate a 
conversation about cybersecurity in case the client fails to initiate it: 
Such conversations should help counsel bring home to 
the client the significance of cybersecurity, the threats and 
risks to it, and the necessity of developing a responsible 
approach to those threats and risks. Engaging in a give-
and-take conversation will lead, with any luck, to a useful 
joint exploration of what might limit or compromise the 
client’s cybersecurity. 
. . . . 
Counsel will want to refrain from attempting too 
much in a conversation about cybersecurity with a client. 
Averting cyber [security] incidents will probably remain 
an elusive ideal, and advocating its pursuit will only 
frustrate everyone involved. Being too prescriptive or dire 
will usually be counterproductive, and it is important to 
know why: prescriptive or dire utterances tend to make 
conversations one-sided. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . And, as a colleague recently noted, if lawyers, in 
conversation with clients, give more information than they 
get, the client will in all likelihood stop listening.284 
Since the issuance of the EO, boards and management of 
critical infrastructure companies have not needed counsel to 
suggest they make cybersecurity a priority on their meeting 
 
 283.  As we have explained throughout this essay, counsel advising BPS clients 
only on the EO, PPD-21, and the need to respond to the federal government’s 
requests for implementation of the Framework will miss at least half the issues, and 
we respectfully submit the same is true for counsel advising critical infrastructure 
owners and operators in any of the other sectors. Understanding the industry-
specific regulatory structure is critical, with the role NERC plays as the ERO and 
FERC plays as the reviewer, approver and, with NERC, enforcer of CIP standards. 
These collectively make the Framework, EO, and PPD-21 important resources, but 
they are not controlling of the regulatory responsibilities for BPS owners and 
operators. 
 284.  Roland L. Trope, Duty to Advise Clients Concerning Use of Cyber and Other 
Digital Technologies, in THE ABA CYBERSECURITY HANDBOOK 81, 81, 96 (Jill D. 
Rhodes & Vincent I. Polley eds., 2013). 
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agendas. Well-managed companies will have made cybersecurity a 
high priority. However, the issuance of the EO and PPD-21 has 
created more confusion than clarity.285 One part of the confusion 
derives from the EO’s invocation of a national security threat and 
the President’s low-key mention of it during the State of the Union 
speech the same day. Another part of the confusion derives from 
the attention attracted by the Edward Snowden NSA surveillance 
disclosures, which have distracted attention away from the White 
House’s efforts, through the EO and Cybersecurity Framework, to 
coax critical infrastructure companies to improve cybersecurity.286 
In fact, the reportage and discussion of the Snowden disclosures 
have created a disruptive “noise” behind the EO that has severely 
impeded its “signal.”287 
 
 285.  See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
 286.  Recent remarks by former National Security Agency Chief General 
Michael Hayden evidence that the Snowden disclosures have created a serious 
distraction from cybersecurity efforts: 
   In terms of the broad cyber effort—as concerned as I am about the 
government shutdown, I’m more concerned about the byproducts of 
the Snowden revelations. . . . 
   But with the Snowden revelations, frankly, quite a bit 
sensationalized—it’s clear to me that there’s a very low probability 
we’re going to get any cyber legislation out of this Congress. We need 
cyber legislation. We need to think through how it is we want to defend 
ourselves. The way I put it is, “what is it we want our government to do 
in the cyber domain” and “what is it we’ll let our government do.” And 
I’m afraid this whole kerfuffle since June has just poisoned that water. 
Brian Fung, Former NSA Chief: NSA and U.S. Cyber Command Are Now 
‘Indistinguishable,’ WASH. POST (Oct. 23, 2013), 2013 WLNR 26623383.  
 287.  As explained by Professors Pierce and Noll,  
In long-distance calls you may hear a hissing or slushing sound even 
when no one is speaking. The sound is caused by random electric 
signals that are unavoidably added to the electric speech signal when it 
is sent over telephone circuits. . . . If Ps is the signal power and PN is the 
noise power, the signal-to-noise ratio is expressed in deciBels is 10 log10 
(Ps/Pn) dB. A speech signal-to-noise ratio of 60 dB or more is really 
high fidelity. A signal-to-noise ratio of 20 dB is very intelligible but 
noticeably noisy. Between 10 and 1 dB the signal becomes nearly 
unintelligible. . . . 
. . . . 
If the radio-frequency signal-to-noise ratio is inadequate, the receiver 
can make mistakes in interpreting the binary digits, and the recovered 
signal suffers huge errors. 
JOHN R. PIERCE & A. MICHAEL NOLL, SIGNALS: THE SCIENCE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
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But boards and management of critical infrastructure 
companies appear to have been most concerned this year with the 
divergent claims and objectives of cybersecurity initiatives that 
attempt to demand corporate attention. Having reviewed some 
representative samples of those initiatives, we are in a position to 
address the five questions mentioned earlier. Those questions 
reflect the issues on which boards and management appear to be 
most frequently asking for guidance from counsel at this 
juncture—in the fall of 2013. The questions arise in response to the 
president’s declaration in the EO that the threats of cyber attacks 
on critical infrastructure pose a challenge to U.S. national security 
and in response to the quite different set of threats of kinetic cyber 
attacks identified in the NERC’s Task Force reports. The answers 
we will explore will attempt to provide the breadth of inputs of the 
legal, operational, and cybersecurity perspective that may be 
requested of counsel and that counsel would, in any event, attempt 
to combine in their responses in discussion with a critical 
infrastructure board and management. We will also try in this 
 
28–29, 81 (1990).  
As is well explained by Jack Goldsmith: 
A major challenge for the government, and one it has not yet figured 
out how to accomplish, is to give the NSA wider latitude to monitor 
private networks and respond to the most serious computer threats 
while at the same time credibly establishing that the agency is not 
doing awful things with its access to private communications. Such 
credibility is hard to establish, and so the government will likely hold 
back until we suffer a catastrophic cyber attack. . . .  
   I still think this holds true, but would modify it a bit. NSA won’t be 
able to do the things that General Alexander wants to do in the private 
network until the lights go out for a week, or some similar such 
catastrophe. 
Jack Goldsmith, The Snowden Revelations and Cybersecurity, LAWFARE (Aug. 14, 
2013, 7:03 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/08/the-snowden-revelations 
-and-cybersecurity/ (quoting Jack Goldsmith, The New Vulnerability, NEW REPUBLIC, 
June 7, 2010, at 21, available at LEXIS). The Snowden disclosures have not only 
prompted protests from governments friendly to the United States, but led 
President Obama to launch two intelligence reviews (one internal, one external): 
“Those reviews have taken on growing international significance in recent weeks as 
top administration officials repeatedly cite them in response to anger from 
European leaders following revelations about Ms. Merkel and about surveillance 
of phone calls in France.” Siobhan Gorman & Adam Entous, Obama Unaware as 
U.S. Spied on World Leaders: Officials, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 2013, at A1, available at 
LEXIS.  
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discussion to assist boards in assessing the extent to which they may 
have to choose between the divergent objectives and 
recommendations expressed, on one hand, in the EO (and its 
initiatives), and on the other hand, in the NERC Task Force reports 
(and their recommendations). 
A. “How seriously should our company take the government’s declaration 
of this cyber threat?” 
There are really three issues that this question raises. Each 
issue concerns a different declaration by the federal government of 
a cyber threat and each requires an answer to an underlying 
question. Each underlying question requires companies to identify 
who is responsible for addressing the threat by making the requisite 
preparations—to defend against the threat, respond to contain and 
mitigate the damage from it, and manage the recovery of services 
degraded by it, to whatever extent and for however long. 
1. Threat Identified in the EO 
The first declaration occurred in the EO and is expressed in 
terms that identify it as current, direct, and serious: “Repeated 
cyber intrusions into critical infrastructure demonstrate the need 
for improved cybersecurity. The cyber threat to critical infrastructure 
continues to grow and represents one of the most serious national security 
challenges we must confront.”288 Given the EO’s limited scope of 
authority, the pronoun “we” might arguably refer only to the 
executive branch. That reading is far too literal and narrow, 
particularly in light of the EO’s directions to increase information 
sharing and to develop the Framework. Both of those initiatives 
aim at motivating, coaxing, and persuading private industry—and 
critical infrastructure owners and operators in particular—to take 
actions to enhance their cybersecurity because the EO is not 
speaking of a threat to the federal government nor generally to the 
nation, but emphasizes it is a “threat to critical infrastructure.”289 
As noted earlier, responsibility for protecting a critical 
infrastructure sector rests with the companies that operate it, and it 
is the responsibility of each such company to protect itself. Should 
 
 288.  Exec. Order No. 13,636, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,739, 11,739 (Feb. 19, 2013) 
(emphasis added). 
 289.  Id. 
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its management be negligent in identifying and addressing a risk to 
the enterprise, management and the board overseeing its actions 
bear the responsibility. So, with respect to the EO’s identification of 
the “cyber threat to critical infrastructure”290 the EO makes clear: it 
is “one of the most serious national security challenges” that 
confronts each sector of critical infrastructure, each company 
operator within a sector, and, ultimately, each such company’s 
board and management.291 To treat that cyber threat as anything 
less than one of the highest priorities for a board and management 
after the issuance of the EO exposes the board to the risk of failing 
to fulfill its fiduciary duties for the enterprise. 
2. Threat Identified in Catastrophic Target Notice 
The second federal declaration of a threat will be issued in 
accordance with the EO’s direction that certain critical 
infrastructure companies receive what we have referred to as a 
Catastrophic Target Notice.292 That Notice will inform a critical 
infrastructure company that the federal government has 
determined that, if such company is damaged or otherwise affected 
by a “cybersecurity incident,” it could “reasonably result in 
catastrophic regional or national effects on public health or safety, 
economic security, or national security.”293 This second kind of 
cyber threat is a subset of the first and, as such, it too is current, 
direct, and serious. It emphasizes implicitly that the recipient has 
been put on notice that it now has knowledge of the widespread 
damage that could result if its operations are damaged and degraded 
by a cyber attack. 
In short, a Catastrophic Target Notice tells a company that if 
the current cyber threat to the nation’s critical infrastructure 
targets your operations, the damages will not be to you alone and 
thus your preparations for such cyber attacks should not be 
confined solely to protecting your operations. Instead, your 
company has much broader responsibilities to avert, limit, or 
mitigate the consequences that could flow from a degradation of its 
operations. Thus, a cyber threat to you poses a risk of “catastrophic 
 
 290.  Id. 
 291.  Id. 
 292.  See supra Part V.A.2. 
 293.  Exec. Order No. 13,636, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,742. 
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regional or national effects on public health or safety, economic 
security, or national security.”294 Neither the EO nor the 
Catastrophic Target Notices issued under its authority impose such 
responsibilities (that could only occur through a federal statute). 
However, once a critical infrastructure company receives such a 
Notice, its board and management must take it, and the risks it 
identifies, seriously. 
The determination to issue a company a Catastrophic Target 
Notice is made by the DHS, not by a mere outside consultant. The 
determination is made within the context of a declared threat to 
national security. From February 2013 onwards, company boards 
and management have been aware of the possibility of receiving 
such a Catastrophic Target Notice. Thus, they have arguably had 
ample time to deliberate carefully and decide what preparations 
should be made in order to address such risks, particularly since 
most candidates for receipt of a Catastrophic Target Notice 
probably expect to receive it—and that would surely include all of 
the major BPS owners and operators in the United States. 
Failure to take seriously such a credibly identified risk, and one 
of expressly “catastrophic” magnitude, could expose a company 
and its board and management to regulatory sanctions and 
lawsuits. This is particularly true if a cyber attack did indeed 
damage the company’s operations, particularly if a plaintiff or a 
post-event regulator investigation discovered evidence suggesting 
that “but for” the company’s failure to take the Notice seriously and 
act responsibly to reduce the risk, the damage would have been 
averted or substantially less extensive, and recovery from it would 
have occurred more quickly and at less expense to all the regionally 
or nationally affected parties. 
3. Threat Identified in Imminent Target Notice 
The third federal declaration of a threat will be issued in 
accordance with the EO’s direction that certain critical 
infrastructure companies receive what we have referred to as an 
Imminent Target Notice.295 It will inform the recipient that it is one 
of the targets of a planned attack against the U.S. homeland. The 
Imminent Target Notice is thus expressed as direct, serious, and, in 
 
 294.  Id. 
 295.  See supra Part V.A.3. 
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this instance, imminent. Companies may receive such notices with 
little or almost no time to make responsible preparations. Here 
again, however, any critical infrastructure company has been on 
notice, since the February 2013 issuance of the EO, that it could 
receive such a Notice. 
Thus, such companies have had time to deliberate carefully as 
to what preparations would need to be made in response to a 
serious threat supported, not by rumors or news media reports, but 
by credible federal cyber intelligence. In the face of what purports 
to be a notice of an extraordinary and imminent threat, no board 
or management will find much protection from liability in arguing 
that the brief period between the delivery of the Imminent Target 
Notice and the start of the cyber attack left the company 
insufficient time to make plans and enhance preparations. It would 
not be persuasive because the company had several months during 
which it knew it might receive such a Notice and could have made 
appropriate plans and preparations during that time. 
4. Viewing the Three Threats Together 
Now consider the position of a board and management asking 
counsel: how seriously should we take each of these three threats? 
Counsel should not only be addressing them separately as we have 
done here, but should also point out that all critical infrastructure 
companies have received the first threat notice (contained in the 
EO), and many such companies should anticipate that they will 
receive both of the other threat notices—Catastrophic Target Notice 
and Imminent Target Notice. In that instance, it would be prudent 
for the company and its board and management to recognize that 
they now have new corporate cybersecurity responsibilities, each 
defined by the respective federal threat notices, and each 
enhancing the extent to which such threats should be taken 
seriously and addressed accordingly. In doing so, it will be 
important to understand the implicit “forewarned-forearmed” 
strategy of the EO and its information-sharing Notices: 
[T]he strategy implicit in the EO’s use of notices is the 
proverbial “forewarned—forearmed.” Receipt of a notice 
will narrow owner-operator alternatives. Inaction is 
unjustifiable; superficial action, when viewed by judges, 
risks being deemed negligent or recklessly indifferent to 
clear government warnings. Notices will make it difficult 
to excuse postponing investments in cybersecurity and 
112
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 9
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol40/iss2/9
 
2014] BEFORE ROLLING BLACKOUTS BEGIN 759 
disaster recovery as courts might view receipt of a notice as 
putting the onus on owners and operators to justify what 
they subsequently did and did not do. If a head-in-the-
sand approach to cybersecurity prevailed at a company, 
that approach will probably be relinquished upon delivery 
of DHS notices.296 
5. Counsel’s Recommendations 
For the reasons given, each threat warrants serious urgent 
attention by management. The board, for the same reasons, may 
decide to assign certain board members or a committee to 
maintain closer than usual oversight of management’s decisions on 
preparations to be made. The board should be informed of the 
intended preparations, the priorities among them in view of time 
and budget constraints, and the progress of their implementation 
and request timely reassessments based on updates of the 
preparations’ progress and of additional threat information. The 
need for closer and more frequent monitoring of these activities is 
driven by the probability that before and during a cyber attack, the 
emergence of, and changes in, the relevant facts will be quick and 
frequent.297 
Similarly, the need for crucial decisions and reassessment of 
plans, preparations, and actions will arise abruptly and without any 
sense of a schedule or cycle. Unlike a hurricane threat to a region’s 
BPS operations, in the event a cyber threat or attack arises, there 
will be neither gradual, orderly updates of the approaching threat 
nor ever-increasingly accurate predictions of the timing of its 
arrival and the extent of its impact. Everything that management 
addresses and that the board may want to oversee will move with 
accelerated rapidity, and there will be unpredictable developments 
that may necessitate considerable changes in approach, plans, 
preparations, and actions. Maintaining orderly communications, 
situational awareness, and calm decision making will be a high 
priority to prevent the adversaries from causing a company’s crisis 
management from undermining its own efforts to protect the 
 
 296.  Trope & Humes, supra note 152, at 4–5. 
 297.  For recommended response actions during or after a cyber attack with 
respect to information sharing, see CATF REPORT, supra note 13, at 59 (“System 
Operations and ESP Monitoring personnel should have frequent conference calls 
to correlate monitored ESP activity and system operations abnormal readings.”). 
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enterprise. In short, achievement of “graceful degradation” of 
operations will require that management maintain order despite 
the cyber attack’s attempts to destabilize, disrupt, confuse, and 
cause chaos, panic, and self-sabotaging mistakes. 
Because a Severe Event caused by a kinetic cyber attack will 
take a critical infrastructure company and its board and 
management far beyond their “comfort zone” into experiences for 
which no prior experience will provide a reliable guide, it is 
important for counsel to encourage the board and management to 
understand those challenges. As a result, counsel should put more 
than the usual emphasis on promptly starting and expeditiously 
completing preparations for handling the Severe Event and the 
New Normal that follows from it. Among the earliest of those 
preparations, however, should be efforts to ensure that the 
company is ready to receive and responsibly handle each of the federal 
government’s threat notices.298 The following questions, among 
others, will need to be addressed in advance of receiving a 
Catastrophic Target Notice and/or Imminent Target Notice: 
 Who in the company will be designated to receive and initially 
review any Notices received from DHS, regardless of the day 
and hour they are received? 
 Who else in the company has a “need to know” the receipt and 
contents of each Notice? 
 
 298.  Recall that the federal government will also be sharing “classified” threat 
information through third party vendors, but we have omitted discussion of those 
in this section because the procedures and details remain, to date, undisclosed. 
But no company can receive such information unless it has applied for and 
obtained clearances for its personnel (and preferably at least one member of the 
board and general counsel) and has ensured that such information is protected in 
accordance with applicable statutes and regulations. 
The Department of the Treasury, in a recent report to the president, 
emphasized the preparations that critical infrastructure companies would need to 
make to participate fully in the information sharing authorized by the EO. “In 
order to fully participate in this program, critical infrastructure organizations must 
have the capability to send, receive, and act upon information about cyber threats 
and vulnerabilities.” DEP’T OF TREASURY, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON 
CYBERSECURITY INCENTIVES PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER 13636, at 9 
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 Who has the authority in the company to make, or coordinate 
the making of, decisions concerning the company’s 
response(s) to each Notice? 
 Has the company adopted a set of formal procedures for 
ensuring that receipt of each Notice, and the information 
contained in each, is protected from unauthorized disclosure outside 
the company and unauthorized access within the company? 
 Where will the company store such Notices (if in hardcopy and 
if in digital copy) so that cyber adversaries cannot gain access 
to that information through the Internet or through the 
company’s business information systems? 
Note: In addressing this question, assume that adversaries 
may already have injected malware into the company’s 
networks that could exfiltrate such information and exploit 
it to the company’s disadvantage during a planned cyber 
attack. 
 Does the company have plans and preparations ready to 
implement in the event it receives a Catastrophic Target 
Notice and to act responsibly and quickly to reduce the risks 
identified in such Notice? 
 Does the company have plans and preparations ready to 
implement in the event it receives an Imminent Target Notice 
and needs to act responsibly and quickly in anticipation of the 
cyber attack identified in such Notice? 
 If the company has made plans and preparations for receipt of 
a Catastrophic Target Notice or Imminent Target Notice, has 
it based them on a cyber attack that produces a Severe Event 
(requiring a “graceful degradation” of operations)? 
 If so, has it also based them on an attack that results in a New 
Normal (requiring months of recovery to restored reduced 
operations)? 
Thus, counsel will be seeking to ensure that the focus is on the 
most serious of cyber threats to a critical infrastructure company, 
which is the issue addressed by the next question. 
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B. “If the cyber threat poses a serious risk to our company, is the main risk 
to our company’s business information systems or to its operation and 
control systems?” 
1. The Ultimate Target of Cyber Attacks on Critical Infrastructure 
The EO fails to make explicit whether the “repeated cyber 
intrusions” it mentions involve attacks to critical infrastructure on 
the company’s business information systems, its operational 
systems, or both.299 One can, however, draw the following 
reasonable inferences from the EO:300 
 If the ultimate objective of the “cyber intrusions” was only to 
exfiltrate business information, the resulting damage to critical 
infrastructure would not, in most instances, put national 
security at risk or cause “catastrophic” effects regionally or 
nationally. 
 “Cyber intrusions” that target business information systems 
may be part of a larger intelligence gathering effort to seek 
data, such as testing awareness or response capabilities that 
can be used to design and execute an attack against a 
company’s operational systems. 
 For a cyber attack to create a national security risk to critical 
infrastructure and a risk of “catastrophic” effects regionally or 
nationally, the objective will almost certainly be to damage and 
disrupt the target’s operational systems. 
2. Counsel’s Recommendations 
For those reasons, counsel will probably need to advise a 
critical infrastructure client that its response to the cyber threats 
identified by the federal government should be to treat its 
operational systems as the “main risk” and, for that reason, ensure 
that the business information systems are kept absolutely separate 
from the company’s operational systems. That can be done in part 
by “air gapping”301 the operational systems of computers and 
 
 299.  See Exec. Order No. 13,636, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,742. 
 300.  Id. 
 301.  Air gapping is a physical separation of a system, such as a control room, 
from the Internet or any means of connecting to the Internet. NERC’s CATF 
Report indicates that reliance on air gapping alone offers a false sense of security 
as attacks have been launched on air-gapped systems through memory sticks or 
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SCADA interfaces or by inserting digital diodes302 in each two-way 
communications link. What is crucial is for two things to be kept 
inviolate from unauthorized access or release: the controls and 
monitors of the operational systems and the security plans (physical 
and cyber safeguards, incident responses, recovery plans, etc.). 
Once the operational systems become the focus of protective 
measures, the next issue becomes how extensively they need to be 
protected, which is the subject of the next question. 
C. “If the main risk of the cyber threat is to our company’s operation and 
control systems, how comprehensive should our company’s preparations 
be?” 
1. Interpreting the Concept of “Comprehensive Preparations” 
This question is probably the hardest for any company to 
answer. Even if companies could be made invulnerable to cyber 
attack, the cost to accomplish invulnerability would be prohibitive. 
Additionally, the invulnerability would only be temporary in the 
rapidly evolving world of cyber threats. Moreover, few, if any, 
cybersecurity experts believe that any company can be made 
invulnerable to cyber attack.303 The White House initiatives do not 
 
other devices inserted into USB drives, for example. See CATF REPORT, supra 
note 13, at 71. 
 302.  Digital diodes, also known as data diodes, are another part of a network 
perimeter defense designed to stop a cyber intrusion into a control center or 
other cyber asset by using a combination of routable or non-routable protocols in 
a communications link to achieve isolation. See id. at 65.  
 303.  Dating back at least to 2007, cybersecurity experts have viewed making a 
company invulnerable against a targeted cyber attack as an unattainable goal. 
Expressions of that view appear in assessments ranging from 2008 through the 
present. See, e.g., BRITISH-N. AM. COMMITTEE, CYBER ATTACK: A RISK 
MANAGEMENT PRIMER FOR CEOS AND DIRECTORS 1 (2007), available at 
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=4888caa0 
-b3db-1461-98b9-e20e7b9c13d4&lng=en&id=111174 (“No business, government, 
nongovernmental, or other organization of whatever size is invulnerable to cyber 
attacks.”); VERIZON BUS. RISK TEAM, 2008 DATA BREACH INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 18 
(2008), available at http://www.verizonenterprise.com/resources/security 
/databreachreport.pdf (“[A]n organization singled out by an attacker with 
sufficient resources will find it difficult to mount an adequate defense.”); Taylor 
Armerding, Best Defense Against Cyberattacks Is Good Offense, Says Former DHS Official, 
CSO (Sept. 26, 2012), http://www.csoonline.com/article/717331/best-defense 
-against-cyberattacks-is-good-offense-says-former-dhs-official (“We will never defend 
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seek that.304 Instead, as we noted earlier, the White House seeks to 
have critical infrastructure companies improve their cyber hygiene 
in order for such companies to cease being easy prey for cyber 
adversaries.305 That minimal objective is achievable, but it 
nonetheless requires extraordinarily effective training of personnel 
who will otherwise continue to make mistakes when subject to 
“social engineering” tricks that invite them to click on a hyperlink 
or open a file and, thereby, grant an adversary’s malware easy 
access to their company’s computers. So with respect to the White 
House objectives, the effort needs to be fairly comprehensive. 
Training personnel in good cyber hygiene will require efforts that 
are both comprehensive (including board members and senior 
management) and relentless. The efforts, in other words, must be 
capable of addressing the magnitude and level of persistence that 
serious and sophisticated adversaries will bring against critical 
infrastructure. The adversary will relentlessly probe for 
vulnerabilities. And, as a result, the adversary may find an easy way 
to execute an intelligence intrusion, a massive data exfiltration, and 
an embedding of worms capable of damaging operational 
equipment. Companies need to expand their preparations and 
training to prevent conduct that will otherwise facilitate an 
adversary in gaining attack intelligence, finding vulnerabilities 
through which to inject an attack, and carrying out its damaging 
exploits. 
2. Counsel’s Recommendations 
Having made allowance for efforts to cooperate with the White 
House’s initiatives, we think, in light of the foregoing discussion, a 
company is best served by directing most of its resources and 
 
our way out of the current cybersecurity crisis. That’s because putting all the 
burden of preventing crime on the victim rarely succeeds.” (quoting Stewart 
Baker, Rethinking Cybersecurity and the Role of the Private Sector, STEPTOE CYBERBLOG 
(Sept. 19, 2012), http://www.steptoecyberblog.com/2012/09/19/rethinking 
-cybersecurity-retribution-and-the-role-of-the-private-sector/)). 
 304.  See Exec. Order No. 13,636, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,739 (Feb. 19. 2013) (“It is 
the policy of the United States to enhance the security and resilience of the Nation’s 
critical infrastructure and to maintain a cyber environment that encourages 
efficiency, innovation, and economic prosperity while promoting safety, security, 
business confidentiality, privacy, and civil liberties.” (emphasis added)).  
 305.  See supra notes 228, 292 and accompanying text.  
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thoughtful planning to preparations for what appears to be 
inevitable: the launching of a cyber attack that targets critical 
infrastructure and that succeeds in causing enough damage and 
disruption to result in a Severe Event and a New Normal. 
Preparations, therefore, must focus on resilience—how efficiently 
and effectively the cyber critical asset operator can recover and 
adjust to the New Normal.306 
With those preparations as the highest-priority objective, the 
issue of “comprehensive” actually becomes easier to answer. Most 
of the hard work of preparing for a Severe Event is not cost 
intensive (especially when compared with the costs of procuring 
crucial BPS equipment such as transformers).307 It requires 
carefully thought-out plans and preparations, “red-teaming”308 the 
successive versions, and devoting time for realistic training that 
includes depriving personnel of leadership and directions so that 
they will be capable nonetheless of taking the right actions at the 
start and can carry out their duties for prolonged periods on their 
own initiatives. 
Cost-intensive issues will arise when, for example, a BPS 
company realizes that a cyber adversary may damage equipment 
that is no longer manufactured in North America and that 
procurement of replacement spare parts or new units has a lead 
time of six months or longer. Boards and management will need to 
address questions such as: 
 
 306.  Conceptually, the issue is the same as storm preparation and response. 
No company can stop a natural disaster, such as a hurricane, tornado, or wild fire. 
The issue for storm preparation and response, like a cyber attack, is resilience—
how quickly and efficiently the company can recover and restore service to 
normal. 
 307.  Among the many recommendations of the NERC SIRTF Report, one 
stands out with respect to planning for major equipment replacements that may 
be needed in response to a cyber attack, including transformers and other 
equipment that are costly and require long lead times. The SIRTF Report 
recommends that companies conduct short- and long-term system planning 
exercises to explore recommended strategies that might include temporary 
alternative equipment interoperability options to speed system restoration when 
certain equipment might be unavailable. SIRTF REPORT, supra note 13, at 49. 
 308.  In current energy industry vernacular, use of the term “blind” or “red-
team” testing is typically conducted by people who are given no information at the 
start, with the goal of seeing if security perimeters can be breached by trial and 
error, brute force, stealth, masquerade, etc.  
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 Should the company revise its budget (and will regulators 
allow the cost recovery in rates) for maintaining an inventory 
of critical spares and units (such as heavy transformers) in 
order to reduce the time needed to restore operations after a 
Severe Event and during a New Normal of degraded 
operations? 
 If the company (and its regulators) would find such costs 
unacceptable, can it enter into cost-sharing arrangements with 
other companies in its sector that would make procurement of 
long lead-time spares and units affordable and available when 
needed after a Severe Event? 
 Can the company enter into agreements with offshore 
manufacturers of critical parts and units that will allow it to 
have emergency orders filled on an expedited schedule that 
would also help the company manage the New Normal with 
enhanced predictability? 
That such cost issues could arise and make a substantial difference 
to the duration of a company’s recovery efforts after a Severe Event 
suggests also that some companies may find themselves in financial 
distress during that period.309 It would therefore be prudent for the 
board and management to address the need for extraordinary 
contingency financing on the occurrence of a Severe Event. 
Lastly, when counsel checks to see if the company’s response 
will be comprehensive enough to address the significant legal risks, 
attention should be given in advance to whether receipt of a 
Catastrophic Target Notice or Imminent Target Notice might 
trigger duties to report their receipt to third parties 
(e.g., customers, suppliers, lenders, and insurers). Companies will 
need to review relevant agreements and may want to negotiate 
amendments to exclude these Notices as in most instances they 
were not contemplated when executing such agreements. 
 
 309.  A severe event will also likely impact critical infrastructure companies in 
the banking sector, which could complicate the financial stresses on BPS owners 
and operators. The financial security of counter-parties transacting in wholesale 
power transactions could become impaired and cause cascading effects on critical 
infrastructure owners and operators to lose ready-access to banking support or 
their counter-parties’ access to credit support.  
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D. “What priority and urgency should our company give to completing 
those preparations?” 
1. Events that Have Obscured the Need to Proceed Urgently 
This is probably the easiest question, but we include it because 
events since the issuance of the EO have impeded its 
implementation in ways that the White House could not have 
imagined and appears to have been unable to overcome. The result 
is that much of the “signal” that the EO may have tried to transmit 
and continue transmitting throughout the nation’s critical 
infrastructure communities has been largely drowned out by 
extraordinarily distracting “noise” and “cross-talk.” Instead of the 
subsequent months evidencing a growing awareness and intention 
to address the threats identified by the EO, the Catastrophic Target 
Notices, and the Imminent Target Notices—or those identified by 
NERC’s CATF and SIRTF Reports—owners and operators have 
found the media and public discourse focused on other issues, 
including: 
 The Snowden disclosures, 
 Debate over the extent of NSA domestic surveillance, 
 Protests from allies in response to disclosures of U.S. cyber 
surveillance, 
 Congressional and White House impasse over the budget 
leading to a federal government “shut down,” and 
 An even more serious impasse over raising the debt ceiling. 
These issues have claimed the attention of critical infrastructure 
companies because each has either drawn attention away from the 
urgent need to improve cybersecurity or has required boards and 
management to address the risks that the federal government crises 
were creating and could create to immediate and long-term 
business planning. 
2. Counsel’s Recommendations 
Because the “signal-to-noise” ratio has been so poor during the 
months following the issuance of the EO and since there has been 
little attention given to the CATF and SIRTF Reports even by some 
of the largest BPS companies, counsel should probably be advising 
BPS and other critical infrastructure companies that cybersecurity 
improvements and preparations for Severe Events should be 
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treated as among a company’s highest priorities and addressed 
urgently. Furthermore, boards that have not yet actively discussed 
the cybersecurity issues would benefit from active discussions with 
counsel on the issues. Otherwise, the evident complacency that 
preceded and prompted the issuance of the EO will lull critical 
infrastructure companies into believing that the warnings are not 
serious, that the threats are exaggerated, and that the 
demonstrated U.S. capabilities to conduct cyber surveillance will 
somehow work as a deterrent or defense against adversaries 
planning cyber attacks and conducting pre-attack surveillance. 
Such assumptions put a company in the worst of all positions: 
it will have received credible warnings of serious threats, it will have 
had time to make responsible preparations, and it will have failed 
to act in a timely or effective manner. That raises the company’s 
exposure to post-attack liability and reputational damage while 
wasting the company’s opportunity to avert such risks to its 
enterprise and operations. It also raises the final issue in this 
discussion—the standard by which a company’s responses to the 
threats identified by the White House and NERC’s CATF and 
SIRTF Reports will be judged. 
E. “In the absence of a uniform federal or state standard for critical 
infrastructure cybersecurity, by what standard will our response to this 
cyber threat ultimately be judged?” 
1. The “Hurricane Sandy” Test for Critical Infrastructure Responses 
Among the multiple applicable standards by which a critical 
infrastructure company could be judged for its response to notice 
(formal or informal) and foreseeable risk of cyber threats, we think 
the most important will be what we would refer to as the 
“Hurricane Sandy” test or standard. 
Owners and operators of BPS and telecommunications 
companies (and some other critical infrastructure companies) have 
regulatory standards that they may fail to comply with and by which 
they may be judged. Typically, for example, electric utilities are 
required by statute to provide safe, adequate, and reliable service. 
However, when “high-impact, low-frequency” events paralyze 
critical infrastructure in a region—as occurred during and after 
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Hurricane Sandy310—there will often be little criticism directed at 
such companies for the extent to which the storm and the storm 
 
 310.  As reported a year after Sandy struck, The Economist provided a post-storm 
damage assessment and contrasted it favorably with the recovery efforts by owners 
and operators of energy and telecommunications companies. The Economist’s 
account suggests that the public—and the media—have judged such owners and 
operators, not by the damage that the storm inflicted, but by their preparedness to 
manage the recovery efforts—and by their willingness to invest heavily in 
preparations that reflect the “lessons learned” from this “high impact, low 
frequency” event: 
[Forty-four] New Yorkers [were] killed during the storm. Most 
drowned in the surge which covered nearly a fifth of the city’s land. Much 
of the city was in darkness for days, including a lot of Manhattan. 
Subway tunnels were filled with water and 150,000 homes were 
damaged across the five boroughs. More than 125 homes burnt to the 
ground in Breezy Point . . . . The damage across the city was pervasive 
and extensive. 
   Yet New Yorkers are resilient. . . . Very quickly the city set up its 
Rapid Repairs programme [sic], which restored heat and power to 
54,000 people and got them back into their homes. . . . Since the 
storm, the city has begun or completed more than $1 billion worth of 
Sandy response-and-recovery work. . . . 
. . . . 
   Utilities such as Con Edison and Verizon are also significantly 
strengthening their kit. Con Edison, an energy company, intends to 
invest $1 billion in storm-protection measures over the next four years. 
It is building flood barriers and gates as well as installing “smart” 
switches to isolate damaged equipment. Verizon, a telecoms giant has 
speeded up a switch to water-resistant fibre-optics [sic] from copper 
lines, which should reduce the chance of communications blackouts. 
Hurricane Sandy One Year On: Stronger Than the Storm, ECONOMIST, Oct. 19, 2013, 
at 36, available at 2013 WLNR 26139202 (emphasis added). 
Note, however, that The Economist’s account may be making a seriously 
inaccurate statement when it observes, reassuringly, that Verizon’s replacement of 
copper wires with fiber-optics cable will “reduce the risks of communications 
blackouts.” Id. On the contrary, as we noted earlier, recent reports make clear that 
the switch to fiber-optics will render communications less reliable. This is an 
example of an all-too-typical instance of a new technology offered for its benefits 
without adequately addressing the drawbacks, or concealing them from the public 
because the owners and operators of the critical infrastructure find the 
deployment of the new technology will enable them to reap larger profits, in part 
justified by the promise of improvements that are, however, illusory:  
Traditional copper landlines use electric pulses to carry voice and data 
signals over a metal wire, which also carries power, so the phone works 
during a blackout. Fiber-optic lines are made of a thin glass filament and 
transmit voice and data at high speeds using pulses of light, but they 
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surge disrupted electric power and telephone communications. No 
one blames local BPS companies for the hurricane; for its chance 
intersection with the coasts of New York, New Jersey, and 
Connecticut; or for the widespread outages, loss of heat, loss of 
water, and loss of control of sewage directly caused by the storm 
surge. Regulators, politicians, the media, and the general populace 
accepted that “these things happen” and when they do on this 
scale, there is little any critical infrastructure company can do to 
avert them.311 Severe Events caused by a cyber attack will 
undoubtedly be viewed with much the same tolerance for failure to 
withstand the brute force of the attack or to have sufficient 
resilience to avoid any disruption of operations and degradation of 
services. 
The crucial element that we refer to here as the “Hurricane 
Sandy” test—the tendency for customers, regulators, governments, 
and the media to judge electric power companies by their readiness 
to manage an orderly and reasonably prompt restoration of service 
to customers—is not limited to the North American cultures and 
political systems. A similar emphasis on readiness and preparations 
for handling severe disruptions to major sections of a nation’s 
electric grid can be seen in the Report of the Enquiry Committee 
investigating the grid disturbance in northern India that occurred 
on July 30, 2012, and the even more widespread grid disturbance 
that occurred the following day in the northern, eastern, and 
northeastern region of India (“India Grid Disturbance Report”).312 
 
cannot carry electricity and so do not work during a power failure 
without a battery. 
Wyatt, supra note 267. 
 311.  See e.g., PUB. UTIL. REGULATORY AUTH., STATE OF CONN., DOCKET NO. 12-
11-07, PURA INVESTIGATION INTO THE PERFORMANCE OF CONNECTICUT’S ELECTRIC 
DISTRIBUTION COMPANIES AND GAS COMPANIES IN RESTORING SERVICE FOLLOWING 
STORM SANDY (2013), available at http://www.dpuc.state.ct.us/FINALDEC.NSF 
/0d1e102026cb64d98525644800691cfe/0072d9132451b44e85257bce00685d3a 
?OpenDocument&Highlight=0,storm. Connecticut’s public utility commission, 
called the Public Utilities Regulatory Authority, evaluated the companies’ storm 
preparations, emergency planning, communications, storm restoration, and 
response and concluded that “these companies performed in a generally 
acceptable manner in preparing for and responding to the storm. The Public 
Utilities Regulatory Authority finds that improvements are necessary in certain 
areas, and orders these companies to make such improvements to their policies, 
practices and procedures . . . .” Id. at 1.  
 312.  REPORT OF THE ENQUIRY COMMITTEE, supra note 9. 
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Several of the recommendations made by the Report are 
remarkably similar to those expressed by the CATF and SIRTF 
Reports (regarding the handling of Severe Events). Most of the 
major recommendations direct attention to the readiness to handle 
post-event recovery and restoration efforts. The NERC Task Force 
focused on “graceful degradation” of operations into “islands” of 
electric power and the need to stabilize them throughout the 
period of recovery and restoration. The India Grid Disturbance 
Report recommended: 
There is need to plan islanding schemes to ensure supply 
to essential services and faster recovery in case of grid 
disruptions. 
. . . . 
. . . [I]t was agreed that criteria for formation of 
islands should not be the geographical or electrical size 
but reliability of load-generation balance in the 
islands. . . . 
. . . . 
As far as possible, major essential loads such as 
hospitals etc should be incorporated in the islands. 
However, if this was not possible due to some reasons, 
efforts would be made to extend supply from these islands 
to essential loads on priority basis. 
. . . . 
Efforts should be made to design islanding scheme 
based on frequency sensing relays so that in case of 
imminent grid failure, electrical islands can be formed. 
These electrical islands can not only help in maintaining 
supply to essential services but would also help in faster 
restoration of grid.313 
2. Counsel’s Recommendations 
We think the focus of everyone within the area affected by a 
“high-impact, low-frequency” event tends to be on resilience and 
recovery—how well prepared, organized, and effective did the 
critical infrastructure companies appear during their efforts (over 
many weeks) to restore electric power and telecommunications 
 
 313.  Id. at ix, 40, 41, 67. The Report also included a set of recommendations 
for “islanding of Delhi metro and Indian Railways” to spare them the worst effects 
of grid disturbances. Id. at 41.  
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after Hurricane Sandy?314 We think it is reasonable to infer that 
similar standards and judgments will be applied to owners and 
operators of BPS and other critical infrastructure in the weeks, 
months, and possibly years following a Severe Event caused by a 
coordinated and adaptive cyber attack. 
The more prolonged the attacks, the more adaptive they prove 
to be, and the more sophisticated their exploits, the more we think 
it probable that the public will not blame or judge critical 
infrastructure companies for being “knocked out”—provided that 
such companies and the federal government disclose such facts to 
the public (which remains an open issue and one that boards and 
management will also need to review). But the withholding of 
judgment for succumbing to a Severe Event will only increase the 
scrutiny and severity of judgment that the public, the regulators, 
and the media give to owners and operators of BPS and other 
critical infrastructure during the New Normal period. To the 
extent that such companies appear to have prepared to manage 
and carry out “graceful degradation” of operations and services, to 
handle the long-term restoration, and to maintain and repair the 
necessary “islanding” of electric power, telecommunications, and 
other vital services, such companies will be judged favorably. If they 
prove ill prepared and lacking in resourcefulness to handle the 
prolonged crisis, then their reputational damage will probably be 
extensive, and possibly irreparable. The public, the media, and the 
government may point to all the warnings such companies 
received—and particularly the recommendations contained in the 
CATF and SIRTF Reports (which will probably get long overdue 
attention after a Severe Event)—and claim “after such knowledge, 
what forgiveness?”315 
 
 314.  After Hurricane Sandy, electric utilities in New York, New Jersey, and 
Connecticut have been participating in regulatory proceedings that investigated 
the adequacy of storm response (see, e.g., PUB. UTIL. REGULATORY AUTH., supra note 
311) and to request extraordinary rate recovery in advance to allow some of these 
companies to make investments to “harden” or make more resilient their electric 
transmission and distribution grid infrastructure. These investments typically 
mean relocating substations away from coastal areas, building storm walls around 
critical infrastructure, or burying power lines to avoid tree falls during storms. See 
id. at 54–55. 
 315.  T.S. ELIOT, Poems 1920, Gerontion, in THE COMPLETE POEMS & PLAYS OF T.S. 
ELIOT 38 (1969).  
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VIII.CONCLUSION: COUNSEL’S QUALIFYING RECOMMENDATIONS—
TECHNOLOGY’S SINISTER SURPRISES 
A. Closing Caveats—the Murky Challenges 
We noted early in this article that a drawback of the White 
House’s 2013 initiatives has been that the EO and its 
announcement in the President’s State of the Union address made 
the cybersecurity threat and requisite response far too neat, clean, 
clear, and straight-forward.316 We return to that theme in this 
conclusion because counsel’s recommendations, when organized 
under a logical sequence of questions and answers, can similarly 
distort and make too neat and clean the challenges facing owners 
and operators of critical infrastructure, which must be seen for 
what they are and will probably continue to be for the foreseeable 
future—complicated, messy, murky, and disorienting. One purpose 
of this discussion has been to make those features more apparent 
than they have tended to be in the White House initiatives. 
Another purpose has been to give boards, management, and 
counsel a cold, hard, realistic view of the challenges presented by 
cyber threats that target critical infrastructure. To ensure that this 
discussion closes with an appreciation of the magnitude and 
messiness of the challenges to critical infrastructure’s operational 
resilience (especially to the resilience of the BPS), we will discuss in 
this conclusion some of the most recent disclosures of 
vulnerabilities in the BPS, the ease with which adversaries could 
exploit them, and the growing sophistication of the tools and cyber 
weaponry that adversaries can use to target, disrupt, and damage 
the BPS. 
Counsel will need to consider bringing these and other 
emerging developments to the attention of a BPS company’s board 
and management. The goal is to ensure the sufficiency of plans and 
preparations the company might be making in anticipation of 
coordinated cyber attacks designed to sabotage operations, Severe 
Events, post-attack graceful degradation, “islanding” of electric 
power, and New Normal periods of prolonged reduced operations 
and restoration of services. Counsel’s focus will need to be on 
helping guide the BPS company (or other critical infrastructure 
 
 316.  See supra Part IV.G. 
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enterprise) to achieve enhanced readiness for the worst-case 
consequences from a cyber attack on company operations. 
B. Recently Disclosed Vulnerabilities 
We will review two recently disclosed vulnerabilities related to 
operation of the BPS or to operations that are interdependent with 
the BPS: (i) vulnerabilities that continue to be introduced into the 
BPS system by deployment of “smart grid” technologies; and 
(ii) vulnerabilities discovered in the software used in BPS SCADA 
systems. 
1. Deployment of “Smart Grid” Technologies Proliferate 
Vulnerabilities in the BPS 
The crux of each “smart grid” technology deployed in the BPS 
is that it seeks to create a two-way communications link or channel that 
would, among other things, provide home customers real-time 
information about the fluctuating costs of electricity so that they 
could schedule power-intensive activities (such as operating a 
clothes dryer or dish washer) during off-peak (i.e., cheaper) time 
periods. As summarized by the DoE, the characteristics of a “smart 
grid” by the year 2030 will be (in its overly optimistic view): 
[A] fully automated power delivery network that monitors 
and controls every customer and node, ensuring a two-way 
flow of electricity and information between the power 
plant and the appliance, and all points in between. Its 
distributed intelligence, coupled with broadband 
communications and automated control systems, enables 
real-time market transactions and seamless interfaces 
among people, buildings, industrial plants, generation 
facilities, and the electric network.317 
The key phrase in this description is “two-way flow” of 
communications. Each two-way flow of communications offers a 
potential vulnerability or portal into a network that cyber 
adversaries can exploit. As explained in a 2011 Congressional 
Research Service report: 
 
 317.  OFFICE OF ELEC. TRANSMISSION & DISTRIB., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, “GRID 
2030”: A NATIONAL VISION FOR ELECTRICITY’S SECOND 100 YEARS 17 (2003), 
available at http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia 
/Electric_Vision_Document.pdf. 
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Grid devices capable of two-way communications are 
considered to be potential points of unauthorized system 
access, and can represent a potential cybersecurity 
vulnerability. . . . Smart meters are another example of 
new applications in which the security of data has been 
mentioned as a concern. 318 
The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), in 2011, 
expressed similar concerns but viewed them in a broader context of 
vulnerabilities: 
The smart grid vision and its increased reliance on IT 
systems and networks expose the electric grid to potential 
and known cybersecurity vulnerabilities associated with 
using such systems, which in turn increase the risk to the 
smooth and reliable operation of the electricity grid. . . . 
[T]hese potential vulnerabilities include: 
 increasing the use of systems and networks increases 
the number of entry points and paths that can be 
exploited by potential adversaries and other 
unauthorized users; 
 interconnecting systems and networks can allow 
adversaries wider access and the ability to spread 
malicious activity . . . . 
. . . . 
In addition, we reported in 2007 that certain smart 
systems—commonly referred to as control systems—used 
in industrial settings such as electric generation have 
cybersecurity vulnerabilities that, if exploited, could result 
in serious damages and disruption. . . . Moreover, in 2008, 
the Central Intelligence Agency reported that malicious 
activities against IT systems and networks have caused 
disruption of electric power capabilities in multiple 
regions overseas, including a case that resulted in a 
multicity power outage.319 
The release of these government reports highlighted the 
vulnerabilities that “smart grid” technologies contain and will, 
therefore, embed when deployed within the BPS. Despite the 
growing possibility that such vulnerabilities could provide attack 
 
 318.  RICHARD J. CAMPBELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE SMART GRID AND 
CYBERSECURITY—REGULATORY POLICY AND ISSUES 7 (2011), available at http://www 
.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41886.pdf.  
 319.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 226, at 10–11 (citations 
omitted). 
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vectors for adversaries seeking to launch kinetic cyber attacks 
against a BPS company’s operations, owners and operators of BPS 
companies appear to be focusing solely on the high (and overly 
optimistic) promised benefits of creating the “smart grid.” We 
think they should instead give early and enhanced attention to 
discovering and correcting the technology’s high-risk vulner-
abilities. As noted by the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies Report: 
Despite these vulnerabilities, many power companies 
are doubling down on the danger; they are implementing 
“smart grid” technologies that give their IT systems more 
control over the delivery of power to individual 
customers—or even to individual appliances in customers’ 
homes. . . . But security is not a priority for smart grid 
designers; according to Woolsey, who two years ago 
chaired a group that published a report for the 
Department of Defense on grid vulnerabilities. “Ninety to 
ninety-five percent of the people working on the smart 
grid are not concerned about security and only see it as a 
last box they have to check.”320 
As BPS companies pursue deployments of “smart grid” and 
involve third-parties to design, develop, and install the devices, it 
will be increasingly important for boards and management to be 
assured that such “progress” is not progressively making the 
company’s operations more susceptible to advanced persistent 
attacks by creating vulnerabilities adversaries could exploit. 
Unfortunately, to date, that seems to be the risk—and there 
appears to be little effort to avert that outcome. Thus in GAO 
testimony to Congress in 2012: 
Security features had not been consistently built 
into smart grid devices. . . . [T]hus increasing their 
vulnerability to attack. Without securely designed smart 
grid systems, utilities may not be able to detect and 
analyze attacks, increasing the risk that attacks would 
succeed and utilities would be unable to prevent them 
from recurring.321 
Boards and management may not be comfortable asking if the 
promise of the “smart grid” is going to be outweighed by the 
 
 320.  BAKER ET AL, supra note 31, at 1.  
 321.  WILSHUSEN & TRIMBLE, supra note 6, at 13.  
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vulnerabilities and risks it introduces into a BPS company’s 
operational systems. However, such questions become more 
compelling each time one considers them in the context of the 
threats identified by the CATF and SIRTF Reports and the growing 
possibility of Severe Events. What would be particularly helpful in 
this regard would be if NERC would have a task force analyze and 
assess the probable consequences of a Severe Event from a cyber 
attack occurring in a BPS company that had extensively deployed 
“smart grid” technology and was therefore that much more 
dependent on complex and hard-to-balance systems. 
2. Vulnerabilities Recently Disclosed in the North American BPS 
As mentioned above, approximately a month after the 
President issued the EO, two engineers detected defects in a 
communications protocol, DNP3, which BPS companies have 
extensively installed in SCADA systems to monitor distant power 
stations from an air-gapped control center.322 When they tested 
DNP3 made by Triangle MicroWorks, the software “broke 
instantly.”323 They tested DNP3 made by sixteen other vendors and 
obtained the same destructive results.324 Although they reported 
their findings within a week to DHS’s ICS-CERT, it took four 
months for ICS-CERT to start to issue advisory alerts to BPS owners 
and operators.325 During that time, the engineers found such 
defects in the software made by another nine vendors. At the same 
time, the first vendor whose wares they tested, Triangle 
MicroWorks, had developed an update that purportedly mitigated 
the vulnerability.326 The risks these defects create in the BPS were 
explained in a recent New York Times article: 
[One of the engineers] found that he could actually 
infiltrate a power station’s control center from afar. An 
attacker could use that capability to insert malware to take 
over the system, and like Stuxnet, the computer worm that 
took out 20 percent of Iran’s centrifuges, inflict actual 
physical harm. 
. . . . 
 
 322.  See Perlroth, supra note 73. 
 323.  Id. 
 324.  Id. 
 325.  Id. 
 326.  Id. 
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What makes the vulnerabilities particularly troubling, 
experts say, is that traditional firewalls are ill-equipped to 
stop them. When the master crashes it can no longer 
monitor or control any and all of the substations . . . . 
There is no way to stop this with a firewall and other 
perimeter security device today. You have to let DNP3 
responses through.327 
There are two such defects. Both kinds “incorrectly validate[] 
input” and enable an attacker to “cause the software to go into an 
infinite loop . . . causing the process to crash. The system must be 
restarted manually to clear the condition.”328 
The ICS-CERT advisory recommended that BPS companies 
install the update and take additional precautions.329 In addition to 
that late August 2013 advisory, ICS-CERT issued, on October 21, 
2013, a similar advisory concerning DNP3 made by a different 
vendor.330 The advisory recommended the same precautions—plus 
an additional mitigation: “Block DNP3 traffic from traversing onto 
business or corporate networks through the use of an IPS or 
firewall with DPN3-specific rule sets.”331 
In substance, these advisories caution that BPS companies may 
have such software—and the embedded defects—resident on their 
control systems. This makes their operations vulnerable to a cyber 
adversary seeking to take over the company’s operational system. If 
successful, that exploit could provide a good foundation for an 
attack directly against the company’s equipment and operations. It 
is unclear whether the EO’s direction for creation of the 
Framework will address such vulnerabilities. Equally important, the 
existence of these vulnerabilities evidences the enhanced 
probability that a cyber adversary could launch an attack against a 
BPS company that could cause a Severe Event. Counsel will want to 
bring these and similar advisories to the attention of boards and 
management, not for discussion of the technical details, but to 
ensure that the technical staff of the company will promptly install 
the corrective updates or “patches.” Such vulnerabilities 
 
 327.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 328.  Advisory, ICS-CERT, supra note 75. 
 329.  Id. 
 330.  Advisory, ICS-CERT, Alstom e-Terracontrol DNP3 Master Improper 
Input Validation (Update A) (rev. Dec. 17, 2013), http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov 
/advisories/ICSA-13-282-01A. 
 331.  Id. 
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demonstrate the extent to which the cybersecurity posture of a BPS 
company is becoming increasingly messy and murky. Furthermore, 
the discovery of these vulnerabilities, and the reactive nature of 
ICS-CERT’s response, suggests strongly that prudent critical 
infrastructure owners and operators cannot wait for the next ICS-
CERT alert. BPS companies need to be ever vigilant and proactively 
testing systems for vulnerabilities. 
3. Closing Observations 
We have argued throughout this article that it would be 
prudent for counsel to advise owners and operators of critical 
infrastructure to give serious consideration to placing their highest 
and most urgent priority attention on managing Severe Events and 
the consequences that arise throughout the following New Normal 
period.332 In giving such advice, however, counsel might also find it 
prudent to recommend that owners and operators of BPS 
companies treat the threats as serious and potentially imminent, 
because once they prove to be, it will be too late to make the 
necessary preparations. 
Lastly, counsel may also find it wise to recommend that as 
owners and operators of BPS companies prepare to manage 
“electric islands” and archipelagos of isolated services, with the 
requisite stabilizing use of scheduled “load shedding” and rolling 
outages, they should be working closely with other critical 
infrastructure as much as possible rather than in isolation as if they 
could spare themselves without making sure that they protected 
others. This recommendation is based on the assumption that 
progress in improving cyber defenses continues to fall ever further 
behind the progress being made in improving cyber weaponry and 
attack sophistication. As a result, attacks can be designed to be far 
better coordinated than the defenses and responses to an attack once 
it is detected. Moreover, many intrusions are so stealthy that they 
remain undetected for months. And even then, their mode of 
operations and objectives may elude the operators and owners of 
 
 332.  We strongly recommend that BPS operators and their counsel carefully 
review the SIRTF and CATF Reports, as both documents are unmatched in their 
extensive detail and the work product resulting from extensive industry 
collaboration on these task forces proves extremely useful. See CATF REPORT, supra 
note 13; SIRTF REPORT, supra note 13. 
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the targeted companies.333 As a DHS paper noted, commenting on 
the imbalance between the formal modes of sophisticated 
(advanced persistent threat) attacks and the ad hoc defenses 
currently relied upon for protection: “Cyber defense today is 
founded on ad hoc, manual processes; yet cyber attacks often follow 
a well known, systematic escalation path beginning with 
reconnaissance activities and extending to gaining entry, 
establishing persistence, setting up external communications 
pathways, and conducting attack operations.”334 
In preparing for such conversations in which some added 
perspective is always useful to avoid an overly technical and 
complex approach, counsel might even find it worth considering 
the need for BPS boards and management to take care to include 
consideration of the interconnectedness of the BPS company’s 
operations with those of other critical infrastructure—and the need 
for readiness should a Severe Event occur as a result of a 
coordinated cyber attack against the company.335 We offer in 
 
 333.  The stealth and delay in detection partially explain why “hackers are able 
to sell previously unknown software vulnerabilities, known as ‘zero days’ because of 
the time between discovery and the first attack, for six-figure sums . . . .“ Chris 
Bryant, Rethink on ‘Zero-Day’ Attacks Raises Cyber Hackles, FIN. TIMES (London), 
January 15, 2014, at 4. Moreover, the National Security Agency appears to have 
gone a step further because it reportedly “has implanted software in nearly 
100,000 computers around the world that allows the United States to conduct 
surveillance on those machines and can also create a digital high-way for 
launching cyberattacks.” David E. Sanger & Thom Shanker, N.S.A. Devises Radio 
Pathway into Computers—Reaching Targets Cut Off from Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 
2014, at A1, available at 2014 WLNR 1172743. It has done this even to computers 
not connected to the Internet. Id.  
The technology, which the agency has used since at least 2008, relies 
on a covert channel of radio waves that can be transmitted from tiny 
circuit boards and USB cards inserted surreptitiously into the 
computers. In some cases, they are sent to a briefcase-size relay station 
that intelligence agencies can set up miles away from the target.  
Id. 
 334.  ENABLING DISTRIBUTED SECURITY IN CYBERSPACE 6 (2011), available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nppd-cyber-ecosystem-white-paper-03-23-2011 
.pdf.  
 335.  In this regard, the SIRTF Report recommends anticipating the needs of 
those who depend on the BPS company owners and operators to keep them 
apprised of the status throughout the New Normal period: 
Throughout the New Normal period, people will need to understand 
how restoration is proceeding so they can make their own decisions to 
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closing expressions of those themes in passages from two writers. 
First, consider the lines from John Donne’s Devotions Upon Emergent 
Occasions, Meditation XVII, where he memorably wrote a caution for 
his congregants that owners and operators of BPS companies might 
find it in their best interest to heed: 
No man is an Iland, intire of it selfe; every man is a peece 
of the Continent, a part of the maine; if a Clod bee washed 
away by the Sea, Europe is the lesse, as well as if a 
Promontorie were, as well as if a Mannor of thy friends or of 
thine owne were; any mans death diminishes me, because I 
am involved in Mankinde; And therefore never send to 
know for whom the bell tolls; It tolls for thee.336 
Second, consider the observations of Shakespeare’s Hamlet 
who broods about the inevitable arrival of certain momentous 
events and the need, when such times come, to be ready: “There is 
special providence in the fall of a sparrow. If it be now, ‘tis not to 
come—if it be not to come, it will be now—if it be not now, yet it 
will come—the readiness is all.”337 
Boards and management of critical infrastructure companies 
know well the need for “readiness.” However, it will fall to their 
counsel to bring to their attention that, amidst the multiplicity of 
identified cyber threats and applicable standards and 
recommendations, the best course continues to be to focus on the 
worst-case scenario of Severe Events and the prolonged New 
Normal periods of degraded operations. A company’s handling of 
those will remain its most challenging test and the one by which its 
customers, regulators, and other critical infrastructure owners and 
operators will ultimately judge it to have acted responsibly or 
otherwise. In this era of new corporate cyber responsibilities, we 
 
care for themselves, their family, and their community. If there is 
limited information available from media outlets, entities could 
consider posting important information (e.g., rotating blackout 
schedules) at government offices such as police stations or post offices 
and at locations where people will congregate (e.g., food and water 
delivery points). 
SIRTF REPORT, supra note 13, at 44. 
 336.  John Donne, Devotions Upon Emergent Occasions, Meditation XVII, in THE 
COMPLETE POETRY AND SELECTED PROSE OF JOHN DONNE 445, 446 (Charles M. Coffin 
ed., 2001) (emphasis in original). 
 337.  WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK act 5, 
sc. 2. 
135
Trope and Humes: Before Rolling Blackouts Begin: Briefing Boards on Cyber Attacks
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2014
 
782 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:2 
believe that focus will best protect a critical infrastructure company 
and help assure a board and management that they are fulfilling 
their fiduciary duties for the enterprise and its cybersecurity. 
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